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 ABSTRACT 
Michelle Amy Cohen: Delving into the Ruins: The AMIA Bombing, the Struggle for Justice, 
and the Negotiation of Jewish Belonging in Argentina 
(Under the direction of Marisol de la Cadena, Advisor, and Dorothy Holland, Chair) 
This work is an anthropological study of the political and social effects of the 1994 
bombing of an important local institution in Buenos Aires, Argentina.  This institution, known 
as the AMIA, was and continues to be a center for Jewish life in Argentina, housing a burial 
society, archives, and the offices of the DAIA, (Delegación de Asociaciones Israelitas 
Argentinas), along with many other offices and programs.  Eighty-five individuals were killed 
in the attack, and hundreds were injured.  Fifteen years later suspected perpetrators of the 
bombing have yet to be tried in Argentine courts.  The attack, in addition to terrorizing the 
Jewish Argentine community and residents of Buenos Aires, raised important questions 
about the functioning of Argentina’s democracy, human rights, and the belonging of Jewish 
Argentine citizens.  Immediately after the bombing, state officials, commentators, and 
everyday citizens contributed to a discourse in which the Jewish victims were separated 
from Argentine or “innocent” victims, despite the fact that the majority of those killed, Jewish 
and non-Jewish, were Argentine citizens.  Concordantly, the bombing was treated by certain 
state actors as a narrowly defined “Jewish problem,” rather than an attack on the nation-
state.  This dissertation shows historically and ethnographically how Jewish Argentine 
citizens and the bombing itself could be viewed in such terms, and what this reveals about 
politics and difference in Argentina.   
I illustrate how many family members of the victims, along with other social actors, 
have defied the view that the AMIA bombing isn’t a national concern, and the idea that its 
intended targets—Jews—are ambiguously Argentine.  I show how the social movement 
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  Memoria Activa, in particular, has worked to place the bombing squarely within the confines 
of the nation, arguing that in doing so they are challenging and reshaping dominant notions 
of Jewishness and politics in the process.  Ultimately, I demonstrate that for Memoria Activa 
and other social actors, the bombing is less a “Jewish issue” than a highlighting of a politics 
of impunity and forgetting that many see as endemic to state and local politics. 
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 Dedicated to those who lost their lives in the bombing of the AMIA, and to those who 
continue the struggle for justice. 
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Prologue: A City 
The city, however, does not tell its past, but contains it like the lines of a hand, 
written in the corners of the streets, the gratings of the windows, the banisters of the 
steps, the antennae of the lightening rods, the poles of the flags, every segment 
marked in turn with scratches, indentations, scrolls—Italo Calvino, Invisible Cities.  
 
We are here.  Together.  In Buenos Aires, a city that once mentioned can bring a 
nostalgic gaze to a person’s eyes—Tango! Beef! Wine! Gauchos! The Paris of South 
America!  Or it can elicit a shudder and a look of disappointment and sadness.  Most often—
if talking to someone from this place—the reaction is likely to be a combination of both, and 
the city will not disappoint in its seductions and terrors.  Situated along a wide, dun colored 
estuary known as the Río de la Plata, Buenos Aires spreads out into the Pampas, gesturing 
toward the geographical center of the nation, surging to define its figurative heart.  
The city will tempt you.  It will lure you with the grainy, sadness-tinged voice of tango 
singer Carlos Gardel, easing out into the air from buildings as dusk approaches, the streets 
and cafes filled with smoking and talking porteños.  All night long tango sessions—
milongas—offer the chance of a hidden life behind seemingly non-descript stone walls. The 
city will entice you with its numerous parrillas, the smell of charring meat lending itself to a 
craving.  It will offer you luxury: the wide boulevards and buildings Parisian and ornate, with 
glittering shops filled with soft leather goods and expensive clothing from the country’s top 
designers.  You may amble by the colossal and lovely Teatro Colon, filled to standing, as 
Daniel Berenboim plays Bach’s Brandenberg Concertos.  Or you may choose to stroll 
through one of its lovely parks, and perhaps take in some art and a bite at the recently built 
Museo de Arte Latinoamericano de Buenos Aires, or MALBA, a modern structure seemingly
 
  built out of light itself.   But the city will also present to you, if you care to see, shantytowns, 
or villas, sitting abreast to some of the wealthiest areas of the city.  Toward dusk there will 
be small armies of children and adults collecting recyclable goods from the garbage.  
Turning the corner of a busy intersection you may find an archeological site, a place where 
people were secretly held and tortured during the “Dirty War.”  Here, silhouettes will be 
painted into the concrete and signs will proclaim Nunca Más (Never Again!) and Basta a la 
Impunidad (Enough impunity)!  Heading into one of the many enormous plazas, you could 
find yourself in the middle of a protest, signs flickering in the wind, or simply surrounded by 
old men on benches feeding flocks of sooty pigeons.  Trying to cross the street you find 
yourself facing men, women and children who have set up a roadblock with tires, piqueteros 
who frequently have come from the provinces to the center of Buenos Aires to use their 
bodies to reorient the city, its traffic, its priorities, and demand to be heard.  Like many other 
struggles that dot the city landscape, they have come to stake a claim, to create something 
on their own terms—whether it be about food, job security, justice, or some other right they 
see being violated or not recognized.  You might turn another corner and find a non-descript 
building with concrete barricades in front and security guards, a mezuzah sitting quietly on 
the doorframe.  The city does not reveal all at first glance.   
Still, here we are!  Please, come.  Sit down.  Even at this workday hour, late 
morning, the corner café is filled with chatter and clinking cups.  I have brought you to a 
busy cafe where the streets Talcahuano and Tucumán meet.  From here we have a good 
view of the grey stone of the Justice building and the open space of the Plaza.  Lawyers, 
judges and others who work in the legal profession intently discuss their business and lives.  
The waiter comes over, somber and professional, to take our orders.  What would 
you like? Café con leche?  I order a lágrima, a tiny cup of steamed milk with a “teardrop” of 
espresso darkening its center.  Our waiter returns shortly with a tray filled with our hot drinks 
and small glasses of sparkling water.  Three delicate cookies sit on a plate that land 
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between us.  With our steaming cups beside us, you look at me.  I look back, look away, 
hesitate.  I need to begin. 
I am unsure as to how to shorten the gulf that must be breached in order to share 
these stories.  I’ll tell you what I’ve learned, but much still remains to be captured as 
knowledge.  There is the issue of feeling and of order and sense.  This may take a while.  
You turn away, and we both become aware of some movement outside. 
A flash of something by the window.  You are distracted.  I gaze over to where you 
are looking.  Off in the Plaza Lavalle, in front of the Palm tree, people are gathering.  
Someone begins to speak in a microphone, although from here it is impossible to hear what 
is being said.  Suddenly an uncanny sound lifts into the air, the sound of a horn being blown, 
a sound of convocation, or of warning.  No, perhaps it is the sound of grief.  A white banner 
with black letters flaps about.  People walk by this group, some stop and listen for a minute, 
most don’t pause.  Gently I bring you back to my attention.  Listen, I say, these people are 
here every Monday… 
You turn back to me and I start talking.  We finish our coffees.  I’ve only begun to 
speak.  But still, there is the distraction outside, people shouting, something’s happening.  
Finally I turn to you and say, “Alright. Let’s go.  Let’s go out and meet them.” And so we 
gather our things and weave our way through the smoky labyrinth of tables to the door and 
step out.  We head towards the crowd gathered in front of the Judicial palace.
   
I.Introduction: The Politics of Belonging, The Political Life 
of Bombs 
 
Once 
The bus ride from the Palermo neighborhood of Buenos Aires to the area known as 
Once, only takes about 15 minutes.  Sitting on the relatively quiet early-evening bus, I gaze 
out of the smudged window and watch, drowsily, the activity of the streets.  As we get closer 
to Once—a busy, merchant and vendor filled neighborhood that earlier in the 20th century 
was predominately populated with Jewish immigrants—the streets become more crowded 
and slightly more unkempt.  Diesel fumes billowing out of the cantankerous vehicle, we 
speed by kosher markets and bakeries, hardware stores, synagogues and apartment 
buildings.  A group of Orthodox Jewish men in black suits with paisim (side locks) speak 
quietly but urgently as they walk briskly down the street.  An old man with visible stubble on 
his cheek slowly walks his equally arthritic dog.  As the light fades to a plum-hued glow, fruit 
sellers prepare their stalls for the last sales of the day and begin to clean up.  Groups of 
carteneros—organized residents that sift through garbage to collect all that is potentially 
recyclable—work silently and expertly, dropping cardboard and paper into their large oil-
cloth bags.   
I have taken this route many times, the sights part of my weekly routine, and yet 
something indefinable always shifts inside me when I get closer to my destination, Pasteur 
street, named, I assume, after the famous French physician.  The feeling that rises through 
me in this part of the city is similar to what happens when I cross the infamous Plaza de 
Mayo—over its hundreds of years, a place of so much repression, violence, protest, and 
 
 solidarity, promise.  Or when I gaze over to the neatly manicured bucolic grounds of the 
Escuela Superior de Mecánica de la Armada (widely known as ESMA—a navy mechanics 
training school), where so many were tortured and ultimately disappeared during the years 
of the last military dictatorship.  These sites, Pasteur Street, Plaza de Mayo, ESMA, are 
charged with contradiction, their meanings discursive battle scenes punctuated with blood. 
As we get nearer to the intersection of Pasteur and Viamonte, I signal the driver to 
stop.  Jumping from the bus, my feet tap the pitted city sidewalk, and as I approach my 
destination, the memory of the famous French man is eclipsed by the destruction that 
happened on this street (then) 10 years previous.  Indeed, the street Pasteur now carries 
two signs, one that simply says “Pasteur” and another, placed on top of it, which states: “In 
memory of the victims of the AMIA bombing, July 18, 1994.”   
On the morning of the bombing, at 9:53 AM, the street is rumbling with activity.  The 
nearby café is bustling with wait staff serving cortados in small white espresso cups and dry, 
toasted triangles of white bread.  There is already a line for the job center at the AMIA, and 
many are at their desks in the various floors of the building.  People walk outside the 
institution, casually, just going from one place to another.  Sometime before or at 9:53 a 
white Renault van pulls up in front of the building and explodes, sending many tons of 
explosives into the black marble façade.  Several moments later, the front half of the 
building lay in a crumpled heap.  The appalling informal nature of risk. 
I walk towards the AMIA, re-built in 1999, nothing like a ruin and yet evocative of the 
tragedy: the new building itself a place and act of commemoration.  The new edifice is much 
grander than the previous one.  Constructed with the financial help of the Argentine 
government, it sits away from the street, protected by cement block sentinels and security 
that rivals a post 9-11 airport security check.  Since the bombing of the AMIA, nearly all 
buildings affiliated with Jewish life, from synagogues to social clubs, museums, and political 
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 and international organizations, bear the marks of security and surveillance.1  Identification 
is checked, questions are asked and bags are searched before walking through a metal 
detector.  The cement barriers and uncompromising security guards function literally and 
symbolically as a border, delineating “Jewish” spaces from “non-Jewish” ones.   
Lest the shiny new building completely belie its bloody past, the front of the building 
is covered with a black board that has the spray-painted names of the 85 dead.  Andrea, 
Alberto, Silvia, Kuky, Cynthia, Erwin… The presentation is informal but deliberate, like the 
writing of children marking their names in soft cement.  Little tree monuments with plaques 
to the dead line the street.  People have used the small, enclosed squares of these 
memorials as refuge for their garbage, making small sanctuaries of paper and soda cans—
more out of indifference than maliciousness, I would guess.   
The AMIA Bombing, Jewish Belonging, and Struggles for Justice 
 On an otherwise unremarkable winter morning in July of 1994, powerful explosives 
tore through the Jewish Argentine building known as the AMIA (Asociación Mutual Israelita 
Argentina), leaving 85 dead and hundreds wounded.  It was the second of two bombings 
targeting Jews in Buenos Aires, the first being an attack two years earlier on the Israeli 
embassy.  Unlike the Israeli embassy, the AMIA building and the organizations it held, from 
the social outreach programs of the AMIA to the political negotiations of the DAIA 
(Delegación de Asociaciones Israelitas Argentinas), were less ambiguously Argentine 
institutions, although founded to meet the needs of a small minority population.  Many 
describe the AMIA building and the institutions it housed as the political and social center of 
Jewish-Argentine life, and its destruction was a powerful physical and symbolic message to 
the community.  It resurrected difficult memories that many Jews have embodied and 
                                                     
1In Buenos Aires, the only Jewish affiliated building to my knowledge that didn’t have any cement barriers was 
the Fundación Pardés synagogue.  Officiated by the progressive rabbi Baruj Plavnick, I asked him why there 
were no security barriers out front.  He responded that he didn’t want to turn the synagogue into a kind of marked 
ghetto, and mentioned that he would put barriers in front when all the churches did as well.  
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 transmitted through the generations, surfacing feelings of fear and vulnerability and 
questioning the possibility of calling Argentina home.  It also collided with recent memories 
of the violence that accompanied the last military dictatorship, and raised serious questions 
about Argentina’s still nascent democracy.  
As many were busy with the logistics of sorting through the physical remains of the 
bombing—gathering stone and sinew, rescuing and healing the survivors, and collecting 
evidence—Argentines and porteños (residents of Buenos Aires) in particular, struggled to 
make sense of the destruction.  In reference to the bombing two years earlier, newspapers 
and magazines ran with the headline Again!  The recurrence of such a shocking violent 
event in the absence of war or the intense internal strife that proceeded and endured during 
the last military dictatorship, seemed almost unbelievable: a sinister illusion.  But of course, 
it wasn’t an illusion. 
Almost immediately, the attack was made intelligible as an act of international 
terrorism, perpetrated by terrorist cells based in or flowing through the tri-border region (an 
area where Argentina, Brazil, and Paraguay share a border), with operational directives and 
financial backing coming from the Middle East, probably Syria and Iran.2  As time passed, 
however, for many of the family members of the victims, or familiares, the bombing and its 
aftermath, while understood as an event with transnational connections, became thoroughly 
imprinted with historically specific understandings of justice, democracy, corruption, and in 
particular, impunidad (impunity).  The bombing has also served as a kind of test of the limits 
of belonging, and an intensification of the cultural politics of citizenship, explicitly in this case 
concerning Jewish-Argentines.   
In many circles, the AMIA bombing largely ceased to be simply about “Jews,” or Mid-
East politics, or terrorism.  It was about Argentina: the very functioning of the state, the 
                                                     
2The tri-border area is often described in the media as “lawless” with borders relatively fluid, facilitating the illegal 
movement of bodies and goods.  
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 nature of its democracy, the contradictions of its national imaginaries, the presence and 
legitimacy of its Jewish citizens.  At the time of this writing (spring 2009), the Argentine state 
and its judicial system has failed to bring any of the suspected perpetrators or accessories 
to either bombing to justice. 
The attack on the AMIA forms a network through which various people, objects and 
ideas have flowed into and radiated out—akin, perhaps, to a neuron with its arbor of 
dendrites.  My particular focus within this network concerns the following actors: Jewish-
Argentine citizens and institutions, the Argentine state, and the social movements and 
organizations that have mobilized around the AMIA bombing, in particular, Memoria Activa.  
In an effort to capture some of the generalized representations or commonly referenced 
understandings of the bombing, “the state,” and “Jews,” I also track Argentine media 
sources, and some state-authored texts.  
The AMIA bombing ruptured bodies, lives, buildings, and streets, but it also disrupted 
and opened up certain discursive fields about the “nation,” “the state,” “citizenship,” and 
“Jewishness.”  As I expand upon in the chapters that follow, the victims of the bombing were 
marked by semantic instability—to some the victims were Argentines who were Jewish, 
others positioned the victims as “Jews,” shorn from their nationality (or given a surrogate 
nationality through an assumed primary affiliation with Israel, and the assumption that Israel 
was “responsible” for Jews worldwide).  Sometimes those caught in the bombing were 
separated into “innocent victims” and “Jewish victims,” prompting many to wonder if Jewish-
Argentines were themselves to blame for the attack.  This kind of positioning and claiming of 
the victims occurred in the media and by the state, among Jewish and non-Jewish-
Argentines.  It seems that despite the many generations of Jews that have made their lives 
in Argentina, Jewish citizenship and belonging was less certain than Argentines of Spanish 
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 or Italian descent.3  The crisis of the AMIA bombing inflamed and made overtly visible this 
ambiguity.  This ambiguity, however, does not mean that Jews essentially don’t “belong” in 
Argentina, but that this belonging is repeatedly disrupted and questioned.  
This work engages the following questions: How is it that Jewishness in Argentina, 
and by extension, Jewish citizenship and belonging, came to be a site of ambiguity, even 
suspicion?  How has the AMIA bombing, and the events and mobilizations following it, 
created a public sphere through which tensions about the Argentine state and citizen-
subject, as well as Jewishness, are actively negotiated?  How has the grassroots social 
movement Memoria Activa enacted a kind of counter-Jewish subject that challenges 
dominant constructions of Jewishness in ways that create new possibilities for the political 
and social in Argentina?  
In what follows is a discussion of the construction of the “field” of this work: the 
actors, situations, and journey from proposal to project; the theoretical frameworks that have 
helped me to amplify and understand some of the issues most constitutive of this field; and 
a brief introduction to the chapters. 
The Making of the “Field” 
Exploring the possibilities and limitations of the idea of “the field” thus carries with it 
the opportunity—or depending on one’s point of view, the risk—of opening to 
question the meaning of our own professional and intellectual identities as 
anthropologists. –Akhil Gupta and James Ferguson, Anthropological Locations 
(1997) 
 
Monday, January 5, 2004. Plaza Lavalle, Buenos Aires. 9:45 AM.4  It’s a warm, 
humid summer’s day with a subtle rainfall that coats us, the pedestrians, with a refreshing 
                                                     
3I am not arguing for Jewish exceptionalism here.  Argentines, and more broadly, Latin Americans, of Muslim, 
Middle Eastern or Asian descent struggle with many of the same ambiguities and hierarchies of citizenship as 
Jews.  Furthermore, Argentines of Spanish and Italian descent may belong with less certainty based on their 
sexual preference, class, etc.  See below. 
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 mist.  I am nervous and apprehensive, as this morning will be my first real introduction to 
Memoria Activa.  But I need to do this, so despite the rain and anxiety I walk on.  I approach 
the western side of the plaza where Memoria Activa gathers, directly across from the 
immense presence of the Tribunales building.  Despite its size and grandeur—meant to 
inspire confidence in the workings of justice, I suppose—its relation to “justice” was 
disputed: stamped on the walls of the judicial palace and on the sidewalks was the word 
“impunidad.”  Impunity.  Even in my short time in Buenos Aires, this word has already 
become familiar to me.  
Apparently I am the first to arrive at the Plaza—there’s nobody else here.  Doubt 
begins to work its way through my body—is this even the right place?  What am I doing 
here, standing alone in the rain?  I don’t feel like I’m doing fieldwork.  I feel like a lost tourist.  
Finally an old man with white hair and an umbrella slowly walks towards the area.  He stops 
and seems to wait.  Is he here for the acto?  Feeling slightly ridiculous, I walk over to the 
man and ask him if we are in Plaza Lavalle.  I’m sure it is the correct plaza, but this question 
seems an easy way to begin a conversation.  He confirms that we are indeed standing in the 
Plaza Lavalle, and I proceed to ask him if he’s part of Memoria Activa.  He is.  This man is 
animated and friendly, and with him I begin to relax.  As other people begin to trickle into the 
vicinity, we talk about what I am doing here, at the plaza.  I struggle to explain this.  
Suddenly the plan I prepared in my research proposal seems flat, empty, mere shadows.  
To reduce my presence to research feels disrespectful somehow, and inaccurate.  Yet, in 
my agitation it is the only thing that comes to mind.  I give a rather vague explanation that I 
am an anthropologist researching the AMIA bombing and Memoria Activa’s struggle for 
justice.  He seems satisfied with this accurate, but in my mind, flat representation.  Caressed 
                                                                                                                                                                    
4For ten years, beginning the Monday a week after the bombing in 1994 to the end of December in 2004, 
Memoria Activa engaged in a weekly protest in front of the Supreme Court building in the Plaza Lavalle.  The 
acto began at 9:53, the time at which the AMIA building was blown up by a car bomb. A more detailed history of 
Memoria Activa is provided in Chapter four.  
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 by the light drizzle, this older gentlemen takes me around and introduces me to everyone 
there.  Most are not surprised to see a relatively young, North American female researcher 
in their midst, as Memoria Activa has become internationally known and the AMIA bombing 
already the subject of other dissertations and papers.5  Thus I don’t have to say much for 
people to accept my presence and have a general understanding of my purpose.  As we’ve 
talked a white banner with the words, “Todos Somos Memoria Activa” (We are all Memoria 
Activa) is strung up.  
 I notice that almost all the people here are past middle age, probably over 60.  I 
suppose that many of the younger people are busy with school, work, or raising children, 
and coming to the plaza every Monday is not practical endeavor.  Before the actual event 
begins, I am given a newspaper called “Mundo Israelita” (Jewish World) and a couple of 
photocopied sheets of paper with information about the “CTA”—a kind of worker’s union.  
People stand around in small groups, talking, with not much interaction between them.  
 In front of a large palm tree are two large cameras and a microphone.  At 9:53, the 
time of the bombing, a man with shoulder-length curly hair begins to speak, and he 
mentions the number of days since the bombings of the AMIA and the Israeli Embassy, as 
well as other victims of impunity.  Although for the most part people have greeted me with 
warmth and interest, I feel quite out of place, and I stand a little apart.  I don’t take out a 
notebook or recorder—to document would feel like I was taking something that I had no 
legitimate claim to.  A shofar (ceremonial ram’s horn) is blown, a rather incongruous sound 
in a bustling city street.  I am unused to hearing the shofar blown in the street, as I’ve 
                                                     
5Other researchers before me include two other North American female scholars, Annette Prekker Levine, a 
modern languages scholar specializing in Argentine literature, and Natasha Zaretsky, a fellow anthropologist.  
Physically joining me in the field later in 2004 was Karen Faulk, another anthropologist.  See Annette Prekker 
(2000) “Memoria y Justicia: Separate Places for Separate Spaces,” Modernity 2, 
www.eiu.edu/~modernity/prekker.html and Natasha Zaretsky (2008) “Singing for Social Change: Nostalgic 
Memory and the Struggle for Belonging in a Buenos Aires Yiddish Chorus” in Rethinking Jewish-Latin 
Americans. Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press.  In addition, Susana Wappenstein, a sociologist, also 
wrote about Memoria Activa in her 2001 paper, Mnemonic Struggles: Nation, Human Rights, and Remembrance 
in Argentina, presented at the XXII International Congress of the Latin American Studies Association, 
Washington D.C..  
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 previously only experienced its arresting sounds as an indoor and rather communally 
specific sound affiliated with certain times in the Jewish year.  To hear the sound of the 
shofar blown on the streets of Buenos Aires is a significant marker of specificity and 
difference.   
As I learned while doing preliminary research, Memoria Activa invites speakers from 
a broad section of society to speak every Monday.  Today, a journalist is welcomed to the 
microphone, and she offers her withering analysis of the investigation into the AMIA attacks 
thus far.  The acto concludes with three calls for justice, one each for the victims of the two 
bombings, and one for the disappeared of the last military dictatorship.  Facing Tribunales, 
everyone raises their arms in solidarity and shouts “justicia” (justice).6  Feeling awkward, I 
do not join this public, communal reclamation.  In what ways are these demands for justice 
my own?  Was I here in solidarity with Memoria Activa, or as an empathetic listener—and 
how might this complicate my position as a researcher?  The claims of these people do not 
yet inhabit me.  Do I want them to?  
There’s no time to ponder my ambivalent feelings.  Before stepping away from the 
microphone the curly-haired man recites a line from Deuteronomy, “justicia, justicia, 
Perseguiras” (justice, justice you shall seek), and the group begins to break up.  Two 
different members of Memoria Activa offer to take me to coffee, and I am flustered at what to 
do.  But these men, having attended the actos together for many years are already engaged 
in their own social negotiations, and I barely say a word before the decision is made.  It 
seems that we will not all have coffee together, and as we walk off, I mention to the man 
remaining that I will go with him next week.  
                                                     
6As I was to find out, these calls for justice vary somewhat from week to week.  They always include the victims 
of the AMIA and Israeli Embassy bombings and the disappeared of the “dirty war.”  Sometimes calls for justice 
are added depending on what is currently happening or being commemorated in Argentina, such as kidnappings, 
or the assassination of the journalist José Luis Cabezas in 1997.  
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 And thus begins a year with Memoria Activa, and a tradition of two coffee dates, one 
after another, every Monday.  These regular coffee meetings helped to transform me from 
an “anthropologist” studying “something” to a friend and legitimate participant in this 
particular social field.  This process took many hours and days, incrementally and in a non-
linear fashion, until finally I felt like Memoria Activa and Buenos Aires had a claim on me.  
The “field” ceased to exist in a particular location, out there, but acquired substance and 
relevance through relationships, through us.  I was caught. 
I arrived in Buenos Aires late in the year 2003 suited and armed with an array of 
maps and technologies: my dissertation proposal, books on social theory, recording 
equipment, and the memory of countless anxious conversations with professors and other 
students.  Years of thinking and mulling over—writing—had gone into crafting a project that 
was now ensconced safely and neatly on paper.  But the proposal turned out to be less than 
a rudimentary map, not much more than points on a page: something is supposed to be 
here, but there are no coordinates or street names, and one has little idea where or how to 
find it.  Abstracted from the social messiness of life, the project on paper only made sense in 
the quiet and solitariness of my own home.  Outside, walking the streets of Buenos Aires, 
the pages fluttered and flew away.  I needed and continue to need others as guides and 
teachers, and this has necessarily redefined what I previously understood about the “field.” 
I consider “fieldwork” to be a process by which the original “project” becomes 
displaced, re-oriented and impinged upon by the people, events, feelings and knowledges 
engaged in the “field.”  This marks the field as active, rather than a passive construction of 
my (hopefully well-informed) imagination.  It means that actors in the field become partners 
in the creation of the meanings, categories, and knowledges that are presented in this 
writing.  Their knowledge becomes counsel, rather than mere information (Simon 2005).  
The field, then, has been created through my dialogues, engagements and experiences with 
friends, acquaintances, and other scholars situated in Buenos Aires, but also comes into 
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 being through classrooms in North Carolina, discussions with friends and faculty, 
engagements with books and ideas.  The field is in many senses intensely specific, yet its 
creation is also dialogic and complex, yielding potentially new understandings and 
categories for thought.  
Acknowledging this co-production of the field does not mean that “I” have 
disappeared or that everything I say is “given” to me by my field partners.  It means that this 
text represents an engagement at multiple levels, in places as diverse as Buenos Aires, 
Chapel Hill, Chicago, classrooms, streets, plazas, homes.  The field has many authors.  I no 
more “own” this field than those others (people and objects) that work to constitute it, 
although I take full responsibility for this particular telling.  This ethnography is a particular 
iteration, and is not meant to stand in for the field itself. 
 This field, then, is not just a place out there, a point on a map to journey to, but it 
exists through people, through relationships, both animate and inanimate, and thus is not 
located in one place, separate from the relations that mark it.  Because these relations exist, 
in part, through me and inhabit this work, I want to complicate the bifurcation between 
“home” and “field,” and consequently between “observer” and “observed.”  Gupta and 
Ferguson (1997:12-15) have explored and questioned these distinctions that have largely 
depended upon on a spatial and temporal separation with certain epistemological 
consequences.  While it is true that I no longer physically dwell in the particular location 
engaged in this writing, my notions and experience of “home” and “field” have been 
significantly transformed through the process of fieldwork.  Both “home” and “field” and “field 
notes” and “ethnography” have become more muddled and intertwined than the (now 
perhaps significantly destabilized) sanitized ideal might suggest.   
 In what follows I provide some orientation notes on the becoming of this field, 
particularly through people and situations in Argentina; the next section will look at some of 
the theoretical signposts. 
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 Family Members of the Victims, and the “Jewish Community” 
Although I have opened up the concept of the “field” above, I do not mean to 
diminish the “location” of this work, nor the lives of the people who have had a critical role in 
shaping it.  The principle substance of this dissertation took place at protests and talks, 
homes and plazas, confiterías and institutions, through formal interviews and less formal 
dialogues.  As I became a part of the field itself, I spent many hours discussing the AMIA 
bombing, impunity and justice, the state, Jewish life in Argentina and democracy with friends 
and acquaintances.  People shared thoughts about how Argentina might become a better 
place, socially, economically, and politically, and how a “culture of impunity” affects everyday 
life.  We explored what it meant to be Jewish and Argentine and how these identifications 
often exist uneasily, and yet inflect and intertwine with each other to the point where they 
can’t be cleanly separated.  Family members of the victims patiently and gracefully talked 
about the person or people they lost in the bombing.  These serious conversations were 
coupled with laughter about the latest comedy in the cinema, the merits of a particular play, 
the everyday concerns of family and friendship.  
Questions were also asked of me.  Where did I grow up?  Why didn’t I have kids? 
Am I going to attend the acto tomorrow night?  What do I think about what so-and-so said?  
Do I like Buenos Aires?  Could I please explain how the people of the United States could 
elect George. W. Bush again?  (I tried my best with this one, but I too was at a bit of a loss 
as to how this could have happened.)   
Who were these people I spent my days with?  Many of them were members of 
Memoria Activa.  Most of them identified as culturally Jewish to varying degrees (few were 
religious).  Some were familiares (family members) of the victims, who were part of Memoria 
Activa or the two other familiares groups, Familiares y Amigos de las Víctimas, and APEMIA 
(Agrupación por el Esclarecimiento de la Masacre Impune de la AMIA, Association for the 
Unpunished Massacre of the AMIA Bombing).  Others were persons very active from a 
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 position of Jewishness in Argentine human rights movements such as Las Madres de la 
Plaza de Mayo—Linea Fundadora, or the journalist Herman Schiller who founded the group 
Movimiento Judío por Derechos Humanos (Jewish Movement for Human Rights) along with 
the North American rabbi, Marshall Meyer, during the last military dictatorship.7  In sum, 
most of my time was spent directly with those most affected by the attack on the AMIA and 
involved in the struggle for justice for this event and other violations of human rights.  The 
majority of those I worked with either explicitly identified as Jews, or became “caught” as 
Jews through the AMIA attack—those who considered their Jewishness primarily an 
historical fact effectively became a Jewish subject by virtue of the bombing.  However, while 
it can be said that I engaged with the “Argentine Jewish Community,” this needs to be 
complicated in light of the divisions that formally emerged after the AMIA was attacked.  
Jewish Argentines generally refer to themselves and fellow Jews as a “community,” 
or colectividad.  This community is conceived as nationally located, but in a diasporic 
manner, also transgresses national borders.  Depending on context, the “community” can 
mean someone who claims to be Jewish, wherever he or she lives.  Thus, an important 
aspect of my access into Jewish institutions concerned not only who I knew, but who I was.  
Inevitably, when approaching a security guard in front of the AMIA and handing over my 
U.S. passport, I would be asked, “sos de la colectividad?” –basically, are you Jewish?  I 
don’t mean to imply that non-Jews wouldn’t gain access—my friend and fellow 
anthropologist Karen went in and out of the AMIA probably as much as I did—but I want to 
                                                     
7I emphasize their involvement as Jews because these individuals separated themselves out in this way.  For 
many of the Jewish madres, this separate identification, even as they fought for human rights for the whole 
society, articulated with their memories, experiences, and identifications with times of Jewish persecution.  For 
some, there were painful overlapping memories between the Holocaust and the “dirty war” as some survived 
Nazi death camps (or had most of their family killed in them), and sought a new beginning in Argentina, only to 
find their daughters and sons stripped of their rights as citizens and subject to state terror.  Moreover, numerous 
testimonies and the CONADEP investigation revealed that while Jews weren’t particularly singled out as Jews, 
they received special and often, harsher treatment, than non-Jews See, in particular, Timerman (2002) Prisoner 
Without a Name, Cell Without a Number; Nunca Más: Informe de la comisión nacional sobre la desaparición de 
personas (1985); Edy Kaufman and Beatriz Cymberkopf, (1989) “La dimension judía en al represión durante el 
gobierno militar en la Argentina (1976-1983). 
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 point out that to some extent, the notion of “Jewish community” as it was often employed in 
Buenos Aires transcends a specific location.    
While many Jewish-Argentines talk casually and loosely about who belongs to the  
colectividad, the word can have a more specific connotation of Jewishness, particularly 
when employed by formal representatives of the Jewish community.  Often referred to as the 
“leaders” of the community, I am primarily referring to the titular heads of the two main 
Jewish Argentine organizations, the AMIA and DAIA.  These institutions have come to 
officially represent “Jewishness” and “Jewish interests” to the Argentine state, society, and 
Jewish organizations in other countries.  The presidents of these organizations have been 
the primary source of opinion, comment, or statement from the Jewish Argentine community 
to the media, although this is no longer the case regarding the AMIA bombing.  While others 
certainly exercise some power within the colectividad, it is the AMIA and DAIA that have 
historically had the authority to speak for the community and thus mark its borders.8  
However, as I will demonstrate in chapters four and five, the power of the AMIA and DAIA to 
claim to speak for Jewish-Argentines and define Jewishness has been significantly 
challenged by other community actors, as was seen during and after the “dirty war” and now 
with the AMIA bombing and investigation.  
In recent years it is primarily the politicization of some of the family members of the 
victims and their supporters that have challenged the power of the Jewish-Argentine 
institutions.  Memoria Activa has been one of the most vocal and organized critics of the 
leaders of the AMIA and DAIA.  The DAIA, in particular, in its role as mediator between state 
and Jewish community, has gradually gained the image of being more aligned with (and part 
                                                     
8I have not found significant research that has examined how over time these institutions came to wield so much 
power in the Jewish community, particularly the DAIA.  The DAIA was organized in the 1930s as a political 
organization that monitored anti-Semitism and discrimination in general, becoming a kind of lobbyist of the state.  
Thus the DAIA from its inception was a conduit between the Jewish-Argentine community and the government in 
power.  While I did interviews regarding the history of the DAIA and people’s conceptions of it and collected 
some documentary sources, they are not enough to provide an informed and nuanced rendering of this process.  
This is something I plan to focus on more explicitly in future research.     
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 of) the Argentine state, than the public.  The failure of these institutions to denounce the 
state despite what many see as mounting evidence of corruption in relation to the AMIA 
case, has further eroded community trust. Alternatively, the grassroots citizens group, 
Memoria Activa, is portrayed by some Jewish-Argentines as “too political,” as they’ve 
subverted “legitimate” political channels and made the streets a site of political struggle.  
Worse, they’ve done this without completely sublimating their Jewish identity.  This presents 
a problem for some members of the community, whether in positions of power or not: by 
agitating as Jews, however defined, they are thought to expose the community to possible 
attack, rhetorical or otherwise, they are taking “private” matters “public,” they are challenging 
the power structure of the Jewish Argentine community that has evolved over the years, and 
they are articulating an alternative expression of Jewishness than the one historically 
prescribed for them.   
Up until now, I have used the terms “Jew” and “Jewishness” without further 
complicating them.  In what follows, I discuss images of the “Jew” in Argentina, and Jewish 
identity and difference. 
What We Talk About When We Talk About “Jewish” 
The Jew is ambivalence incarnate. – Zygmunt Bauman (1998) 
The figure of the “Jew” is one of the most prolific and contradictory in contemporary 
times.  This is as true in Europe as it is in Latin America, and in this case, Argentina (Graff 
Zivin 2008).  Argentina has the largest Jewish population in Latin America (around 200,000 
at present), at one time swelling to an estimated 300,000 individuals.9  Although images of 
the “Jew” and understandings of “Jewish” are always historically situated, many of these 
images are well traveled through the colonial and discursive force of European power, albeit 
subtly or more overtly transformed in new contexts.  Many images of the “Jew” that can be 
                                                     
9See the demographic information put out by the American Jewish Committee Yearbook. Can be accessed at 
www.ajcarchives.org/AJC_DATA/Files/AJYB727.CV.pdf 
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 found in Argentina are similar to what one might find in Europe, although utilized for different 
purposes and with varied effects.  
What specters, then, inhabit the image of the “Jew” in Argentina?  The intolerable 
and devilish presence of the Spanish Inquisition, in need of conversion, death or expulsion? 
The mystical Kabbalist of Borges’ fancy; the cultural outsider whose very marginality is a site 
of innovation?  Harbingers of greedy capitalist “values” and materialist ambition—destroying 
the very soul of the Argentine republic—as Julián Martel’s 1891 novel La bolsa portrays the 
“Jew”?  Or does the “Jewish presence” bring to mind the so-called Rusos, or Russians, of 
the early twentieth century, whose supposedly “foreign” political ideas threatened to 
refashion the very logic of Argentine society?  Or are the “Jews” best represented as victims, 
by the emaciated and huddled victims of pogroms and death camps—bodies heaped on the 
dusty earth like a horrifically bountiful harvest of potatoes?  Emblematic of occupation, 
repression, and brutality or champions of human rights?  Militaristic or weak and effeminate?  
Is the “Jew” the bespectacled marker of modern intellectualism, inheritor of a rich 
hermeneutic tradition and progenitor of porteños’ beloved (and for some, dangerously 
subversive) psychoanalysis?   Or backwards representatives of a counter-enlightenment 
philosophy that stubbornly insists on exclusivity, chosenness?  Can the “Jew” be truly 
Argentine, or is he fundamentally a cosmopolitan roamer?10  A patriot or yoked to the dream, 
and now fact, of another homeland? 
As this tour through some of the most actively employed symbolic imaginary of the 
“Jew” in Argentina attests, the figure of the “Jew” is highly contradictory, malleable and 
unfixed.  What we find when we peer ever so slightly into the discursive construction of 
“Jew” is a cacophonous and flexible riot of possibilities: “Jewish” is an elastic, powerful 
category with rich and diverse histories that can be mobilized within various contexts by 
                                                     
10I employ the masculine pronoun here because in general the subject imagined here is male.  
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 disparate actors, and in quite contradictory ways.  While all identities are semantically 
unstable and open to multiple possible associations, the figure of the “Jew” has become 
profoundly heteroglossic, particularly in the Christian dominated West.11  Scholars such as 
Jon Stratton (2000), Max Silverman (1998), Bryan Cheyette (1993), Zygmunt Bauman 
(1991), and Slavoj Zizek (1989) have noted, in Graff Zivin’s words, the “radical flexibility of 
‘Jewishness’” as a category (2008:3).  
The sociologist Zygmunt Bauman has argued that within Christian dominated 
Europe, the “Jew” has become the site exemplar of ambiguity, flux, disorder.  Rather than 
using the terms anti-Semitism and philo-Semitism, he prefers “allosemitism” to describe the 
complex feelings that Christian Europe reserves for the Jews (1998).  “Allos” being the 
Greek word for “other,” highlights Jews’ historical position of radical alterity within the 
consciousness of the Christian West.  (Bauman is not very subtle when it comes to talking 
about groups of people; they tend to be lumped into large undifferentiated categories.  
Nevertheless, he makes some insightful points.)  Bauman writes, “‘Allosemitism’ is 
essentially non-committal…it does not unambiguously determine either hatred or love of 
Jews, but contains the seeds of both…”(1998:143).  “Allosemitism” is an attitude primarily of 
ambivalence, and this ambivalence, Baumen argues, dangerously marks the subject as 
well.  Bauman suggests that it is not perhaps Jewish difference (in dress, practices, etc.) 
that is so troubling, but  
the apprehension and vexation [is] related not to someone or something disquieting 
through otherness and unfamiliarity, but to something or someone that does not fit 
the structure of the orderly world, does not fall easily into any of the established 
categories, emits therefore contradictory signals as to the proper conduct—and in 
the result blurs the borderlines which ought to be kept watertight.” [1998:144]    
 
Bauman further argues that the primary source of this ambiguity as it relates to Jews 
is connected to how their relationship to Christianity has been conceived by dominant 
                                                     
11Perhaps not unlike the category “Mestizo” as Marisol de la Cadena (2005) illustrates in her article Are Mestizos 
Hybrids? The Conceptual Politics of Andean Identities.  
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 Christians.  Jews are both the source of Christ and his denial.  Their continued existence 
and belief articulates a powerful counter-truth to Christian truth and power.  They represent 
the unruly excess to the Christian subject:  
…identities are constructed through, not outside, difference.  This entails the 
radically disturbing recognition that it is only through the relation to the Other, the 
relation to what it is not, to precisely what it lacks, to what has been called its 
constitutive outside that the ‘positive’ meaning of any term—and thus its ‘identity’—
can be constructed (Derrida, 1981; Laclau, 1990; Butler, 1993).  Throughout their 
careers, identities can function as points of identification and attachment only 
because of their capacity to exclude, to leave out, to render ‘outside’, abjected.  
Every identity has at its ‘margin,’ an excess, something more. [Hall 1996:5]  
 
While many European (and beyond) countries underwent a secular revolution 
beginning in the eighteenth century where religion became, for many, divested of absolute 
truth, the ambivalence that often marks Jews still circulates in Christian influenced 
imaginaries.  As Jews became part of a nominally secular society, becoming neighbors 
instead of strangers, shedding their skull caps and tzitzit, shaving their beards and side-
locks, and Jewish women expanding their worlds outside their homes, Jews adopting the 
national language—in short, leaving much of their outward difference aside, ambiguity still 
marked the Jewish figure.  And Jews themselves very often expressed an ambiguity of 
identity, of feeling both inside and outside the societies in which they lived.   
As developing states sought unification through an imagined ethnic community, Jews 
had a difficult time being excepted as true nationals by dominant society in most places.  
They were still other, but in some ways more ambiguously so in post-Enlightenment Europe.  
The Jewish other, which was generally plain to see (in customs of dress, profession, 
language, and where they lived) before the eighteenth century, became difficult to 
distinguish from “real” Germans, for example.  To take an image from current popular 
culture, Jews in many ways came to function like Cylons within the dominant society: it 
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 became difficult to separate the real from the “ersatz” imitation.12  And under certain regimes 
of power and knowledge, this became an intolerable state of affairs.  
As much as Argentines can be said to be Christian subjects, Jews are held at the 
discursive margins of the nation—and of course, Jews are not the only or even the primary 
“outside.”  The more potent “others” of Argentine identity are generally of indigenous or 
African descent.  The question is, however, how do different discursive regimes deal with 
these others, how is this “constitutive outside” dealt with on the ground? 
If within European lands the primary way to deal with the difference Jews 
represented was to get rid of it, either by expelling or murdering them, in Latin America, 
difference in general doesn’t operate under the exact same logics.  This is not to say that 
extermination and other less extreme efforts at homogeneity have not been part of various 
projects in Latin America, as indeed they have, but one could argue that eradication of the 
other has not achieved the same logical force as it did (and one could argue still does) in 
Europe, or that it exists in tension with more inclusive discourses.  In her illuminating book 
on the rhetoric of Jewishness in Latin America, Graff Zivin (2008) notes that there is a kind 
of “fatalism of difference” in the symbolic imaginary of Latin America—a recognition of an 
unavoidable heterogeneity forged through the violent crucible of the colonial encounter.  
Along with elite desires of purity and “whitening,” is the acceptance and sometimes 
celebratory recognition that the cultures and bodies of Latin America are radically diverse 
and “hybrid.”13  Indeed, mixture and hybridity are often terms used to talk about Latin 
American identities and subjectivities, even as these terms have come to signify different, or 
                                                     
12For those not in the know, Cylons are from the popular TV series Battlestar Gallactica.  Cylons are androids 
that were made by humans who eventually rebelled and evolved.  Some look exactly like humans and there are 
only a few ways to tell if someone is a Cylon or human. 
 
13For one well known positive view of miscegenation, see José Vasconcelos (1925) La Raza Cósmica (The 
Cosmic Race).   
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 multiple things over time.14  (And importantly, but not addressed here, is how changing 
conceptions of race have constructed these identities in both positive and negative ways.) 
Graff Zivin cites Roberto González Echevarría’s (1998) idea of the “Other Within” to help 
conceptualize the interplay between discourses of exclusion and inclusion that have 
circulated in Latin America.  According to this argument, the “Other” is recognized to be an 
essential part of the subject, a constituting presence traced to the Conquest that is futile to 
erase.  To eradicate the Other would be to turn on one’s self, as the other is already in the 
nation and in the body.  (In this way, one could argue that Derrida’s notion of Différance 
approaches this conception of difference.)  Within this logic, the Jew as Other is not 
necessarily seen as an entirely foreign presence:  
If modern European notions of “Jewishness” (and, by extension, difference in 
general) often focus on a foreign invader that would corrupt the purity of the national 
corpus, Latin American representations of the “Jew” tend to recognize a primordial 
other that, symbolically or historically, forms a part of the individual or collective 
self… [Graff Zivin 2008:19]  
 
However, this “primordial other” that is part of the self is not necessarily celebrated, 
but expresses, a profound ambivalence.  I might add, also, that Jews and other minorities, 
such as Latin Americans of Asian or Middle Eastern descent, are perhaps less a  
“primordial other,” than another kind of “Other,” given the relatively recent arrival of “real” 
breathing Jews to Latin America.  
The idea of the “Other Within” however, does seem to resonate with certain ideas 
about Argentinidad, that appear rooted in ambivalent feelings.  In my many discussions with 
porteños, a narrative of failure—national, social, governmental—would almost always arise, 
                                                     
14See, for example, Charles Hale (1996), “Mestizaje, Hybridity, and the Cultural Politics of Difference in Post-
Revolutionary Latin America,” in Journal of Latin American Anthropology, vol. 2, no. 1, pp. 34-61.  Also, John 
Kraniauskas (2004). “Hybridity in a Transnational Frame: Latin Americanist and Postcolonial Perspectives on 
Cultural Studies.” In The Latin American Cultural Studies Reader, eds. Ana del Sarto, Alicia Ríos, and Abril 
Trigo, 736-59. Durham: Duke University Press.  For an analysis of how the terms  mestizo and mestizaje have 
come to embody different meanings, see Marisol de la Cadena (2005) “Are Mestizos Hybrids? The Conceptual 
Politics of Andean Identities,” Journal of Latin American Studies 37, pp. 259-284, and Marisol de la Cadena 
(2000) Indigenous Mestizos. Durham: Duke University Press.  
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 a sense of seemingly inevitable breakdown and disappointment that was focused within 
rather than without.  The prevalence of psychoanalysis among middle-class Argentines also 
alludes to a general feeling that there is something “wrong” within, or something hidden that 
needs to be exposed.  These feelings have deep histories, as I discuss in Chapter one.  
Will the “Real” Jew in the Room Please Stand Up? 
The above has mostly discussed representations of Jews and Jewishness and 
constructions of Jewish difference.  Thus when I write about “Jews,” and “Argentines,” for 
that matter, I recognize that these are not fixed, timeless categories that denote a unified 
essence or truth about “a people,” even as they are often employed as such by those who 
inhabit and enlist these identities.  Rather, identities as I understand them are “never 
singular but multiply constructed across different, often intersecting and antagonistic, 
discourse, practices, and positions (Hall 1996:4).  However, as I conceive of identities as 
fundamentally discursive, this doesn’t imply that they don’t have consequences that can be 
seen and felt.  On the contrary, the discursive vigor of “Jew,” not unlike other identifications 
with histories of subjugation, carries a material force that can be horrific in its effects.  The 
Jew, as Jonathan Boyarin states (1992:xiv) is “more than just the suffering allegory.”  In 
other words, it is important to attend to the historically, lived experience of those on the 
ground who claim and are claimed by Jewish identity, lest the notion of “Jewishness” itself 
become a reified category, unconnected to the varied and specific meanings and 
experiences that can inhabit it.  This is often the aim of ethnography, and in this case, I had 
to suspend my North American ideas about “Jews” and “Jewishness,” to be able to see and 
hear how Argentines construct this identity for themselves.  
I attempt in this dissertation to provide a nuanced account of both “real” Jews on the 
ground, and the specific ideological constructs that give meaning and material presence to 
the category “Jewish-Argentine.”  I am not trying to make a clean separation between the 
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 “material” and “ideological,” as the two are constitutive of each other.  “Real,” living (and 
dead) Jews are quite invested in “ideas” about Jewishness, as they are enlisted by them.  
By “real” Jews I am again not referring to an idea of authenticity, but to consider the 
“existence of real people who have lived as Jews—whether by religious observance, 
patrilineal descent, participation in Yiddish theater or Zionist socialism, or by having been 
victims of the Holocaust or other forms of anti-Semitic violence—without limiting the 
boundaries of this category” (Graff Zivin 2008:9).  Indeed, it would be hard to limit 
“Jewishness” to a list of possible identifications, as it is a site of proliferating possibilities, 
based in part through the variety wrought from living in highly heterogeneous societies. 
I will point out, however, that there are some broad stroke differentiations that Jews 
make amongst themselves that concern language, culture, and to some extent religious 
practice.  As many of those we now call “Jews” began to migrate and disperse from the 
Levant after Roman invasion, Jews began to live in widely disparate areas.  Following 
further expulsions and opportunities over hundreds of years, communities of Jews lived in 
regions and countries as geographically dispersed as England and India, sub-Saharan 
Africa and the Caucuses.  Thus the community that identified as Jews became a reference 
for hybridity, multiplicity, and heteroglossia, while at the same time holding onto the idea of a 
shared mythic past and a series of fundamental texts, notably the Tanach or “old” testament 
and volumes of Talmudic writings, that could provide a touchstone of collective identity.  
Sander Gilman writes that “The Jews are to be understood as a multiple yet single entity: 
multiple because of the cultures manifested under that label, yet unitary because of the 
common archaeology or cultural identity they believed themselves to share (1999:20).  
Currently the cultural diversity to be found among Jewish groups (and these identifications 
are waning within many communities) is lumped into two primary categories: Ashkenazi 
(Yiddish speaking Jews that at one time were concentrated in German speaking lands that 
later migrated East to Poland and Russia), Sephardic (specifically referring to Ladino 
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 speaking Jews that had one time lived in Iberia, but today also refer to Jews from North-
Africa and the Middle East, sometimes called Mizrahi).  These groupings are sometimes 
further broken done by cities in which there were long-standing communities: Damascene 
Jews, Baghdadi Jews, etc.  I note these divisions to further complicate the image of the 
“Jew” (which in contemporary times is likely to be glossed as Ashkenazi) and because these 
points of identification can be important sites of stratification and power within Jewish 
communities, particularly in Israel (Alcalay 1997).   
Most of the Jewish-Argentines I knew in Argentina were connected to Ashkenazi 
heritage.  When I speak of “the community” I refer to Jewish-Argentines of all possible 
affiliations.15  At this point I’d like to turn to a further consideration of such “real” Jews 
through the disciplinary lens of Latin American studies.  
Where’s the Jewish in Latin American Studies? 
While drafting an email message to a prominent scholar of Jewish cultural studies 
(who trained in Anthropology), I began to articulate some feelings about my work that had as 
of yet not been fully apparent to me.  This individual, Jonathan Boyarin, has written about 
the possible intersections between Jewish studies and cultural studies (1997).  Boyarin and 
his brother Daniel note that, “…younger ethnographers who work on Jewish materials 
seldom find a place among lingering areal divisions and the newer ‘diversity’ categories that 
dictate academic hiring choices” (1997:xii).  This statement resonated with a barely 
examined unease I felt in studying “Jews,” as if looking at these particular people “should” 
only happen in Jewish studies, not Anthropology or Latin America.16  (Interestingly, I would 
feel differently if I were studying Israelis, whose controversial actions are intensely 
                                                     
15The majority of Jews in Argentina are Ashkenazi.  For an examination of Sephardic Jews in relation to the 
Jewish community at large in Argentina, see Adriana M. Brodsky (2004) “The Contours of Identity: Sephardic 
Jews and the Construction of Jewish Communities in Argentina, 1880-Present” Ph.D. Dissertation, Duke 
University.  
 
16 See Daniel Boyarin and Jonathan Boyarin (1997), Sander Gilman (1999) and Jon Stratton (2000) for  historical 
explorations of the development of Jewish studies vis-à-vis “ethnic” or cultural studies.  
 26
 scrutinized in media, public, and academic venues.  Whether deemed legitimate or not, 
Jews are often seen as connected to the lands that comprise Israel and Palestine in ways 
that, for example, Jews in Mexico are not.)     
As I explained in my email, my way of dealing with this ambivalence was primarily to 
ignore it, and therefore, when I found myself compelled to delve deeply into the “Jewish 
question” and questions of Jewish difference in Argentina, I scrambled to acquaint myself 
with literatures that I had neglected for most of my graduate studies.  I felt insecure about 
studying Jews as Latin Americans, and among other Latin Americanists I sometimes felt 
slightly illegitimate, as if I wasn’t working with “real” Latin Americans or issues of regional 
import.  While this perception probably says as much about me as the discipline itself, it 
does revel certain biases and aporias within Latin American studies and Latin America itself.  
It elicits a questioning of how “Latin America” has been constructed through the discipline of 
Latin American studies (and from a predominately Anglo perspective, although this is 
changing).  As the historian Jeffrey Lesser has written, “To be sure, no one has ever 
claimed that Jews never lived in Latin America.  Even so, Latin American historians have 
tended, at least until recently, to see the study of Jews as really a part of Jewish history, 
implicitly relegating Jews to a space in which they were not real Latin Americans” (1995:xv).  
At the disciplinary level, then, the study of Jews had been in effect ghettoized into its proper 
place.  However, as I will show, this disciplinary segregation of Jews in Latin America arose 
from both Latin Americanists and the ways in which Jewish Latin Americans had been 
conceived and studied by (often Jewish) researchers.  
Responding to this personal and disciplinary ambivalence, one of the main objectives 
of my work is to examine historically and ethnographically the unspoken assumption that 
Jews of Latin America are somehow separate from the social, political, and cultural contexts 
in which they live, and to show how understanding the relations between Jewish and other 
Latin Americans can reveal important insights about difference, state-building, and 
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 nationalism in the region.  Importantly, I owe a debt to the social movement Memoria Activa 
for teaching me that the dominant view of Jewish Latin Americans or Jewish Argentines—as 
insular, separate, and incidental to the cultural politics of the nation—needs to be revisited 
and complicated.  In carrying on the legacies of Jewish Argentines who mobilized for human 
rights during and after the “dirty war,” Memoria Activa refuses to accede to the perception 
that Jews remain outside of the main currents of Argentine society and can (should) not 
participate in processes that dramatically challenge the state and society.  Significantly, the 
latter sentiment comes from a portion of the Jewish Argentine community itself. 
Part of the general scholarly neglect of Jewish Latin Americans and the feeling that 
Jews aren’t “real” Latin Americans, might have to do with the relatively small populations of 
Jews in many Latin American countries and the fact that many Jewish populations do retain 
some level of corporate separation from the dominant society.17  But this separation should 
not be confused with isolation or a general lack of interest in country within they live. 
Identifications are fluid, multi-faceted, and over-lapping, sometimes in profound tension, but 
not mutually exclusive and rigid.  Often class interests are one site where Jews suture into 
society, and these interests may trump assumed Jewish loyalty.  
In Argentina many Jews do belong to organizations that provide religious, social, and 
cultural support that may not be fulfilled by national organizations or practices (for example, 
the particularity of Jewish burial practices).  They serve as means to satisfy the ways in 
which some individuals want to connect with Jewishness, however imagined.  Like other 
minority groups, many Jewish Argentines attend “Jewish” schools (these aren’t generally 
religious and most are highly regarded academically) instead of public schools, as a way of 
connecting with histories and practices that aren’t part of the dominant culture.  (Since the 
bombing of the AMIA, however, attendance at Jewish schools has been down, as parents 
                                                     
17See the demographic information put out by the American Jewish Committee Yearbook.  Can be accessed at 
www.ajcarchives.org/AJC_DATA/Files/AJYB727.CV.pdf 
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 express a fear that their children may be targets.) While there are popular “Jewish” sports 
and social clubs—huge venues for various kinds of sports, exercise, and social reunions, 
and cultural events—these clubs are part of the culture of the middle class, not necessarily a 
sign of Jewish separation.  They also reflect the legacies of large-scale immigration in the 
latter portion of the nineteenth century and early twentieth century, where social clubs and 
mutual-aid societies were essential support systems for new immigrants.  In addition to 
“Jewish clubes” one can find a “club Italiano” and “club Español” in Buenos Aires today.  In 
short, while one could argue that in other Latin America countries Jews are less integrated 
(although what this means and says about the society at large needs to be delineated) 
Argentina has a Jewish population that is highly assimilated; that is, individual Jewish 
Argentines tend to be highly integrated with Argentine society—sometimes to the point of 
relinquishing their Jewish identity.18  While a certain percentage of Jewish-Argentines 
associate with the organized Jewish community—synagogues, clubs, the AMIA, schools—a 
significant percentage do not, enacting their Jewishness in other spaces and through other 
vehicles, if at all.  I would argue that today in Latin America, in practice and imagining, 
Jewish insularity is more of a myth than a reality. More current scholarship on Jewish 
communities in Venezuela, Uruguay, or Chile, for example, needs to address these issues.  
Another possible source of elision of Jews from dominant streams of Latin American 
studies is that they fall outside of historically specific categories of identity and ethnicity 
(often framed through racial discourses) such as “European,” “indigenous” or “African,” or 
“mestizo.”  Jewishness fits uneasily in any of the categories mentioned above, and even 
though Jews can often “pass” as white, they are not unambiguously European (this 
                                                     
18Judith Elkin, one of the early pioneers of Jewish Latin American studies, has written about reasons for why 
some Jewish communities have remained less integrated: “There is a world of difference between merging with a 
secular population on equal terms and accepting a subordinate position on a Catholic standard” (1998:219).  I 
find this explanation lacking, as it gives a monolithic reading of Catholicism, “secular population,” as well as the 
assumed Jewish subject.  Nevertheless, there is something different (locally specific) about processes of 
incorporation in countries with different historical experiences and national visions.  Processes of integration are 
obviously not the same from country to country.   
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 becomes even more obvious when one considers Jews from North Africa or the Middle 
East).  Although Jewish identity is often described as hybrid or “double,” the hybridity 
assumed here still fits ambiguously with dominant Latin American lexicons of identity.  There 
are other populations that have achieved a certain visibility and invisibility, such as the 
considerable populations of Peruvians and Brazilians of Japanese descent, and Latin 
Americans whose roots hail to the Middle East.19  Nevertheless, pluralism in Latin America is 
often primarily conceived through varieties of indigeneity, (sub-Saharan) Africanness, and 
whiteness, which fail to include groups that are discursively constructed as outside or 
marginal to these identifications.  This is in spite of the fact that Latin American countries 
received immigrants from diverse parts of the world.  Despite the relative paucity of 
materials focusing on minority ethnicities in Latin America, Lesser and Rein have noted that 
currently, readily available scholarly and cultural production concerning Jews in Latin 
America dwarf the materials devoted to or emerging from Latin Americans of Japanese or 
Middle Eastern descent (2008: 26).  More attention in general to minority ethnic groups in 
Latin America would reveal important insights into the theorization of difference, popular 
culture, and nation-building projects.  
The emphasis on the above-mentioned categories of identity (indigenous, mestizo, 
etc.) undoubtedly has something to do with the regional foci of Latin American departments 
in the U.S., where research on Andean, Mexican and Central American countries has 
predominated.  In Anthropology in particular, it has only been the last twenty years or so that 
Argentina and other Southern Cone countries have become popular “fields” in which U.S. 
based anthropologists work.20  While I cannot go into all the factors that made certain 
                                                     
19Scholars such as Lesser (1999), Klich and Lesser (1998), Hirabayashi, Kikumura, and Hirabayashi (2002), and 
Anderson and Lee (2005) have begun to address the lacunae in the literature on these populations. 
 
20When I started my fieldwork in 1999 I knew of few anthropologists with North American backgrounds working in 
Argentina and Chile.  Andrew Lakoff, Julia Paley, and Lessie Jo Frazier were the most prominent.  In contrast, 
when I went into the field for extended fieldwork in 2004, I knew of at least 7 other North American 
 30
 regions and peoples of Latin America more desirable or “reasonable” to study—and I 
emphasize that U.S. Latin American Studies today is much more diverse than it was twenty 
or thirty years ago—I can attest to a measure of ghettoization of studies focusing on Jewish, 
Asian, or Middle Eastern Latin Americans.  This is due in part to how scholars of these 
populations have historically developed and positioned their studies—in ways that 
emphasize bounded group identity and history, apart from larger a national context.   
In the case of Jewish life in Latin America, for many years, the existence of Jews in 
Latin America remained under the radar of scholarly study within Latin American studies, 
and was primarily “catalogued” by umbrella organizations such as the American Jewish 
Committee, a non-academic institution, which advocates on behalf of Jewish communities 
all over the world, or was subject of much internal publication within specific Jewish Latin 
American communities.  However, in the 1960s and 1970s Latin American Jews began to 
be a focus of study within Israel, albeit with little attention outside of the country (Lesser and 
Rein 2008:27).  In North America, serious investigation into Jewish Latin America began 
with the work of Judith Laikin Elkin.  Her publications, which were wide-ranging and 
informative, provided a detailed panorama of Jewish life and history in various countries in 
Central and South America.21  In 1982 Elkin founded the Latin American Jewish Studies 
Association (LAJSA), to formalize and support the scholarly study of Jews in Latin America.  
This was the first attempt within North American academic circles to approach the study of 
Jews from within Latin American studies, and over the years studies of Jewish-Latin 
                                                                                                                                                                    
anthropologists working in or around Buenos Aires—promising a boon in anthropological studies of urban 
Argentina.  
 
21 Her books include Jews of the Latin American Republics (1980) Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina 
Press; The Jewish Presence in Latin America (1988) New York: Harper Collins; and The Jews of Latin America 
(1998) New York: Holmes and Meier.  
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 Americans have slowly become more visible within mainstream U.S. Latin American 
studies.22  
Thus over a period of about thirty years, attention to Jews as part of the ethnic 
diversity of Latin America began to increase in the United States, but often failed to 
challenge some of the dominant assumptions about Jewish life in Latin America—nor did 
they problematize “Jewish” identity.  As Lesser and Rein (2008:28) note, “The research 
produced since 1982…is much like the earlier studies that emerged from the Institute of 
Contemporary Jewry [based in Israel], often embedded with the idea of Diasporic primacy 
rather than nation-based identity.”  Despite the promising formation of LAJSA, studies of 
Jewishness in Latin America tended to ignore the significant differences between Jewish 
groups, and tended to focus on or characterize Jewishness as if it were essentially 
Ashkenazi.  Additionally, Jewishness was often uncomplicatedly portrayed as the “primary” 
site of identification (overshadowing national belonging and feeling) and viewed as largely 
insular or community based.  Many of these studies focused on anti-Semitism and tended to 
emphasize Jewish life in Latin America as a continual struggle against recurring tides of 
anti-Semitism.  While none of these characterizations are wholly inaccurate, they portray a 
simplistic picture of the varieties of Jewish experience in Latin America, and the diverse 
ways in which Jews identify among themselves.  Moreover, these studies often failed to take 
into account the particular locales in which Jews lived, as if Jewishness remained the same 
whether in Buenos Aires, Curaçao, or Rio de Janeiro, rather than paying attention to how 
Jews of different backgrounds have influenced local cultures and have been shaped by 
them.  Additionally, an attention to gender, which is also missing from this work, has 
previously been found lacking.  At times, these early forays into the study of Jewish-Latin 
                                                     
22This is evident in part by the academic publishing industry, with publishers with significant Latin American 
series, such as Duke and California, publishing works that examine Jewishness in Latin America.  As I show, the 
work coming out of LAJSA has in recent years has moved beyond “community studies” to offer rigorous and 
nuanced studies of Latin American Jewishness.  
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 Americans resembled a highly detailed travel guidebook, or a synthesizing of demographic 
information, rather than a nuanced interrogation of the possibilities and transformations of 
Jewishness in local contexts.  At the same time, however, it is important to note that these 
early studies were critical in making a subject out of what otherwise may have remained 
overlooked.  
 I agree with Lesser and Rein (2008), that work on Latin Americans of Jewish, 
Eastern European, Asian, and Middle Eastern descent need to be put in dialogue with each 
other and complicate prevailing visions of Latin America, and are presented in ways that 
illuminate larger national processes. Encouragingly, in recent years more scholars appear to 
be focusing upon these other Latin Americans and going beyond the static, essentializing, 
and bounded conceptions of identity that tended to characterize previous studies.  At this 
writing, the study of Jewish-Latin Americans and other less discussed groups seems poised 
to enter a sustained and engaged dialogue with other streams of Latin American studies.  
Recent notable works focusing on Jews and Japanese minorities in Latin America, such as 
Lesser and Rein’s 2008 compilation, Erin Graff Zivin’s 2008 study of the figure of the Jew in 
Latin American literature, and Jeffrey Lesser’s 2007 study on Japanese-Brazilians, have as 
much to say about the nation-state as a particular minority within it.  Speaking of the nation-
state, the next section theorizes “the state,” and “citizenship,” as they’ve come to be central 
sites through which the AMIA bombing and the struggle for justice is interpreted, and in turn, 
re-shapes these concepts.  
Re-figuring the “State”  
“Argentina seems like a country, but isn’t.”—Baruj Z., Buenos Aires, September 10, 
2004 
 
The above statement reflects sentiments about Argentina I heard many times during 
my fifteen months in the country.  In fact, the ways in which I most commonly heard the 
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 state, and often society, invoked by middle-class porteños is through a discourse of failure. 
“Argentina no existe”—Argentina doesn’t exist—a close friend used to say to me.  The state, 
according to these actors, is primarily a site of brokenness, sickness—an inability to 
function.  Not only is the state portrayed as fundamentally lacking, but in fatalistic tones it 
was sometimes expressed to me that this was unlikely to ever change.  This fatalism stems 
in part from a circulating belief that the society itself is fundamentally flawed, imbued with a 
“culture of impunity” that dwells in the highest public offices and in less overtly political 
spaces.  (I will return to these feelings about the state and society in chapters one and five.)  
Perhaps this lack of trust and faith in either the nation or the state is due to promises of 
democracy that in the eyes of many Argentines have yet to be fulfilled, as an institutional or 
cultural process.  In order to give a broad historical reference for how the “state” is 
envisioned as a site of failure, corruption, and impunity by many middle-class actors, I will 
provide a brief discussion of the role of democracy and human rights in recent Argentine 
history.   
Argentina has had a turbulent political and social history, one in which democratic 
ideas have existed in tension with more authoritarian and elitist sympathies.  In the 
nineteenth century, democracy, when it was discussed and implemented, was rarely if ever 
envisioned for the masses, but reflected the interests of the landowning and educated elite.  
Bonner (2007:34) notes that in the nineteenth and early twentieth century, liberal democracy 
as a political practice never had a strong foothold in Argentina, although liberal ideas—
particularly economic liberalism—circulated productively among the elite. 
As Bonner (2007:41) points out, the close connection of the governing bodies to the 
military (often presidents were military generals and the force of the military was frequently 
used to “win” elections) early in the nation’s history helped to ensure the latter an excess of 
unchecked power that would come to haunt Argentina in the twentieth century.  Since the 
1930s, Argentines experienced no less than six military governments.  In 1983, after the last 
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 military dictatorship ended, when there was a concerted effort to remake Argentina into a 
democracy, it was a project that involved not just the formal agencies, posts, and 
bureaucratic structures that people often affiliate with the “state,” but intense mobilization by 
the many Argentine human rights organizations, and ostensibly a remaking of Argentine 
citizen-subjects.  As with all such projects, this process is ongoing and continually 
negotiated by various actors. 
The process of democratization is rarely easy or quick, and in Argentina it was 
complicated by the human rights abuses perpetrated by the previous government.  For the 
middle-class human rights movement and its supporters, any transition to democracy had to 
be coupled with a societal wide reckoning of the military dictatorship, with junta leaders held 
accountable by the state itself for their actions.  From this perspective, in order to move on 
as a nation and state, it was important to reclaim the archive and re-write the official story 
and have the state assume responsibility for the dead, especially since military leaders 
continually denied the disappearances of thousands of citizens.  To this end, during 
Alfonsín’s government (1983-1989) a truth commission was set up to investigate the 
military’s actions, producing the report Nunca Más (Never Again) in 1984.23  Military leaders 
were tried and sentenced in historic trials that were televised for the whole nation to witness.  
However, after this initial burst of attention to human rights and a state interest in holding 
members of the military accountable for their actions, toward the end of the nineteen-
eighties another discourse began to capture the nation’s attention: forgetting.  At the end of 
a historic presidency, President Raúl Alfonsín enacted two laws known as “las leyes de 
impunidad” (laws of impunity), the Final Point law and the Law of Due Obedience.  These 
laws effectively ceased trials against the military, from the highest to lowest ranks.  
President Carlos Menem (1989-1999) deepened an adherence to a politics of forgetting and 
                                                     
23Comisión Nacional sobre la Desaparición de Personas (CONADEP) (1984). Nunca Más. Buenos Aires: 
Editorial de Universidad de Buenos Aires.   
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 a culture of impunity by granting amnesty for those military officers already charged for 
having committed human rights crimes.24  Under Menem’s presidency, forgetting was 
promoted as essential to “societal healing,” and economic prosperity was tied to a neoliberal 
agenda, with now famously disastrous results. 
After the economic collapse of 2001 and the political crisis that followed it, the 
Argentine state under Néstor Kirchner was eager to portray stability and “seriousness” to its 
citizenry and the world (see chapter 5).  A main pillar of Kirchner’s government was a 
commitment to “human rights,” emphasized as a necessary feature of a democratic society.  
Beloved by many in the mainstream middle-class human rights community (something that I 
experienced first hand), under Kirchner’s government the amnesty laws were over-turned.  
As is discussed in the chapters that follow, Kirchner has also shown a more open attitude 
than his predecessors toward taking the demands of family members of the victims of the 
AMIA bombing seriously, albeit with few different results.  
Given the ways in which the state has historically wielded power against or in spite of 
the citizens, middle class porteños tend to talk about the “state” in ways that sharply 
delineate it from civil society.  (Even when they might see a fundamental connection 
between the two via the discourse of impunidad.)  Human rights discourse plays an 
important role in the fashioning of Argentine citizen-subjects, as holders of certain rights and 
responsibilities, and tends to be an idiom utilized across class and gender affiliations—
although the understanding of what these rights should consist is constantly being tested.25  
However, this discourse tends to reify the separation between “state” and “society,” even as 
                                                     
24See Michelle D. Bonner (2007) Sustaining Human Rights, University Park, PA: Penn State Press, pp. 118-124) 
for a detailed analysis of the effects of these laws.  
 
25For an analysis of notions of “rights” in Argentina, see Bonner (2007).  For earlier influential analyses of human 
rights and democratization in Argentina and Latin America, see Alison Brysk (1994) The Politics of Human Rights 
in Argentina: Protest, Change and Democratization, Stanford: Stanford University Press and Elizabeth Jelin and 
Eric Hershberg, eds. (1996) Constructing Democracy: Human Rights, Citizenship, and Society in Latin America. 
Boulder, Co: Westview.  
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 non-state actors have been successful in shaping the state.  A view of the state as primary 
locus of power also corresponds with recent Argentine history, when the state effectively 
worked to control the bodies and knowledges of the citizens (Taylor 1997).   
While a separation of state and society may be formally expressed by many different 
actors, and particularly through the discourse of human rights, the practices of human rights 
groups and social movements like Memoria Activa considerably complicates the distinction 
between state and society.  Since 1983 the crucial role of non-state actors in constructing 
and hailing the state, and reshaping understandings of citizenship and human rights, 
complicates this commonly expressed separation of state and society, and the power that 
each is assumed to wield.  To greater or lesser degress, the construction of the state since 
the last military dictatorship has taken place on city corners and plazas, cafés and living 
rooms, in newspapers and other media, as well as within the halls of congress and painted-
pink walls of the presidential palace.  Even before this latest transition to democracy, 
Argentine citizens had, over time, developed a rich tradition of negotiating, whether through 
active or passive means, with the state outside of formal channels.  This process of 
negotiation can be thought as not only resistance, but as actively productive of new forms of 
governance and sociality and ultimately deepening democratic practice.  Dagnino (1998:47) 
has argued that,  
…social movements have advanced a conception of democracy that transcends the 
limits of political institutions as traditionally conceived and of “actually existing 
democracy.”  The distinctive feature of this conception, which points toward the 
extension and deepening of democracy, is the fact that it has as a basic reference 
not the democratization of the political regime but of society as a whole, including 
therefore the cultural practices embodied in social relations of exclusion and 
inequality. 
 
Democratic practice, then, is not “located” in one designated place, fixed in the halls 
of government and through the voting box.  It is not only a means of governance, but an 
attitude and a basis for kinds of social relations.  Democracy as it is being practiced and 
formulated by many social movements and other actors, then, is not just a series of acts and 
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 a formalized set of relationships that exist in isolation of public spheres.  Thus, what is often 
glossed as “the state” is not simply “out there” but also exists through us.  It is not simply a 
“the,” it is a multitude.  Thus I present a conception of “the state” and “politics” that exists 
beyond the buildings, policies, governmental organizations, and individuals who formally 
make up the government in any given place.  Rather “the state” alludes to a shifting 
constellation of people, ideas, and practices that range from civil society to public office, as 
well as events, ceremonies, ideas, processes, buildings, documents.  One does not find “the 
state” in one centralized local, although it is often invoked as such, but instead the state 
comes to be seen and felt through a multitude of actions and discourses at different levels of 
society.  Following Gupta (1995) and Aretxaga (2003), I understand the state to be 
constitutively performed at the level of everyday life—in conversations in homes and in the 
streets, in the effect of a given policy on someone’s ability to feed themselves or their family, 
on the ways in which state-sponsered city planning attempts to guide bodies through the 
city.  In this way, one knows the state “through its multiple effects” (Aretxaga 2003:398).  
The state, then, ceases to be seen as “out there,” but as intertwined with everyday spaces 
and situations; “it” is a blurred site, negotiated through the everyday.  While I am de-
centering the state, I am also acutely aware of the inbalance of power often involved in 
these negotiations.  Even as the state’s power is challenged by social movements, other 
non-governmental organizations, “globalization,” and individuals, in most cases it still 
effectively wields the physical power and authority to create and enforce “the law.”  
While this work as it stands can only begin to be called an ethnography of the state, I 
do hope that the various ways that actors involved in seeking justice for the AMIA bombing 
are suggestive of the ways in which the state is a “social subject in everyday life” (Aretxaga 
2003:395).  
“State effects” are keenly and intimately felt by the family members of the victims of 
the AMIA bombing.  In this case, the state is primarily experienced as a lack, a feeling that 
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 the state isn’t working in the citizens’ interests, that it has abandoned its dead and is 
indifferent to its citizenry.  Amongst many family members of the victims, the state is often 
portrayed to have failed in its responsibility to its citizens on many accounts relating to the 
attack on the AMIA: it failed to protect, it failed to investigate, it failed to provide justice.  
These accusations have formed the basis of the case that Memoria Activa has taken to the 
Inter-American Court of Human Rights at the OAS.  In many ways, however, the activism of 
Memoria Activa has turned these failures into questions and accusations posed to society 
as well as the state and to some extent blurring the boundaries of each. 
Much of this failure is thought to be due to corruption and impunidad (impunity), as 
well as a sense that the Argentine state as it stands lacks the organization and 
sophistication to fulfill its responsibility to the citizenry.  Impunidad and accusations of 
arbitrary applications of the law are a fairly common charge against the Argentine state, 
particulary in relation to the last military dictatorship, the AMIA bombing, and other acts of 
violence thought to be connected to improper or negligent application of state power.  
Aretxaga’s piece Maddening States has one of the best descriptions of impunity I’ve seen:  
Sovereignty then presents itself as the law, which stands outside the law.  In this 
sense, to claim state sovereignty is to embody a juridical order that cannot be held 
accountable.  The state in this sense is and is not the law.  The lack of distinction 
between transgression and execution of the law that characterizes the state of 
exception, within which anything can happen, leaves the law as a terrifying force 
devoid of meaning from which one cannot escape. [Aretxaga 2003:405] 
 
Argentines of a particular generation and position have intimate knowledge of the 
“state of exception, within which anything can happen.”  For this reason, the charge of 
impunidad takes on a particularly urgent force when understood through the memories (and 
largely unpunished actions) of the last military dictatorship.  The charge of impunidad 
sounds an alarm about slipping into the danger zone of the “state of exception,” threatening 
the very rights of the citizen, as many of those struggling for justice for the AMIA bombing 
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 have acknowledged.  Articulating and arguing for the rights of the citizen is one potent way 
that actors have found to engage the state. 
In the last thirty years or so, the concept of “citizenship” has become a useful tool 
amongst various social actors and movements in Latin America (Dagnino 2003).  What is 
meant by “citizenship” is negotiated and contested among various actors, including the 
state, social movements (both international and national), organizations such as the World 
Bank and IMF, and multi-national corporations.  While ideas about citizenship in Latin 
America and other parts of the world have been in changing in response to neoliberal 
projects, many social movements have been active in articulating alternate conceptions of 
citizenship that include (or argue for a return to) legal rights beyond market participation and 
cultural recognition of various sorts.  As I’ve suggested above, the discourse of citizenship 
has been important for those struggling for justice for the victims of the AMIA bombing.  Like 
other social movements, groups like Memoria Activa present citizenship as both a status 
and a project, conferring legal rights and responsibilities on the one hand (in this case 
specifically the rights to justice and protection), and arguing a grounds for a “new sociability” 
(Dagnino 2003) on the other hand.  At the same time as Memoria Activa seeks to engage 
and challenge the state as a particular entity, they also recognize that the workings of the 
state and the culture of impunity are part of a larger sphere of social relations.  Claiming and 
shaping the discourse of citizenship both inserts the AMIA bombing and its victims within the 
collective nation, hails the state as a responsible party, and articulates the possibilities for a 
new socialibility.  How this unfolds will be made clear in the chapters that follow. 
Structure of the Dissertation 
Taking into account the importance of past events and debates in present-day 
articulations of central issues that have emerged in relation to the AMIA bombing, I have 
structured the dissertation in two parts.  Part I, composed of chapters one and two, are 
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 largely historical journeys.  These chapters, however, while providing important contextual 
depth, are meant to go beyond context to deconstruct and propose understandings and 
possibilities for citizenship in Argentina, and ethnic and religions difference.  Part I is meant 
to situate the debates, understandings, and feelings that have been circulating through and 
around the AMIA bombing and its victims in locally salient idioms.  Chapter one focuses on 
key events and ideas that have significantly influenced the processes of Argentine state-
making and development of civil society, and have deeply shaped its national imaginaries.  
This chapter discusses the role of some vital Argentine visionaries and leaders in conceiving 
the nation, particularly Domingo Faustino Sarmiento and the civilization and barbarism 
debate, and his contemporary Juan Batista Alberdi.  In relation to these thinkers, I also look 
at the ideological justifications for promoting immigration to Argentina—and resistance to 
this idea—as well as the process of incorporating these potential citizens into the nation, 
with specific focus on Jewish immigrants.  Finally, I look at the rise of organized right-wing 
nationalist movements in Argentina, their ideological antecedents and basis in Argentine 
society.  Particular focus is placed on the tense encounters between Argentine forms of 
liberalism and right-wing anti-liberal movements—which can’t be cleanly separated, even as 
they are often promoted as discrete ideological poles.   
Throughout most of the chapter, these histories are presented in relation to the 
positioning of “Jews” in the national imaginary and on the ground, and more generally, the 
question of difference.  This chapter also provides an introduction to some of the feelings 
and ideas that Argentines use in the relation to understanding and seeking justice for the 
AMIA bombing.  I ask, what kind of Argentine citizen is invoked in struggles against 
impunity?  Among many middle-class Argentines, the more obvious questions might be: Will 
Argentina fully implement the structures and feelings associated with liberal democracies or 
remain a nation socially and politically governed by more authoritarian anti-liberal currents?  
Is Argentina part of Europe or Latin America?    
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  Chapter two looks at historical discussions about Jewish citizenship as they 
emerged in eighteenth and nineteenth century Europe.  Much of these discussions, 
informed by Enlightenment thought and the process of transforming Europe into unified 
nation-states structured by the ideals of liberalism, concern how Jews could be transformed 
from a ghettoized “other” to part of society as citizens.  This process and discussion varied 
across the region, and I particularly focus on French and to some extent German, contexts.  
I look at this revolution from what at the time constituted a Jewish perspective (religiously 
informed, and male), as well as from the understandings about “Jews” presented by elite 
French and German intellectuals and leaders.  Ultimately I show that the process of making 
Jewish citizens required a profound transformation of the meanings and practices of 
Jewishness; a transformation that required a significant loss of Jewish specificity and 
outward difference, and elicited a kind of hybridity and “double consciousness” in Jewish-
identified subjects.26     
While the discourse of universalism as it was linked to ideas of citizenship and 
equality appears to be neutral, this is far from the case.  Rather, the claim of universalism is 
rooted in quite specific images of humanity: European, pale skinned, male, and Christian.  
While societies based on liberal tenets, and thus buttressed by a “universal” vision of 
humanity, appear to be inclusive of difference, as we saw in creation of the French republic, 
this difference was meant to be erased through the process of citizenship.  Radical 
difference at the epistemological level was and is rarely given parity in the West.  Moreover, 
as biological race garnered political and social force as a site of absolute difference, the 
color of one’s skin or the shape of one’s nose, could determine one’s position—or one’s 
necessary removal—from society.  At the conclusion of this chapter, I briefly discuss some 
                                                     
26I take the term “double consciousness” from W.E.B. Du Bois’ (2007) The Souls of Black Folk. New York: Oxford 
University Press.   
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 of these ideas in relation to Argentina and the complicated ways in which Jews identify as 
Jewish and Argentine.  
Even though chapter two takes the dissertation outside of the geographical 
boundaries of Argentina and Latin America, it is not outside of larger imaginaries active in 
the region.  In the emerging nation-states of nineteenth-century Latin America, intellectuals 
and leaders were seriously debating and engaging aspects up Enlightenment thought and 
liberalism, and coming up with new political and social formations to reflect local 
circumstances.  Argentina’s constitution is based in large part on the U.S. and French 
constitution, albeit with particular local transformations, such as the declaration of 
Catholicism as the official state religion.  The legacies of the Enlightenment, specifically 
liberalism (particularly in an economic sense), secularism, and democratic ideas have been 
profoundly constitutive of many Latin American nation-states—but not without contestation 
from more authoritarian nationalist movements based on an imagined pre-Enlightenment 
Spanish utopia, as has been present throughout Argentine history.  Moreover, I argue that 
the European and Jewish histories presented in chapter two are local in the sense that they 
have worked to shape Jewish-Argentine subjectivities.  They are a part of “feeling” Jewish in 
Argentina. While some of the experiences presented may be particular to the “Jews,” they 
can be mobilized in Argentines in ways that exceed their specific origins.  
I intend chapters one and two to provide historical depth and specificity to the 
debates and circumstances of the AMIA bombing and the struggle for justice.  But they are 
also necessary to denaturalize certain understanding about Jews and Argentines.  I provide 
this because I found the category of “Jew” and the discussions surrounding the bombing of 
the Jewish site in Argentina, too laden and fraught with certain “common sense” knowledges 
that served to shut down dialogue and debate.  Concepts such as “anti-Semitism,” for 
example, tend to enclose events within a timeless and essentializing narrative of Jewish 
victim-hood and difference.  Without giving at least a partial history of Jewish difference as 
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 constructed vis à vis the emerging liberal nation state in Europe and Argentina, as well as 
the image of the Jew circulated by counter-liberal nationalist movements in Argentina, I felt 
conceptually trapped by the explanatory powers of words like “anti-Semitism,” “terrorism,” 
and “victim” to describe and give meaning to an event like the AMIA bombing.  This is not to 
say that these terms don’t circulate meaningfully in Argentina.  They do, but they are 
contested, and it is this struggle that I am most interested in exploring.  It is precisely this 
“common sense” vision of the attacks that social movements such as Memoria Activa are 
struggling against, working to rearticulate the bombing within other explanatory frameworks. 
With the images and ideas of Part I circulating, Part II begins to directly engage with 
the events of the AMIA bombing.  Chapter three continues the story of Jewish Argentines, 
with the history of the AMIA building and its destruction in 1994.  I then detail the responses 
to the bombing, from both Jewish and non-Jewish Argentines postitions.  I show how the 
bombing and its Jewish victims were frequently placed at the margins of the nation and the 
ambivalence that attends Jewish citizenship in Argentina.  I discuss how the view of the 
AMIA bombing as solely a “Jewish” affair, has been contested by social movements 
composed of family members of the victims such as Memoria Activa and APEMIA, and 
much of the middle class human rights community.  I argue that the competing visions of the 
bombing express different ways of conceiving Jewishness and Argentinidad. This discussion 
leads into the next chapter, where I look at the divisions within the Jewish Argentine 
community that became amplified and created after the AMIA bombing. 
In chapter four, I focus on the groups of familiares (family members of the victims) 
that formed after the AMIA bombing, and how these groups diverge in their engagement 
with the memory of the bombing and the struggle for justice.  I look at the role of the main 
community organizations, the AMIA and DAIA, in constructing and maintaining a certain 
vision of the colectividad, or Jewish Argentine community, and how this representation has 
been challenged in recent years.  Thus this chapter primarily highlights the tensions and 
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 divisions within the Jewish Argentine community that have become amplified through the 
bombing and the tortuous search for justice.  These divisions, I argue, are tied up with 
different notions of community and citizenship.  I end with a reflection upon how the social 
movement Memoria Activa enacts another politics kind of politics of belonging outside of 
formal channels, widening the possible perimeters of what is “properly” Jewish in Argentina.  
Chapter five directly takes up the subject of justice.  It has been nearly fifteen years 
since the AMIA bombing and seventeen since the Israeli embassy was attacked, but any 
form of justice for the victims continues to remain elusive.  In the case of the AMIA bombing, 
“justice” has gone beyond finding the direct authors of the attack, broadening into an issue 
of human rights that potentially concerns all Argentine citizens.  While the investigation of 
international suspects and connections remains important, the AMIA case is seen as an 
emblematic example of the “culture of impunity” that many lament is endemic in Argentine 
politics and society, and therefore, the investigation of the investigation has garnered almost 
equal importance.  For many years the AMIA investigations, and the one trial relating to it, 
has been the subject of various allegations and suspicions alluding to a deliberate 
obstruction of justice—a cover-up.  This was for good reason, as over the years pieces of 
evidence have been lost, key suspects have been dropped, and information about the 
handling of the case by the judge in charge of the investigation hinted at serious infractions.  
Memoria Activa has been one of the only public voices that have consistently critiqued the 
role of the state in essentially enabling the attack, and later, obstructing justice.  Through the 
work of groups like Memoria Activa, along with middle-class human rights organizations, the 
attack on the AMIA has been used like a mirror to reflect and highlight issues of impunity, 
corruption, and human rights within the nation.  I detail how the Argentine state has become 
one of the principle actors in the AMIA case, and not in the roles one might expect (as 
protector and source of justice), but as perpetrator of a crime.  In this chapter, I show how 
the AMIA case came to be emblematic of impunity and the violation of human rights in 
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Argentina, detailing the twists and turns of the AMIA investigations, and the failure of the 
only trial relating to the attack.   
Only in the last few years have the AMIA investigations (or lack thereof) been 
officially recognized by the state as being significantly compromised, with networks that 
reach all the way to former Argentine president, Carlos Saúl Menem.  This chapter highlights 
in particular the role of Memoria Activa in attempting to hail the state and demand 
accountability and responsibility.  Groups like Memoria Activa directly challenge the 
discursive authority of the state to create meaning and fashion an “official story” to serve the 
purposes of government officials, offering a counter-archive of knowledge. 
The conclusion is really an ode to Memoria Activa.  I focus on their decision to leave 
the Plaza Lavalle in 2004, and the discussions that led up to this result.  I further reflect 
upon how what Memoria Activa was able to do in their ten years in the Plaza (they are still 
struggling for justice, but cease to have weekly presence in the street), and how they’ve 
opened up a critical space within which to discuss citizenship, Jewishness, and the nation.  
The conclusion is also meant to give a sense of the journey I took over the course of thirteen 
months in Buenos Aires.  As I provided a description of my first day in the Plaza here in the 
introduction, I describe a scene of my last Monday with Memoria Activa.  Importantly, as I 
reflect upon this work, I also look to the future and delineate further questions and aporias 
that need greater contemplation.  
II. Can an Argentine Be a Jew? 
“Last name?”   
“Schnaiderman.” 
“Again?”… 
“Schnaiderman,” you repeat… 
“It would be better,” he answers… “if you write it yourself. I find it difficult to copy 
foreign names.” 
“What is your name, sir?” you ask…. 
“Hector García. Why?” 
“And your name is not ‘foreign’ but rather ‘Argentine’?” 
“Yes…Yes, sir.” 
“You mean to say, then, that you descend from a tribe of Mataco Indians. Or Tobas. 
Or from Querandí Garcías. Perhaps Califucara García, an Araucano chief… 
“No, sir, I wanted to say that I am ‘Argentine’ because I was born here. In this 
country.” 
“I was also born here.” 
“In Buenos Aires. In the neighborhoods.” 
“In Buenos Aires. In the neighborhoods.”… 
“My mother too is Argentine…I am a second-generation Argentine.” 
“My mother too is Argentine. A native of Buenos Aires, to be exact. Second 
generation.”… 
“You don’t understand me. To be Argentine is…”—Ricardo Feierstein, Mestizo 
(2000). 
 
“Nations, in their infancy, are children who foresee nothing, who know nothing, and 
men of much foresight and much knowledge must serve as their fathers. The 
barbarians have devoured us…”—Domingo Faustino Sarmiento, Facundo (1845) 
 
Introduction 
This chapter is part one of a two-part section entitled “The Jew in the Nation.”  Both 
chapters taken together explore the “Jewish Question” in Argentina from the perspective of 
Argentine nation-building processes on the one hand, and on the other, from European 
processes of Jewish emancipation in the eighteenth and nineteenth century.  Both chapters 
consider challenges and responses to citizenship from Jewish intellectual, social, and 
 
religious perspectives.  Although the “Jewish Question” in Argentina was never part of the 
political and social climate as it had been in Europe, I use it to refer to the social and political 
questions that Jews (and by extension other minorities) posed to the nation and state at 
various times.  Through a tracing of some of the sources from which Argentine national 
imaginaries draw, I ask, “Can an Argentine be a Jew?”  I look specifically at two important 
dialogues in nineteenth and early twentieth century Argentina that continue to resonate 
today, the ideas of “civilization” and “barbarism” and ideas about immigration and the role of 
immigrants in creating the nation.  I show how immigration was not just a topic of practical 
concern, but part of an ideological mission to transform Argentina—and a highly contentious 
one.  In order to conceptually frame the desire for immigrants—specifically, European 
immigrants—I give an account of one of the most visible and influential debates of 
nineteenth century Argentina, that of “Civilization and Barbarism.”  I also discuss the rise of 
“traditionalist” and “nativist’ discourse in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries 
that attempted to define the nation in part through a rejection of all that was “foreign.”  These 
discourses were often taken up in specific ways by the ultra-right nationalist movements that 
began to coalesce in the 1930s and 40s.  
In all of these topics, the visions of Argentina conceived through immigration and 
polarizing discourse of “Civilization and Barbarism,” and right-wing nationalist movements, I 
ask where or how Jews may fit into or disrupt these national dialogues, particularly when 
they came to inhabit not just Argentine imaginaries, but life on the streets.  I discuss some 
important aspects of Jewish life in Argentina, from the time of immigration to more 
contemporary periods, in order to show the processes and practices through which Jews 
accommodated and stretched the dominant articulations of Argentinidad, often occupying a 
position of ambivalence. This ambiguity is reflected in the various ways that the bombing of 
the AMIA came to be interpreted, and the position and positioning of Jews vis à vis this act 
 
 of violence.  I now turn to a recurring source of tension in discussions of the nation, the topic 
of immigration.  
The Specter and Promise of Immigration 
“…the principal element of order and morality upon which the Argentine Republic 
relies today is the immigration of Europeans…If there were a government capable of 
directing their movement, this alone would be enough to cure in ten years, at most, 
all the homeland’s wounds made by the bandits, from Facundo to Rosas…”—
Domingo Faustino Sarmiento, Facundo, (1845) 
 
 In 1852 Juan Bautista Alberdi famously said that in America, “to govern is to 
populate.”  This statement was made shortly before the Constitution of 1853 would be 
ratified, a document largely constructed through the vision of Alberdi elaborated in his 
famous essay, Bases y Puntos de partida para la organización politica de la República 
Argentina (1852) (Bases and Points of Departure for the Political Organization of the 
Argentine Republic).  Forty-two years after independence from Spain, Argentines were 
intensely negotiating their national identity and system of government.  There were many, 
notably wealthy urban elites of whom Alberdi was one, who desired to release Argentina 
from its Spanish colonial roots, and prosper among the “enlightened” nations of the world: 
France, England, Germany, and the United States.1  However, in order to achieve this 
transformation, criollos needed to be convinced that the way of life that had developed in 
Argentina was not the way to progress, and that immigration was a necessary remedy for 
the nation’s ills.2  
                                                     
1For a discussion of the desire for immigration among elites (both liberal and non-liberal) see Nicolas Shumway 
(1993) The Invention of Argentina, Berkeley: University of California Press; Donald S. Castro (1991) The 
Development and Politics of Argentine Immigration Policy, 1852-1914: To Govern is to Populate. San Francisco: 
Mellen Research University Press; and Tulio Halperín Donghi (1976) “¿Para qué la inmagración?: Ideología y 
política inmigratoria y aceleración del proceso modernizador: El caso Argentino, 1810-1914,” Jahrbuch für 
Geschichte von Staat, Wirtschaft and Gesellschaft Lateinamerikas 13: 437-489).  
 
2During colonial times criollo referred to Spanish born in the colonies, as opposed to Peninsular Spaniards in 
Spain or who had posts in colonial America.  Criollo came to represent a different way of life and culture than 
Spaniards, forged through the colonial experience.  Thus, the term criollo began to refer less specifically to those 
of Spanish descent to those who were from the colonies and were often of mixed Spanish, indigenous and 
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 Why was the uniting of nation-building with immigration so strong among these 
urban, liberal intellectuals?  Immigration served a dual purpose: increasing the population 
would allow for the “improvement” and “development” of the land and economy through 
industry, agriculture and the building of infrastructure, and it would help realize a vision of 
the nation that was “white,” “civilized,” and “productive.”  
Alberdi and others within his elite intellectual circle, such as Domingo F. Sarmiento 
and Esteban Echeverría, called “liberals” and often “Unitarists” (as liberals often wanted to 
unite the provinces under the power of Buenos Aires) fought for a particular vision of 
Argentina that was rooted in enlightenment ideas, particularly economic liberalism, popular 
secular education, separation from the Church.  However, along with these ideas 
championed by men such as Sarmiento and Echeverría, was a notion of governance that in 
conception and practice only included the educated, land-owning elite.3  Thus, while 
influenced by the popular democracies of France and the United States, their political 
visions were heavily colored by strict colonial hierarchies and the belief that the “masses” 
were ill-suited on multiple levels to participate in processes of governance, including voting. 
(Widespread suffrage for men wasn’t implemented until 1912 with the passing of the Sáenz 
Peña Electoral Law. Women did not get voting privileges until Perón came to office in the 
1940s.4)   
                                                                                                                                                                    
African heritage.  Around the time of independence, criollo began to refer to particular ways of life and social and 
political sensibilities that were at odds with the developing attachment to “liberalism” and to some extent, 
cosmopolitanism, in the cities.  Even though men like Alberdi and Sarmiento were criollo by virtue of their birth, 
they distinguished themselves through their social and political beliefs and “non-native” ideas.  
 
3The labeling of these men as “liberals” should not be confused with current popular usage of the term in the 
United States.  To call men like Alberdi and Sarmiento “liberals” refers to the ways in which they challenged parts 
of culture and politics of Spanish colonialism (but not necessarily its hierarchical ideas), and argued for an 
opening up of the economy to foreign investment, widespread secular education and a general desire to limit the 
role of the Catholic church in state and society, and an emphasis on reason. 
 
4See Bonner (1997:51-57) for a discussion of the expansion of political rights for women under Perón and the 
role of Evita in championing these rights.  
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 Battles about how the nation would be conceived were often waged along axes of 
“rural” and “urban” or Buenos Aires and the provinces.  There was intense strife between the 
power the came to be located in Buenos Aires and its environs and the power of the 
provinces.  There were those (Unitarists) who sought to unite Argentina as a republic, 
significantly curtailing the autonomy of the provinces, and others who wanted greater 
autonomy for the provinces (Federalists). Federalism came to be associated with populism, 
which realized the political power of the popular classes and came to articulate a position of 
nativism to the “Euro-centrism” of most Unitarists.5  
 Power in general and the ability (legitimacy) to govern was concentrated in the 
hands of wealthy landowners, whether urban or rural based.  Up until the constitution of 
1853 which instituted Argentina as a republic with centralized power based in Buenos Aires 
(the Unitarists won this fight, but not the battle), government in the provinces consisted of a 
loose federation of wealthy landowning families and individuals who were essentially free to 
make laws according to their own interests, with little thought to larger political or economic 
concerns.  The provincial leaders were known as caudillos, and the style of their leadership 
known as caudillismo.6  In opposition to the vision of the state desired by elite urban 
intellectuals, the caudillo and caudillismo came to be seen as one of the sources of trouble 
(or barbarism) for Argentina.  The rule of the caudillo, while sharing the same elitism and 
paternalism as the liberals, was seen as capricious, self-centered, passionate and violent.  
The suspicion toward the caudillo will be further elicited below through the sharp words of 
                                                     
5Shumway (1993:47-48.)  
 
6The caudillo and caudillismo has a rich history in Argentina and Latin American.  Used rather generally today to 
refer to a type of politics that often has aspects of populism, localism and personalism—a strong leader that often 
sees himself (and is seen to be) above the law.  At the time of Alberdi and Sarmiento, caudillos were primarily 
associated with rural politics and referred to a local leader (a wealthy landowner) who consolidates and keeps his 
power through a combination of patronage, intimidation or violence, often along with a cult of personality.  The 
caudillos fought ideological and bloody battles for their particular economic and political interests, enlisting the 
help of the peonadas (peons) in battle. For their loyalty, the peonadas were given security, employment, food 
and shelter (Lynch 1993:16). 
 51
 one of their greatest critics: Domingo Faustino Sarmiento.  The effort of the Unitarists could 
be seen as a desire to suppress caudillismo and “civilize” the pampas.  
Another significant source of tension among Argentine elites concerned the place of 
Spain and Spanish “tradition” in the nation.  Among certain prominent men in society, what 
they identified as “Spanish culture” was like the kiss of death: it was viewed as against 
progress, dominated by Catholicism, and “backward.”  Among many liberal intellectual elites, 
including Sarmiento and Echeverría, Spanish culture came to be seen as reason for the 
deficiencies of criollo culture.  Shumway (1993:137) notes that, “Sarmiento laments that 
Argentina had not been colonized by a more ‘civilized’ country that would have left Argentina 
a better legacy than ‘the inquisition and Spanish absolutism.’ Spain for Sarmiento is the 
backward daughter for Europe….” From the perspective of men who held these ideas, what 
Argentina needed was an injection of fresh blood and enlightened ideas from Northern 
Europe.  The rebirth of Argentina would happen in part through education, but mostly, it was 
hoped, through an infusion of new bodies from more “desirable” countries in Europe: 
France, Germany, and England.   
Carrying on the legacy of Argentina’s first president, Bernardino Rivadavia, and his 
dream of a “new society that…would become a showplace of Western Civilization, an 
exemplum of European culture in the Americas, Paris in the Pampas” (Shumway 1993:84), 
Alberdi and his ideological brothers looked to Europe and North America, rather than Spain 
or criollo culture to fashion a newly independent Argentina. From the perspective of these 
urban elites, their struggles could be subsumed within the following concerns: Would the 
Argentine state adopt the liberal ideals present in the United States and Northern European 
countries, albeit with significant local transformations, or would it continue to be heavily 
influenced by the political traditions that had evolved with Spanish colonization?  Would 
Argentine culture become a shiny showcase of European manners and civility, and perhaps 
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 most importantly, productivity, or remain tied to the traditions of Spanish colonial rule—
intensely hierarchical, authoritarian, insular, stagnant, and tied to the power of the Church?  
Two ideological positions came to dominate the Argentine imaginary, one defined as 
liberal, European, and “civilized” and other which invests civilization in the traditions of Spain 
and the Catholic church.  To some extent, these positions are premised upon a distinction 
between “rural” and “urban,” with the latter corresponding to the former, and vice versa. 
These divisions can be traced back to the early years of independence, if not earlier, and 
have much to do with the different ways that Buenos Aires and the interior developed, in 
power, wealth and culture.7  Those who saw Argentina’s future with the local culture of the 
criollos became part of a nativist movement that would see its fullest political fruition in the 
rise of nacionalismo in the 1920s, 30s and 40s.  The liberals, on the other hand, were 
portrayed as “selling” Argentina to Europe, and betraying the true heart of the nation.  This 
debate has as much resonance today as it had in the nineteenth century. 
The cities, and Buenos Aires in particular, came to represent a liberal vision of 
Argentina that sought economic growth and security, as well as a civilizing process through 
European immigration.8  Many of those who held political and economic power in the 
provinces, the caudillos, wealthy landowners, and Catholic Church, were not necessarily 
interested in being “civilized” by European immigrants, nor did they necessarily believe that 
the destiny of Argentina lay outside of its national or regional, boundaries. The problem was 
not just of political power, but about authenticity and the definition of the nation.  From what 
                                                     
7Shumway writes, “By 1820 the fault underlying Argentine society and history was clearly visible…On the side of 
the fault were the liberals, mostly the Unitarians of Buenos Aires, who lived facing Europe, and were anxious to 
import the latest, most modern ideas from abroad, to wrench their embryonic nation into modernity whatever the 
cost, and to make it a showplace of European civilization.  In their scheme, Buenos Aires would serve as 
exemplar and tutor of the provinces and perhaps for all of Latin America.  On the other side of the fault were 
Federalists, provincial caudillos, and populists of several stripes.  Although their dream for Argentina was less 
clear and less articulate than that of their liberal enemies, they sought a more inclusive polity where there was a 
place for the campesino, the Indian, the mixed-bloods, and the gauchos” (1993: 80).  
 
8“Buenos Aires” and the “interior” (and here I need to be careful not reify these places more than they already 
are) were quite different culturally and economically, even if the urban elite intellectuals often had considerable 
estancias in the country of their own.  
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 sources would the spirit and people of Argentina be forged?  For those who lay claim to 
authenticity though Spanish “tradition” and local criollo culture (often under the umbrella of 
Federalism, caudillismo, nativism, and later nacionalismo), whether a wealthy landowner of 
peonada, it was the Europeanized porteños who were the imposters and had to sublimated.  
 The fascination with non-Spanish Europe by many intellectual elites of the 
nineteenth century, coupled with a romantic but ultimately negative image of the “local,” is 
reflected in one of the most important and infamous debates in Latin America: that of 
Civilization and Barbarism.  The subject of Domingo Faustino Sarmiento’s seminal work of 
Argentine and Latin American literature, Facundo, this debate was a struggle not only to 
define the burgeoning nation, but to determine from where its spirit would be drawn.  This 
debate, as I will illustrate below, is not only a discussion about kinds of bodies and ways of 
life, but also of geography: the “natural” world and its “tamed” counterpart, the city—or 
“nature” and “culture.” 
Civilization and Barbarism 
The breath of Domingo Faustino Sarmiento can still be felt in the streets, homes, and 
cafes of Buenos Aires.  His legacy can be felt in the classrooms of public schools that dot 
the country, and in the ways in which Argentines (perhaps especially porteños) conceive of 
themselves in relation to “Latin America,” “Europe,” and today the “United States.”  During 
his time, Sarmiento was a powerful force in Argentine letters and politics.  The man made an 
impression by both his word and his girth; he was not immoderate in either thought or 
appetite, and during most of Sarmiento’s political career (1830s-1880s) he wasn’t an easy 
figure to ignore, even in exile.9  Born and educated in 1811 in the Argentine province of San 
Juan, he was neither wealthy nor European educated.  Notably for the time and influential to 
his thought, the social and economic position he was born into did not hinder his future 
                                                     
9Sarmiento, like many in his intellectual circle, went into exile a couple of times during the Rosas regime (1829-
1852).  He wrote one of his most famous works in Chile, Facundo, or Civilization or Barbarism.  
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 success.  Sarmiento, then, was not part of the Buenos Aries intellectual elite by birthright, 
but gained prominence through his lively polemical writings, philosophical beliefs and 
political activities; his life was in many ways an example of one of his most cherished beliefs: 
the power of the individual “…to shape personal and public destinies” (Kirkpatrick and 
Masiello 1994:4).   
Sarmiento engaged with an important group of intellectuals based in Buenos Aires, 
European educated, and for the most part wealthy, who formed a literary society in 1837 as 
a forum to challenge the existing political leadership of the country, most notably the rule of 
Juan Manuel de Rosas—a brutal caudillo ruler (1829-1852) despised by Sarmiento and his 
circle.10  The founder of the group known as La asociación de Mayo (The May Association, a 
reference to Argentine independence), Estaban Echeverría, along with Sarmiento, Juan 
Batista Alberdi and Bartolomé Mitre, among others, believed in the power of the “right” ideas 
and beliefs, and along with this, the strengths of “good” breeding and racial provenance, to 
set Argentina in the direction they desired (Shumway 1993:126-127).  What the people 
needed was the right words, delivered by a man of particular genius. Esteban Echeverría 
argued that this man will…“drink from the fountains of European civilization, he will study our 
history, he will examine with a penetrating eye the depths of our society, and, enriched by all 
the treasures of study and reflection, he will…bequeath a legacy of works that will enlighten 
and ennoble the patria” (Shumway 1993:127).  
What the people also needed, were more (and different) people.  Immigration was 
the other side of this coin.  Immigration served two needs: to tighten a claim on the land and 
increase economic productivity, and to realize a vision of society based on (non-Spanish) 
European ideals and phenotype.  Immigration, it was believed, could tame and transform the 
                                                     
10Alberdi is probably the more subtle thinker in this group.  He initially supported the Rosas regime and argued 
that caudillismo was not mere barbarism but reflected a genuine reflection of the people, and a “stage” toward 
democracy.  As the brutality of the Rosas regime grew, he attitude toward the leader changed (Shumway 
1993:124-125).  
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 inherent barbarism that Sarmiento in particular perceived in the nation.  The desired goal of 
these intellectuals was less a revolution composed of arms and blood (although it was this 
too: the extermination and suppression of the indigenous population was part of this project) 
than an attempt to transform Argentine society through social engineering, education, and 
“whitening” the population through immigration.  While most of their ire was directed at the 
Rosas regime, it was not just the man they despised, but what they felt he represented: the 
illiberal and irrational demagoguery of the caudillo and an ethics derived from the untamed 
pampas, rather than the enlightened reason and noble leadership provided by the books 
and intellectual banter of the salons. 
For Sarmiento, land or place had a deterministic power on character; it could 
cultivate an industrious “reasoned society” or stimulate “savage impulses” and idleness, with 
the culture and tamed nature of the cities promoting the former and the plains of Argentina 
advancing the latter.  What the ‘untamed” plains could nurture, apparently, was (in 
Sarmiento’s eyes) a brute like Rosas.  The figure of Rosas, whose use of violence and 
intimidation were well known, became for Sarmiento and his peers more than a vicious 
tyrant.  Coming from the provinces (although in actuality not too far away from the city of 
Buenos Aires), he symbolized aspects of Argentina, its people and land, that, according to 
Sarmiento, threatened progress, civilized life, reason and liberty.  It is Rosas that is to stand 
in for all that is barbaric in Argentina: “…[the] despotic government of the rancher Don Juan 
Manuel de Rosas… sticks the gaucho’s knife into cultured Buenos Aires and destroys the 
work of centuries, of civilization, law, and liberty” (Sarmiento 2003:78).  The desire for 
immigration was in part an economic and racial desire, but it also promised to transform the 
land into civilized, productive spaces, that in turn would foster the “right” kind of culture.  
    Therefore, the work of Sarmiento and his peers is more all encompassing and 
expansive than a directed political attack.  Shumway sums up the struggle of Sarmiento and 
his intellectual siblings in the following way: “The cause of his generation was not, then, 
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 merely a fight against a particular politician, but a monumental struggle the pitted the forces 
of civilization against the powers of barbarism; Civilization or Barbarism are the choices 
Sarmiento offers us, and to a degree those terms become the rallying cry of the entire 
generation” (1991:134).  The epic quality ascribed to this struggle required significant 
discursive work.  It is not an understatement to say that Sarmiento, along with his 
contemporaries, provided some of the most lasting, powerful, and problematic guiding 
fictions for the nation. 
Sarmiento’s masterpiece, Facundo, Civilization or Barbarism, published in 1845, 
most compellingly and urgently evokes what is at stake for Argentina in this battle.11  While 
Sarmiento’s analysis of the nation is composed of rather absolute dichotomies and his 
bombastic prose annoyed some his contemporaries, the lens with which he renders 
Argentina has served as a potent narrative of understanding for many of its citizens.  It can 
be argued that Sarmiento’s dichotomous rendering of Argentina is so entrenched and all-
encompassing that it is difficult to interpret the events and ideas of the nation outside of its 
perimeters.  The ideas presented in this stylistically groundbreaking narrative (it can’t be 
contained by one genre, but includes many), have given the Argentine nation a national 
ethos with which to unite, and become.  “Civilization or Barbarism” gave Argentines—and 
Latin Americans in general—a language with which to know and interpret themselves and 
their country’s history.  Echevarría states in his introduction to the most recent (and most 
complete) translation of Facundo in English: “With Facundo in particular, Sarmiento had 
given Argentina a national discourse, a set of ideas and figures through which the country 
could think itself—a phenomenology of its spirit, as it were” (2003:10).  More recently, one 
can detect echoes of Sarmiento in questions that porteños sometimes pose to themselves: 
is Argentina part of Europe or Latin America?  
                                                     
11The book has changed titles over successive printings. The original title of this book was Civilization and 
Barbarism: The life of Juan Facundo Quiroga, and the physical aspect, customs, and practices of the Argentine 
Republic. 
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 What are the evocative ideas and figures that manifest so prominently in Sarmiento’s 
prose?  Ostensibly a non-fiction narrative about the life of Juan Facundo Quiroga, a caudillo 
leader in the Northwest of the country who is seen to be a precursor to Rosas, the book is 
“about” much more than Facundo or Rosas.  The main actors in Sarmiento’s national drama 
are: gauchos and caudillos in contrast to porteños and other city-folk, centralism opposed to 
federalism, democracy vs. despotism, and the landscape of Argentina itself.  The gaucho in 
particular, while romanticized at times in Sarmiento’s prose, is one of the most vivid 
examples of “barbarism” that he provides.  The independent gaucho, this famous image of 
Argentina that still graces literature for tourists and the popular imagination, was for 
Sarmiento an image of unrestrained wildness, of a life lived outside of society and the law.  
Sarmiento’s negative view of the gaucho, and his denigration of what he saw as “barbarism” 
would be later challenged by a resurrection of nostalgic feelings for this “authentic” 
Argentine figure.  
Interestingly and not insignificantly, the other work of literature that has most 
contributed to nationalist discourses and feelings is José Hernández’s myth-making epic 
poem on the gaucho, Martín Fierro, published in 1872.  Ironically, by the time this work was 
published, “the gaucho had become an object of nostalgia, a lost origin around which to 
build a national mythology” (Echevarría 2003:15).  Martín Fierro helped to immortalize the 
gaucho as a figure of authentic Argentineness, a model to be lauded rather than denigrated.  
These two works, one championing the civilization of the cities, with its industrious 
immigrants and its educated citizens, and the other celebrating resourcefulness, the bounty 
of the land, and the individual unschooled in neither the laws, customs, or knowledge of 
urban society, are again evidence of the tensions and contradictions at work in Argentine 
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 national discourse, and are a testament to the ways in which “civilization” and “barbarism” 
can come to mean different things.12   
In many senses, the vision that Sarmiento provided Argentina (and beyond), being 
based on irreconcilable opposition—Civilization or Barbarism—has created a blueprint for 
failure.  Can Argentines or Argentina every fully rid themselves of “barbarism”—a category 
whose qualities change over time—and if not, what then?  Argentina becomes a nation 
“betwixt and between”: “The image of Argentina as in incomplete being, an inauthentic 
reflection, or an unfinished product of modernity has often been seen as the inevitable 
drawback of its European genealogy.  From this angle, Argentina appears to be a utopian 
dream that went awry…the lingering ruins of a stillborn great nation” (Nouzeilles and 
Montaldo 2002:4).  A significant legacy of Sarmiento’s Facundo, can be described as a 
sense of failure, a feeling of inevitable decline that haunts discussions about the state and 
society.13  
Sarmiento’s other significant contribution to the shaping of the country is less 
ambiguous in its benefit.  The well-developed education system, which he worked at 
expanding and improving most of his life, is one of his most important legacies.  Sarmiento 
was president of Argentina from 1868-74, during which time some of his most successful 
works included building schools and the education system, as well as the modernization of 
the railway and communication systems of the country.  For Sarmiento, education was 
foundational to his vision of the individual and his (and to some extent, her) ability to 
                                                     
12See Josefina Ludmer’s work, (2002) The Gaucho Genre: A Treatise on the Motherland, for an in depth study of 
the gaucho and national discourse. 
 
13It is not clear to me that thinking in Sarmiento’s terms of “Civilization and Barbarism” is still relevant among 
younger Argentines.  It did seem to still be an important idiom through which to conceptualize the state and 
society for older middle-class Argentines, however.  Among younger social actors, intellectuals, and social 
movements (all of which are not mutually exclusive of course) in Argentina and beyond, the categories of 
“civilization” and “barbarism” are being redefined or thrown out altogether. See Walter Mignolo (2005) The Idea 
of Latin America, Malden, MA: Blackwell, pp. xviii. 
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 progress and access power.14  In part, his own modest upbringing and improvised education 
may have shaped his thinking in this regard. Sarmiento, a man of rather humble 
background, achieved quite illustrious goals in the world of politics and letters.  (Not 
incidentally, many of his ideas about education and the implementation of public schools are 
directly influenced by the U.S. system.  In fact, Sarmiento brought U.S. school teachers to 
Argentina to help set up schools.)   His thoughts on popular education may seem at odds 
with some of his more hierarchical and elitist views, but in this aspect Sarmiento was a 
visionary for his time and place.  As Halperín Donghi states, “…Sarmiento always refused to 
believe that the distinction between rich and poor established the most important internal 
boundary in Argentine society…”(1994:23).  Perhaps contradictory to some of his other 
social and political positions, Sarmiento, like his North American contemporaries, sought 
education to help level the effects of differences in wealth and power.  However, other 
boundaries in society remained unexamined in his thought.  
As a man of his time and place, Sarmiento’s world-view was deeply marked by a 
profound racism and elitism.  The question of from where to build a national foundation was 
a thoroughly racialized issue.  In 1844 he defends the Spanish treatment of native peoples 
by saying: “…It may be very unjust to exterminate savages…but thanks to this injustice, 
America, instead of being abandoned to savages, incapable of progress, is today occupied 
by the Caucasion race, the most perfect, the most intelligent, the most beautiful, and the 
most progressive of those who people the earth” (Kirkpatrick and Masiello 1994:6).  For 
those intent on transforming Argentina it was not simply a matter of education or improved 
living conditions: the monumental task required new blood.  The barbarism that Sarmiento 
and others see is connected to an idea of racial inferiority, and the inferior culture of the 
                                                     
14For a greater understanding of how Sarmiento approached the matter of women and education, see Elizabeth 
Garrels (1994) “Sarmiento and the Woman Question: From 1839 to the Facundo.” In Sarmiento: Author of a 
Nation. Tulio Halperín Donghi, Iván Jaksic, Gwen Kirkpatrick and Francine Masiello, eds. Berkeley and Los 
Angeles: University of California Press.  
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 criollos was due in part through the inevitable mixing of colonialism.  Although in his later 
years the influential essayist Juan Batista Alberdi comes to respect aspects of criollo culture, 
he doesn’t mince words when he writes in 1852, “Take one of our ragamuffins, or gauchos, 
or half-breeds—the essential ingredients of our popular masses—through all the 
transformations of the best educational system, and in a hundred years you will not make of 
him an English laborer” (Shumway 1993:141-142).  According to this line of thinking, the 
“popular masses” were inherently indolent and lacked the culture and thinking that would 
bring about “progress” to the vast fertile plains and deserts of Argentina.  No amount of 
education could significantly change these qualities: culture and body were unequivocally 
bound together—blood was destiny. 
For Sarmiento, as with Alberdi, the project of nation-building was yoked to 
immigration.  For many decades immigration was seen as an effective means of “improving” 
the nation by the urban elite, but not without heavy opposition from leaders in the interior.  
Despite support for immigration reaching back at least to Rivadavia (1820s) it wasn’t until 
late in the nineteenth century that Argentina actively pursued a pro-immigration policy. And 
immigrants did come, particularly between the years of 1870 and 1914, when almost 6 
million immigrants ambled their sea-addled bodies through the ports of Buenos Aires 
(Cortés Conde 1993:55).  The majority of immigrants to arrive to Argentina were from Spain 
and Italy, with significant numbers of Eastern Europeans and Russians.  Amongst this wave 
of immigrants were thousands of Jews, the majority hailing from Czarist Russia’s “Pale of 
Settlement,” an area of land that comprises present day Poland, Latvia, Lithuania, Ukraine, 
and Belarus.  However, as I explain more fully in the pages to come, most of these 
immigrants did not match the dreams of men like Alberdi and Sarmiento.  
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 Immigration Implemented: Settling and Unsettling Argentina 
In the years between 1871 and 1914, nearly 6 million new immigrants entered 
Argentina.  About 3.2 million chose to settle permanently in the country (Gallo 1993:83).  As 
I described above, the reasons for encouraging immigration were rooted in European ideas 
of (economic and social) progress and civilization.  Argentine leaders and elite urban 
intellectuals thus desired to “modernize” their nation by expanding the economy, building 
infrastructure, and having greater numbers of people to make the land productive.  In the 
1820s, Bernardino Rivadavia, the first President of a newly independent Argentina, began 
agitating for a policy of immigration and colonization, but this policy met with little success 
before 1870 (Cortés Conde 1993:54).  Despite all the talk in the middle decades of the 
nineteenth century about the positive role immigrants could play in shaping Argentina, 
politically it was difficult to install a successful immigration policy.  This was primarily due to 
two factors.  As I iterated above, resistance from landowners and others who had different 
economic and philosophical interests than the liberal leaders, were not keen on “developing” 
the country through immigration.  The other problem was largely practical: the considerable 
difficulties of moving people into the interior without cheap and adequate transport services 
(Cortés Conde:54).  In short, there was very little infrastructure to support bringing more 
people into the interior, and yet, it was hoped that by increasing the population the 
infrastructure would be built.    
With the liberally-minded elite in power in the last quarter of the nineteenth century a 
substantial immigration policy was put in place in the 1870s, challenging and changing the 
society in ways unanticipated by even the policy’s supporters.  In fact, the population of 
Argentina grew quite drastically once the Immigration and Colonization Law passed on 
October 19, 1876.  Bureaucratic changes to Argentina’s immigration agencies in Europe 
served to more aggressively proselytize Argentina and facilitate immigration.  In 1869 
foreigners represented 12.1 percent of the population, but by 1914 they corresponded to 
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 nearly 30 percent of the total population, and the number of urban dwelling people rose to a 
majority (Cortes Conde:55-57).  In many respects, Alberdi’s aphorism, “gobernar es poblar” 
(to govern is to populate) was realized, although not exactly in the way he and others hoped.  
For Juan Batista Alberdi, governance and immigration went hand and hand, each 
influencing the other to strengthen the developing republic.  However, Alberdi’s plan, like 
Sarmiento’s and many of their intellectual contemporaries, depended upon the “right” kind of 
governance and the “right” kind of immigrants in mutual development of each other.  As he 
writes in his most famous political essay, Bases y puntos de partida para la organización 
política de la República Argentina: “Do we want to plant and nourish the qualities of English 
liberty, French culture, and the industriousness of men from Europe and the United States?  
Then let us bring the living exemplars of these attributes…and let those qualities take root 
here” (Alberdi [1852]2002:95).  
The majority of people who responded to Argentina’s aggressive immigration policy 
were indeed European.  But most didn’t hail from France, England, or Germany.  Argentina 
didn’t receive the dreamed of large numbers of “intellectual,” “industrious,” and “civilized” 
peoples from the more northerly regions of Europe—a romantic vision of Europe to be sure.  
Weary and weakened by long travel, most of those who ambled from the ships into the 
boisterous world of Buenos Aires were poor or working class immigrants from Southern and 
Eastern Europe and Russia, along with a smaller percentage of people from the Middle and 
Far East.  The vast majority were Catholic, many were Protestant, some were Jewish or 
Muslim.  It was primarily through the labor and society of Italians and Spaniards, Jews and 
Asians, descendents of slaves and indigenous people, that the nation of Argentina was 
built— “barbarism” with “civilization,” in spite of Sarmiento’s vision.  What were the Argentine 
elite and popular classes to do with this babel of languages and customs?  In a country that 
until then had been primarily Catholic in religious and cultural terms, the presence of 
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 Protestants, Jews, and Muslims tested the limits of religious pluralism as defined in the 
constitution.  How this opening to religious others came to be is worth a brief explanation.  
While the Spanish colonialists left Argentina with a powerful, vocal Catholic Church 
and a society steeped in the mores and traditions of Catholicism (while hardly unchanging, 
the Church works to present an illusion of constancy and tradition), from early in the 
country’s history liberal Argentines sought to curtail the power of the church and allow for 
the immigration, and tolerance of other religious traditions, particularly Protestantism.  The 
desire for non-Catholics stems in part from the negative perception that many liberal elites 
had of “Spanish culture.”  According to this view, the country needed Protestants (who 
correspond to the Northern European countries) in order to prosper and thrive.  
Characteristically, Alberdi states this best in his “Bases” essay: “Reduced to Catholicism to 
the exclusion of other beliefs, Spanish America is a lonely and silent monastery…to exclude 
dissident religions sects in South America is to exclude the English, the Germans, the 
Swiss, the North Americans who are not Catholics, that is to say, to exclude those settlers 
whom this continent needs most ”(Alberdi 2002:98).   
Given the great influence that Alberdi had on the drafting of the 1853 constitution, it 
is not surprising that Article 25 states:  The federal government will encourage European 
immigration and will not restrict, limit, nor burden the entry to Argentina with any taxes the 
entry of any foreigner whose goal is to work the land, improve industry or introduce and 
teach the sciences or arts.15  
Thus, any European immigrant who may be able to help “improve” Argentina will not 
be hindered or discriminated in any way, and while the constitution overtly supports 
Catholicism as the official religion (Article 2), it also guarantees freedom of religion before 
                                                     
15The article reads as follows in Spanish (my translation above): El Gobierno federal fomentará la inmigración 
europea; y nopodrá restringir, limitar ni gravar con impuesto alguno la entrada en territorio argentino de los 
extranjeros que traigan por objeto labrar la tierra, mejorar la industrias, e introducir y enseñar las ciencias y las 
artes. Go to http://pdba.georgetown.edu/constitutions/argentina/argentina.html for the full text of the Argentine 
constitution. 
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 the law (Article 14).  The guarantee of religious freedom coupled with the emphasis on 
European immigration, functioned as a welcome mat for German and English Protestants—
some of the most desired immigrants by the intellectual liberals.  
The constitution of 1853, followed by an encouraging immigration policy in the 
subsequent decades, did bring some Protestants to Argentina.  For the most part, however, 
whatever particular positive influence Protestants were thought to bestow upon Argentina 
was overwhelmed by the Catholics, Jews and others who arrived with them.  While 
Protestant immigrants left and continue to leave a distinct influence on Argentine society, 
they didn’t have the overpowering edifying affect Sarmiento or Alberdi were hoping for.  That 
is to say, they didn’t provide the revolutionary force of civilization that Sarmiento consistently 
championed (Alberdi’s thinking became more nuanced in the later years and less 
disparaging of “native” (criollo) people and culture).    
However, the desire for immigrants and the constitutional guarantee of religious 
freedom did create a legal fissure through which Jews and Muslims could enter the nation.  
It is unlikely that the guarantees of religious freedom proposed in the 1853 constitution had 
Jews and Muslims in mind.  Initially, their entry into the country was a side effect of the 
desire for more immigrants.  As Avni has pointed out, “Alberdi’s idea of change was 
restricted to altering Argentina’s status as a Catholic country only to the point at which it be 
known as a Christian country.  This made it highly unlikely that the Jews would be classified 
as desirable immigrants” (1991:16).  According to Avni, the records of the constitutional 
deliberations contain very few references made about Jews, and it is difficult to ascertain 
what, if anything, the authors of the constitutions were thinking regarding non-Christian 
settlement (1991:17).16   
                                                     
16As Avni writes, the 1853 discussion of article XIV of the constitution dealing with religious freedom was 
contentious, yet ultimately those in favor of religious tolerance prevailed, for the most part: “Non-Catholics could 
not aspire to become president of the Republic. Nonetheless, they were promised total religious freedom, 
equality before the law, and the opportunity to be appointed or elected to other public offices.  The decisive factor 
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 Whatever ideas about Jews had been circulating, they were not overwhelmingly 
negative or persistent enough to prohibit the entry of Jews into the country.17  Indeed, 
Jewish immigration was sometimes positively promoted as a way to help “build” a nation’s 
economy, as Lesser (1994) pointed out in the case of Brazilian nation-building.  The passing 
of the immigration law and the protections guaranteed in the constitution, opened the doors 
to Argentina for Jews.  By the 1880s the Argentine government was pursuing a more robust 
push for immigrants than ever before, and under President Julio Roca (1880-1886), Jewish 
immigration actually became a pursued policy, at least moderately so.  The Argentine 
government fostered Jewish settlement by offering free or subsidized passage to Argentina 
and a plot of land. These promises were not always kept, but thousands of Jews arrived—
and stayed—regardless.  
The changes in immigration policy, the increase of Russian pogroms, and the money 
and connections of a German Jew named Baron Maurice Hirsch coalesced to make 
Argentina a viable and sometimes celebrated option for Jewish settlement. 
From Pale to Pampa: Jews Arrive to Argentina18 
 Before the great waves of immigration in the late 1900s, Jews were a rather 
insignificant presence in Argentina.  But the combination of an active and liberal immigration 
policy, along with increasing instability for Jews in Europe and particularly, Russia, brought 
thousands of Jews through the port of Buenos Aires.  The latter portion of the nineteenth 
                                                                                                                                                                    
here, constantly repeated by the legislators, was the need for massive immigration” (Avni 1991:5). Carlos 
Menem, Argentine president from 1989-1999, himself a convert to Catholicism from Islam, changed the law 
requiring Argentine presidents to be Catholic. 
 
17What is missing from this analysis is a greater understanding of what “Jews” signified to the elite and popular 
classes in nineteenth century Argentina.  Actual Jews were scarce in Argentina until late in the century, and I 
have not significantly explored how the image of “the Jew” in colonial Spanish America articulated with changing 
European notions of race that elite Argentines most likely engaged with. What I will show, however, are some of 
the ways Jews came to be perceived once they settled in Argentina in significant numbers.   
 
18I am borrowing the title of Eugene Sofer’s (1982) book From Pale to Pampa: A Social History of the Jews of 
Buenos Aires. I am using the example of Russia to discuss Jewish immigration to Argentina because it is where 
the majority of the first waves of Jewish immigration have come from.  Jews in Argentina were often called 
“Rusos” as I show below. 
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 century was a chaotic and dangerous time for most of Russia’s millions of Jews.  Confined 
to the Western border of the country (which at the time included portions of today’s Eastern 
Europe) by Catherine the Great in the late eighteenth century, and limited in their freedom of 
occupation and participation in wider Russian society, the Jewish population mainly lived in 
smaller towns (called shtetls in Yiddish) and maintained their own system of education and 
social life, as dictated by religious practice.19  Pogroms, or periodic organized violence 
against Russian Jews, reached a particular intensity in the late nineteenth century, and 
helped to instigate waves of emigration.  While I cannot fully expound upon the complex life 
and place of Russia’s millions of Jews, suffice it to say that the relationship between 
“Russians” and “Jews” during the late 19th century was becoming increasingly perilous for 
the latter.  I focus here in particular on Russia’s Jews because of the significant number of 
them who set their sights on Argentina.  Some quite specifically imagined Argentina as a 
refuge (based on some literature available at the time) and others simply wanted out of 
Russia, by whatever route possible.   
While many new Jewish immigrants chose to settle in Buenos Aires and other cities, 
a significant number stayed in urban Buenos Aires for only a brief period of time, on their 
way to decidedly more tranquil locals.  Instead of making a living as peddlers, tailors, 
seamstresses, or merchants in the cities, with the help of Baron Maurice Hirsch and the 
Jewish Colonization Association (JCA) they traveled to the interior of Argentina and to the 
vast fertile plains of the pampas.20  These intrepid, hopeful, and originally non-agricultural 
Jews settled in sparsely settled areas on tracts of land bought by the JCA.  At these sites, 
known as colonias, they farmed, raised cattle and built the structures necessary for 
                                                     
19The legal decree stipulating that Jews live in the “pale of settlement” lasted from 1791-1917, the year of the 
October Revolution.  
 
20Baron Maurice Hirsch sponsored Jewish immigration, primarily from Czarist Russia to Latin America, Canada, 
and Palestine.  His organization, the Jewish Colonization Association (JCA), was instrumental in helping 
thousands of Jews travel to Argentina and settle in agricultural colonies.  
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 maintaining Jewish life: synagogues, schools, mutual aid associations, cemeteries.  In living 
a largely agricultural life in rural Argentina, they couldn’t have found a more direct route to 
becoming part of Argentina’s mythologized past: they became the Los Gauchos Judíos, the 
Jewish Gauchos.   
 The colonias were isolated, unique outposts of Yiddish and criollo culture.  With the 
help of the JCA, 17 colonias were established in Argentina at the end of the 19th and early 
20th century (Feierstein 1999).  In these hybrid spaces, Yiddish mingled with Spanish and 
farming and ranching complemented trips to the library and local Yiddish theater.  In the 
beginning, Yiddish was the lingua franca and the newly erected stone buildings bore writing 
in Yiddish (a language composed with the Hebrew alphabet), which can be seen today.  The 
first and most famous of the colonias in Santa Fé province, Moíses Ville, began with a group 
of 136 families, all from Russia’s Pale of Settlement.  While many of Russia’s Jews favored 
relocation to Palestine or North America, Argentina had a lure of its own.  To a limited 
extent, Argentina competed with Palestine as an envisioned site for independent Jewish life 
(Gerchunoff 1998; Avni 1991).  In pamphlets and brochures that highlighted the availability 
and quality of Argentine land, and most importantly, the freedom to live there and cultivate it, 
Argentina began to be seen by some as an alternate “promised land”—alternate to the 
envisioned redemptive promises of Palestine and the imagined gilded freedoms of North 
America.  
By the time Jews came to settle the pampas, the gaucho had all but disappeared.  
The term gaucho, now laden with nostalgia, pride, and “authenticity,” had lost its specificity 
and had come to refer to rural inhabitants in general (Shumway 1993:12).  Many of the rural 
folk were skilled in the same way as the gauchos, but led a life substantially different from 
the gauchos of the past—they were not the independent roamers of earlier times.  
Nonetheless, despite the absence of the “real” gaucho, his image as the archetypical 
Argentine cowboy par excellence, infuses discussions about Argentina’s rural agricultural 
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 life.  With the publication in 1910 of Alberto Gerchunoff’s Los Gauchos Judíos (published in 
English as The Jewish Gauchos of the Pampas), Jews firmly appropriated one of the most 
cherished—and contested—figures of Argentine nationalism, positioning themselves not just 
as Jews in Argentina, but Jews of Argentina.21  As Elkin notes, “…the Jewish gaucho 
symbolizes the settlers’ physical and psychic investment in the upbuilding of the Argentine 
interior” (1998:115).  
While the image of the “Jewish gaucho” is celebrated in some Jewish-Argentine 
sectors, it is largely ignored or looked upon with amusement by general Argentine society 
(Lockhart 2005).  Despite the fact that the colonias figure prominently in the history of 
Jewish-Argentine life, their populations were never huge, the settlements weren’t 
economically successful, and they have all but disappeared in present-day Argentina.  
Moíses Ville, the earliest and one of the most robust of the colonias, exists today as a 
sleepy rural village where every once in a while one sees a tourist bus amble through its 
dusty streets.  The Yiddish-inscribed buildings still remain, as does a Jewish school and an 
active synagogue.  But the majority of the town today is non-Jewish and there are few 
opportunities for young people.  Most of the Jewish-Argentines who grew up in the colonias 
chose to raise their families in more urban locations, where there were more business 
opportunities, and particularly in Buenos Aires, a thriving Jewish cultural scene that 
beckoned by the 1910s.  
As the Jewish community swelled in Buenos Aires, so did the institutions and cultural 
offerings that catered to Jewish life.  The AMIA had been established by 1894 and by the 
early decades of the twentieth century one could choose from a variety of Yiddish theater (to 
accompany the lively and prestigious theater culture already present in Buenos Aires since 
                                                     
21Another recent translation to English of Los Gauchos Judíos is Aizenberg’s 2000 publication of Parracide on 
the Pampa? A New Study and Translation of Alberto Gerchunoff’s Los Gauchos Judíos. For more on the figure 
of the “Jewish gaucho” see Lockhart 2005 and Aizenberg 2004.  See also Juan José Jusid’s 1975 film Los 
Gauchos Judíos, based upon Gerchunoff’s book. 
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 the late nineteenth century), Jewish social and sports clubs, camps, schools, political 
organizations and philanthropic societies.  One could find multiple outlets for kosher meat 
and bakeries to pick up Challah bread for Shabbat dinner, and signs in Yiddish graced some 
of the streets of Buenos Aires.  As new immigrants, many Jews chose to live in particular 
parts of the city, such as the neighborhood known as Once, where they created businesses 
and organizations that catered to their needs, like the AMIA and DAIA.  Popular daily 
Yiddish newspapers, such as Di Yiddishe Zaitung and Di Presse, existed for over half a 
century, in addition to dozens of smaller news outlets that catered to the spectrum of Jewish 
political and social interests.  Thus, by the early part of the twentieth century, various 
iterations of Jewish life was more or less thriving in Argentina. According to Avni, by World 
War I the community numbered between 100,000 and 115, 600 persons, the majority of 
whom lived in Buenos Aires (1991:91).  By the end of World War II, the Jewish population 
swelled to near 300,000, but it has been declining since.  While perhaps not fully 
incorporated into the dominant visions of Argentinidad, Jews were nevertheless able to 
practice their religion and pursue their interests relatively unencumbered.  And over the 
generations, many Jewish Argentines would come to have more affinity with others of their 
economic class than religious or ethnic group.  However, the “success” of Jewish life in 
Argentina does not preclude the existence of anti-Jewish sentiment to either “real” or 
“figurative” Jews, and anti-Semitism has had a respectably resilient history in the country.  
Popular literature, such as Julián Martel’s La Bolsa (1890), portrays “Jews” as a 
foreign element (although not as foreign, say, as an Englishman) inherently connected to 
greedy capitalist ventures, intent on taking over Argentine society and economy (if not the 
world).  Martel was writing at a time when the nation was experiencing tremendous 
confusion, strain, and reorganization due to the large numbers of immigrants coming to work 
and settle in Argentina, it was a period of extreme economic stress.  It is during this time that 
we begin to see the seeds of the nacionalismo movement begin to sprout, as we see later in 
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 the chapter.  This movement resurrected “nativist” traditions and ideas for Argentina, and 
marks a resurgence of anti-liberal sentiment in Argentina.  
As I’ve previously mentioned, Jews weren’t the only immigrants to enter Argentina in 
significant numbers, and the influx of new immigrants challenged and changed the physical 
make-up of the country and added to the tributaries of ideas flowing into the nation. By 
1914, third generation Argentines did not make up more than 20 percent of the total 
population of cities like Buenos Aires, Rosario and Santa Fé (Cortés Conde 1993:85).  
According to Cortés Conde, the changes wrought by so many new immigrants did lead to 
conflicts and tensions between native Argentines and those recently arrived, but they were 
not of a “serious character” and “assimilation was, generally speaking, both rapid and 
peaceful” (1993:91-92; see also Romero 2004).  However, I argue that it is debatable 
whether or not the tensions between new immigrants and native Argentines were not of a 
“serious character.”  This same period of rapid immigration saw also a re-evaluation of 
“native traditions” by both supporters and critics of immigration, as I show below, reflecting 
the uneasiness that many criollo Argentines felt in the presence of so many new immigrants.  
Moreover, the process of assimilation was unevenly experienced and pursued by different 
immigrant groups, further complicating the stories that can be told of this period.  
In fact, some of the outcomes of the immigration policies of the late nineteenth and 
early twentieth centuries largely exceeded the peaceful, seamless nation-building that 
nineteenth century liberals imagined.  Those who initially supported or were indifferent to 
immigration may have changed their minds when substantial numbers of immigrants actually 
came to Argentina, and challenged the entrenched power of the wealthy, and often ruling, 
elite.  By the beginnings of the twentieth century rumblings of discontent began to gather 
force at the margins.  
Given the writings of men such as Sarmiento and Alberdi it is not unreasonable to 
aver that those whose liberal visions supported immigration for both economic and social 
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 purposes envisioned receiving people whose worldview was not so different from their own.  
The immigrants, however, were not a homogenous bunch and they brought with them 
different social norms and customs, and also bundled within this, new or otherwise “foreign” 
ideas about politics and society.  “European” proved to be many things, and the period 
(1880-1920s) of immigration corresponded with vast social and political changes in Europe. 
Many of the new immigrants, particularly from Russia, sparked life in political 
movements and aspirations that previously had little purchase in Argentina.  With a 
burgeoning immigrant community often at the margins of society, social and political 
philosophies such as anarchism, syndicalism, socialism, and communism found a new 
home in the streets and meeting places of the larger urban centers—most prominently in 
Buenos Aires.  In the early twentieth century, labor laws were loose at best and a 
governmentally run social safety net was inexistent (this was to be handled somewhat by 
Mutual Aid Societies organized by different immigrant groups).  As Rock has noted, by 
1914, “There was no minimum wage law, eight- or ten-hour act, pensions or retirement 
provisions” (1993:136).  While demands for improved (or at least standardized) working 
conditions and visions for a differently organized society rallied a new generation of workers 
and intellectuals, these demands were not particularly cared for by business owners and 
many of the wealthy elite.  Frequently coupled with a desire for improved labor conditions 
was an interest in transforming the very structure and rationale of society.  Anarchism, in 
particular, became a well-organized and popular movement in Argentina.  This was due in 
large part to the number of Russian immigrants who settled in Buenos Aires since the 
1880s.  A visible portion of these Russians were Jews.  
Jews, while somewhat isolated in the Pale from larger currents in Russian society, or 
perhaps because of their marginalized position in Russia, were not ignorant of the social 
and political changes happening around them.  By the end of the nineteenth century, Jewish 
life all over Europe began to tranform in greater or lesser degrees in response to changed 
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 political and social environments sparked by movements sprung from the Enlightenment 
(see chapter two).  Jews in Russia created their own organizations that combined Jewish 
ideas of social justice with larger political movements.  The Bund, a secular Jewish socialist 
party, was created in Wilno in 1897, but more assimilated Russian Jews shedded their 
religious and ethnic identity and became directly involved with the Russian Social-
Democratic Labor Party.22  Some of these new Russian Jewish immigrants (along with other 
non-Jewish Russians and Europeans) brought their anarchist and socialist ideas to 
Argentina, particularly Buenos Aires, disturbing the extant hierarchical society with their 
political organizing, and agitation for better working conditions and wages.  As I expand 
upon below, as increasing numbers of immigrants began challenging the aesthetics and 
politics of Buenos Aires, a backlash against immigrants, and in particular, Rusos or 
Russians, began to gather force.  
The involvement of many Jews in revolutionary political movements brought 
generally unwanted visibility to the Jewish community (who were often stereotyped and 
seen as guilty by association), and perhaps further marginalized them from mainstream 
Porteño society.  Although Jews did not by any means make up the majority of any 
particular movement, their involvement, particularly in the anarchist movement, was 
disproportionately high, and their presence was quite visible (Moya 2004).  Perhaps the 
most notorious example of this concerns the assassination of the Buenos Aires’ Chief of 
Police in 1909.  The man eventually associated with the crime was a Russian-born Jew, 
Simon Radowisky.  As Moya (2004) details, the killing of the Chief of Police, along with a 
couple of other high-profile events, solidified the stereotype of Jews as anarchists.  
(Significantly, it wasn’t only Jews who were stereotyped, but Catalans as well—not 
surprising given the prominent place of Barcelona in the anarchist movement.)  Thus, Jews, 
                                                     
22See Nathans (2004) for more on this complex period of Jewish Russian relations. 
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 who as the Other to Christian Europe for centuries already were ambiguously welcomed into 
Argentine, particularly porteño society, were also seen as harbingers of “alien” and 
threatening political sympathies.  In early twentieth century Buenos Aires, with its growing 
population of Jews from Russia, the majority of whom still lived in relatively closed 
communities, “Jews,” “Rusos,” and “revolution” came to be almost interchangeable terms 
(Moya 2004; Rock 1993; Avni 1991).  However, the association of Jews with alternative 
political philosophies wasn’t entirely negative.  While the active involvement of Jews in 
revolutionary and labor movements and the stereotype marginalized the community from 
business and elite sectors, Moya (2004) argues that involvement in these mobilizations may 
have helped Jews integrate with other immigrants and the working classes. 
In the first few decades of the previous century, Rio de Plata based (this includes the 
cities of Buenos Aires and Montevideo, Uruguay) anarchists were some of the most active 
politically, and therefore, visible.  By the early decades of the twentieth century, Buenos 
Aires had become “…probably the second most important center for anarchist activism, after 
Barcelona” (Moya 2004:20).  Anarchism, a political philosophy with many incarnations, has 
at its root a belief in “freedom” that can best be achieved without the artificial and often 
negative strictures of a governing body, or state.  Peter Kropotkin, an early and influential 
anarchist thinker, believed in the “natural” and beneficial tendency among humankind for 
cooperation and mutual aid, in refutation of the need of an organizing state or governing 
body (1972).23  In early twentieth century Argentina, there were anarchists who aligned 
themselves with socialism, anarchists who were active in the union movement, and 
anarchists whose notion of society and freedom eschewed both of the above (Moya 2004).  
While Jews of mainly Russian descent did play a prominent role in anarchist and Bolshevik 
                                                     
23This a very truncated definition of a complicated, and varied, political philosophy.  Unfortunately, a more 
complete and nuanced exploration of anarchism is beyond the bounds of this dissertation.  See Peter Kropotkin’s 
(1972) Mutual Aid: A Factor of Evolution, Robert Paul Wolff’s (1998) In Defense of Anarchism, and George 
Woodcock’s (1986) Anarchism for a thorough introduction to the subject. 
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 movements in Buenos Aires, they were not the sole or even the majority representatives of 
these movements.  Nevertheless, in some people’s minds, the Jewish community (and to 
some extent most immigrants) was guilty by association, and was often targeted for the 
actions of a minority.  The most egregious example of the power of this assumption probably 
occurred during a week of political and social unrest, known as “Semana Tragíca” (tragic 
week).   
Following the negative economic effect that World War I had on the Argentine 
economy and the political excitement stemming from the 1917 Russian Revolution, social 
conflict began to intensify in Buenos Aires.  Workers, challenged by difficult economic times 
and perhaps buoyed by the October Revolution, initiated a wave of strikes that reached its 
zenith in 1919.  The government at the time led by Hipólito Yrigoyen sought to negotiate 
with syndicalist demands rather than resort to outright oppression, but as the strikes 
increased, negotiation became an increasingly tenuous option.  The infamous week known 
as “Semana Tragíca” was sparked by a strike in a metallurgical factory in Buenos Aires and 
was followed by a succession of general strikes.  During one week in January 1919, Buenos 
Aires became a “no-man’s land” with a series of “…violent incidents that took place between 
the strikers and the police, who abandoned a hands-off policy and unleashed a harsh 
repression” (Romero 2002:31).  The army, acting independently of the executive branch, 
took matters into their own hands and released troops to quell the violence.  Significantly, 
this week marks the beginning of the army’s assertion of power independent of the 
Commander-in-Chief (the president)—a development that will come to deeply mark 
Argentina in the twentieth century.  Aiding the army were groups of armed civilians 
organized by the Naval Academy.  As the general chaos and violence spread, Jews and 
Catalans were disproportionately targeted by these civilian groups.  Jewish and Catalonian 
businesses and homes were vandalized and people on the street were harassed and 
beaten.  Rock (1985; 1993) while not going into detail, also notes how the Jewish 
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 community, in particular, was targeted. He writes, “The manhunt for ‘agitators’ claimed 
scores of victims, among them numerous Russian Jews who were falsely accused of 
masterminding a Communist conspiracy”(1985:202).24  For the Jewish community—so many 
of whom still held relatively recent memories of Russian pogroms—the attacks raised 
serious questions of their acceptance.  Shortly after the attacks, the Jewish Argentine 
literary magazine Vida Nuestra solicited responses from several statesmen and intellectuals, 
who affirmed the community its place in the country (Avni 1991:101).  Leaders from the 
community also met with President Yrigoyen, and were assured by the president that 
“…persecution of the Jews was ‘incompatible with the traditions of the country and spirit of 
its laws…Public opinion and the government consider Jewish immigration an advantageous 
and important element…’”(Avni:101).  The actions toward the Jewish community during 
Semana Tragíca do not appear to be condoned by the president or other governmental 
officials, and in fact, anti-Semitism as state policy has never really existed in Argentina.  
However, as I describe below, within the nacionalismo movement, particularly after 1928, 
rhetorical scape-goating and derision of the “Jews” developed more productively than it had 
previously.  
Right-Wing Movements and the “Jewish Question” 
The profound social and political changes of the period between 1900 and 1920 
incited a desire for the search for origins and “authentic” Argentine identity.25  Many criollos 
saw the policies of the liberals, particularly immigration, pulling the country apart and 
introducing “foreign” and “corrupting” values.  The years 1909 and 1910 brought the 
                                                     
24For more on Semana Tragíca and how it affected the Jewish community in particular, see Wald 1998 and Avni 
1991:100-102. 
 
25 For more extended discussion on the debates and ideas of this time period, see Lilia Ana Bertoni (2000) 
Patriotas, cosmopolitas, y nacionalistas: Buenos Aires: Fondo de Cultura Económica; Aldofo Prieto (1988) El 
discurso criollista en la formación de la Argentina Moderna. Buenos Aires: Sudamericana; Nicolas Shumway 
(1991) The Invention of Argentina, Berkeley: University of California Press, pp. 214-296; David Rock (1995) 
Authoritarian Argentina, Berkeley: University of California Press, pp.1-37. 
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 publication of two important, early works that helped to give a vision to those for whom an 
emphasis on immigration and an elision of what was seen as the nation’s “traditions” by the 
liberal, cosmopolitan leanings of the Buenos Aires elite were a mistake. The publication of 
Ricardo Roja’s La restauración nacionalista and Manuel Gálvez’s El diario de Gabriel 
Quiroga: Opiniones sobre la vida Argentina, articulated a new interpretation of Argentine 
history and new blueprint for argentinidad, one that looked to caudillismo, gauchismo and 
the “spiritualism” of Spain for inspiration and direction (Rock 1993:40-42).  These books 
helped to resurrect the caudillo president, Juan Manuel de Rosas (Argentina’s downfall, 
according to Sarmiento) as emblematic of the “national character” and a hero to be 
emulated, not despised.  Rosas became an example of the kind of “native” leadership many 
“traditionalists” desired: Catholic, paternalistic, and autocratic.  
Previously, much of the nation’s written history was dominated by urban liberals, and 
accordingly, often reflected a desire to suppress or denigrate what the traditionalists saw as 
the true spirit and strength of argentinidad.  The gaucho, the caudillo, the Church, and rural 
life were not the sites of barbarism or backwardness, as Sarmiento passionately argued 
nearly a half-century earlier.  According to Rojas and Gálvez and others sympathetic to their 
thought, liberalism as it had been practiced in Argentina, along with cosmopolitanism and 
positivism, were not the harbinger of progress, but its very opposite: signs of social decay 
and chaos (Romero 2002:17).  “Civilization” as conceived by Rojas, lay in the “native” 
traditions and organizations of Argentina before the triumph of “foreign” ideas and the influx 
of Europeans (Rock 1993:44-45).  With biting sarcasm, Gálvez writes,  
[W]e began to bring in multitudes of rustic peoples from the Italian 
countryside…Then we started to imitate English and French customs.  Jews and 
Russian anarchists came…The old Creole squares became English parks; the 
barbarous and poor Spanish language has been smoothed out and enriched with 
many Italian, French, English, and German words…We have forgotten our own 
traditions and those ridiculous old-fashioned customs…Today anyone can read 
Voltaire, Marx, Kropotkin, or Bukunin for a mere thirty cents.  As everyone can see, 
we’re now completely civilized [Rock 1993:43].  
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 Gálvez’s ironic words illustrate the variety of people and ideas that had come to 
inhabit Argentina’s physical and imaginary landscape, threatening to erase criollo culture.  
And what did Argentina get to “civilize” the criollos and criollo culture? “Rustic peoples,” 
Jews and Russians, among a smattering of other Europeans whose “civilizing” ideas—
socialism, communism, anarchism, and the rationalism of Voltaire—were the source of the 
materialism, greed, and decay of social order.  
Gálvez’s and Rojas’ writings, along with the works of Argentine poet Leopoldo 
Lugones, tapped into a general kind of romantic nostalgia that reassured those who longed 
for a long suppressed “other” Argentina to the liberal project—a more homogenous, 
homegrown, spiritually united Catholic nation.  These writers were part of a growing 
expression of uneasiness regarding the liberal vision as it was unfolding in Argentina.  They 
saw a society torn apart by “materialism”: a turning away from religious truth and Spanish 
traditions, an alienating focus on the individual, and an unseemly emphasis on the pursuit of 
wealth.  For some of the authors of this new traditionalism, and later nacionalismo (or right-
wing nationalist movement) “the Jew” came to represent this foreign presence and 
influence, a topic I will return to below. 
Some of the sentiments expressed in the writings of Rojas, Gálvez, and Lugones, I 
would aver, was something with which many of the criollo Argentines, including supporters 
of liberalism, could identify.  While liberals may not have agreed that turning to “Spanish 
traditions” was the right path, they weren’t necessarily prepared for societal challenges that 
rapid immigration brought.26  Things were changing in the social and geographic landscape 
of Argentina.  The country was growing rapidly in wealth and population size, the old ways 
of doing politics and conceiving of society were challenged by new ideas and logics of living.  
During this time, new hybrid cultural expressions began to take shape and grow in popularity 
                                                     
26Even Sarmiento wasn’t so sure, when he saw the threat of “two nations”—immigrant and native (Rock 
1993:40).    
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 (particularly in and around Buenos Aires), such as Tango and an Argentine slang known as 
Lunfardo—often to the distaste of the elites (Romero 2002:20).  In some of their more lofty 
and enthusiastic moments Sarmiento and Alberdi alluded to immigration as a panacea—
orderly, industrious and “cultured” Europeans would come to calm and instruct the less 
refined criollos.  However, both the “criollos” and the “Europeans” in this drama were 
products of fantasy, and the country grew and changed in ways unpredicted by the nation’s 
liberal fathers.  
Immigrants, then, weren’t the only ones to experience change and the need to 
accommodate a new social rhythm.  For many native Argentines, daily life was shifting, and 
some people found they could no longer occupy the same social and political space. In 
particular, the wealthy elite felt that their institutional power was waning, as other compelling 
forces threatened influence on the discursive playing field.  The narrowly conceived elitist 
democracy of previous generations was superseded in 1912 by the Saenz Peña law, which 
established universal male suffrage.  (As I mentioned earlier, women weren’t given the vote 
until 1947, under Peron.)  The institutional power of the wealthy elite was further eroded 
when Hipólito Yrigoyen of the Radical Party was elected president in 1916.  The Radical 
Party was a more populist and inclusive party (but not “leftist”), in opposition to the patrician 
Partido Nacional Autonomista that had dominated Argentine politics until then (Romero 
2002:19-25).27  Thus the elite sectors that had dominated Argentine politics and its social 
sphere for decades were feeling encroached upon from multiple fronts.  A greater political 
consciousness was spreading among the popular and emerging middle classes, due in part, 
to the political ideas the new immigrants brought with them.  The strikers, anarchists and 
Bolsheviks were not only saboteurs of the factories, railroads and institutions of society, but 
saboteurs of the mind as well, as Gálvez and his ideological supporters eloquently argued.  
                                                     
27Romero defines the Partido Nacional Autonomista as a “…federation of governors, the provincial heads of the 
political establishment” (1994:14)—an elite, closed system of governance. 
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 They questioned the assumed logic of Argentine society, and began to alter the circulation 
of ideas.  Criollo Argentines and new citizens alike were presented with the possibility of a 
different kind of society and nation.  The upheavals of 1919 (Semana Tragíca), along with 
the growing ideological and political challenge to the status quo, was sufficiently threatening 
to hasten the founding of the Liga Patriótica Argentina (Argentine Patriotic League, Liga 
from now on).  For those who were to become the ultra-right (nacionalistas), the combination 
of “foreign” socio-political ideas and the secularism and materialism they associated with 
liberalism was Argentina’s downfall.  Despite the disruptions and changes that occurred in 
Argentina between the end of the nineteenth century and the beginning of the twentieth, it 
wasn’t until the 1920s that the ultra-right nationalist movement begins to gather significant 
force, with the Liga as its early incarnation.28  
The Liga 
While the writings of the “traditionalists” and their supporters glorify qualities and 
values marked as right-wing in Argentina, it isn’t until the formation of the Liga in 1919 that a 
clear mobilization of these values comes into being.  The Argentine historian Luis Alberto 
Romero described the Liga as a “right-wing paramilitary organization,” as it brought together 
citizens and military to effectively contain “undesirable” actions or citizens (2002:33). 
The Liga brought together many Argentines from the upper and middle classes who 
were concerned about labor militancy, the erosion of traditional structures of power, and the 
dilution of “argentinidad” due to large numbers of immigrants.  In part, it represented a 
concerted effort to integrate the immigrants, and transform them into a specific idea of 
argentinidad.  The overarching expressed goal of the Liga at its inception was to “…foment 
the spirit of argentinidad among all inhabitants and awareness of a citizen’s obligations to 
                                                     
28In Argentina the nationalist movement or nacionalismo refers to ideas considered to be right-wing and their 
authors and supporters: often counter-liberal, anti-immigrant, pro-Catholic and anti-democratic.  Thus nationalism 
in Argentina usually doesn’t refer to in a general sense to a community of people with imagined or genealogical 
ties.  If I am speaking of nationalism in this generic sense I will note it.  
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 the homeland” (McGee Deutsch 1993:39).  They understood argentinidad primarily through 
conformity with their vision of the status quo, and pursued their goals by a variety of means 
(McGee Deutsch 1993:39).   
Education was seen as a primary vehicle through which to create the kind of subjects 
they desired, and they worked to foster patriotic feelings through an understanding and 
celebration of their rendering of the country’s history both inside and outside of school 
settings.  Along with the Catholic Church, they also sought to increase the welfare of the 
poor, in the hopes of staving off a search for alleviation through “foreign” (read: socialist or 
anarchist) ideas.  The military was actively involved in the Liga as well, with military officers 
serving in official roles and working with the Liga to break up union activities.  
The Liga was able to mobilize and recruit large numbers of Argentines to form 
citizen’s brigades, “…which assumed the task of imposing order through force…and to 
pressure the government” (Romero 2002:34).  Like the traditionalists, many urged a return 
to “order” (people in their proper place) and “Hispanic tradition,” and called for a return to the 
Church for moral reform (Rock 1995:67-68). 
The Liga was primarily comprised of members of the upper class and business 
owners, although many in the middle class became involved in the association as well.  The 
organization was not overtly hostile to new immigrants qua immigrants—they welcomed 
them with the express purpose of turning them into “proper” subjects.  It was only those who 
harbored “alien” ideas that challenged the status quo who would feel the harsher side of 
their reform.  While the Liga’s rhetoric was often chauvinistic with a narrowly conceived 
vision of argentinidad, membership was not completely off-limits to new immigrants or those 
who might be called “foreigners.”  Nor were some immigrants immune to the benefits the 
Liga could provide, particularly if they were business owners or landed agriculturalists.  Thus 
despite the pro-Catholic rhetoric of the Liga, Jews sometimes made alliances with this 
group.  In fact, in the province of Entre Ríos, where many Jewish agriculturalists were based 
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 in their colonias, a struggle between workers and farmers in 1921 brought the interest of 
Jewish landowners and the union-breaking Liga together.  After this event, McGee Deutsch 
writes, “Jews joined the Liga in increasing numbers” (1993:44).  The participation of Jews in 
the Liga is an intriguing topic that deserves more consideration than I can provide here.  The 
entry of Jews into the Liga shows that the Liga’s nationalism was largely based on “…an 
idealized conception of worker-employer relations” (McGee Deutsch 1993:47).  In this 
respect, it was more or less open to anyone who saw the same enemy.  In comparison to 
what was to follow, the Liga, while repressive and suspicious of popular democracy, 
appears if not open-minded, then significantly less xenophobic.  
The Nationalists 
Like much of the world, at the end of the 1920s Argentina was suffering the 
economic consequences of the global depression, instigated by the 1929 U.S. stock market 
crash, and the democratically elected government of Hipólito Yrigoyen was facing 
considerable opposition from the military (already a powerful independent force) and elites 
who derided his populism and what they saw as too strong of a commitment to democracy.  
In 1930, Yrigoyen’s government was overthrown in a coup d’état, installing a military lead 
government for two years.29  In the reorganization of the government that followed the 
ousting of Yrigoyen, the voice of the nationalists and their agenda became one of the most 
prominent.  
I do not intend to provide a detailed discussion of the nationalist period here, as this 
topic has been extensively covered by others.30  My purpose here is to illustrate probably the 
                                                     
29For more on this period, see Romero (2002:47-58).  
 
30See, for example, David Rock (1995) Authoritarian Argentina: The Nationalist Movement, Its History and Its 
Impact, Berkeley: University of California Press; Deutsch and Dolkart 1993; Sandra McGee Deutsch (1999) Las 
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Editor de América Latina.  
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 most rigorous undertaking of the “Jewish question” in Argentina.  As I’ve previously iterated, 
negative images of Jews circulated in Argentine society prior to the late 1920s and 1930s, 
however when the nationalist movement acquired greater organization and force in 
Argentine society, the figure of the “Jew” acquired new layers of threat and denigration.  
The contradictions, claims, and beliefs embodied in the Argentine nationalist 
movement are not simply to parse, as the movement was “more effective at attacking rather 
than building” (Romero 2002:61).  The nacionalistas drew on the ideas presented in the 
previous pages, albeit with new infusions of thought from Nazism and the eugenics 
movement.  Like earlier thinkers, the main sources of corruption to true argentinidad were 
“liberalism and individualism, democracy and capitalism, socialism, communism, and 
‘cosmopolitanism,’ Judaism and Masonry” (Rock 1995:1).  Although Jews weren’t the only 
targets of the nacionalistas, as I have illustrated elsewhere, “Jewishness” came to be 
discursively connected to a variety of often contradictory ideas and practices—many of the 
same social and political ideas that the nacionalistas sought to wrest out of Argentine 
politics and society.  
Scholars such as David Rock (1995) and Nancy Leys Stepan (1991) have both 
noted the marked anti-Semitism of the Argentine Right, particularly in the 1930s.31  Thus, the 
anti-Semitism that was building to a crushing crescendo in the 1930s and 40s in Europe had 
its Argentine counterpart—although not the same kind of power or logic behind it.  In many 
ways, the reaction of Argentine anti-Semites (who may or may not have been Nationalists) 
toward the Jews followed well-worn narratives: Jews were an enemy of the nation, linked to 
economic imperialism and “foreign” influences like communism.  As the depression hit 
Argentina, fears about political and social revolution gave way to deepening worries about 
the economy, and conspiracy theories involving Jews and often Freemasons circulated in 
                                                     
31See also McGee Deutsch 2005 and 1993; Rein 2003; Feierstein 1999:203-206; Avni 1991. 
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 Argentina and elsewhere.  As the economic depression deepened, shadowy but well 
organized Jews were invoked as secretly undermining the world economy for their own 
purposes (Rock 1995:23).  Jews were sometimes imagined as being engaged in organized, 
secret plans to take over the world.  In the 1930s, copies of the infamous pamphlet, The 
Protocols of the Elders of Zion circulated in Buenos Aires, which portrayed Jews’ engaged in 
a secret “Bolshevist” plan to take over the world (Rock 1995:104-105).32  After the 1930’s 
the nacionalistas increasingly believed that Argentina’s welfare was being attacked from 
abroad; a conspiracy that “united liberals, democrats, leftists, foreign capitalists and Jews” 
as the enemy (McGee Deutsch 1993:52).  
While Jews were certainly not the only targets of the nacionalistas’ ire, they were 
often invoked as “behind” the various movements and philosophies that they despised.  It 
would not be an exaggeration to note that for many nacionalistas, Jews were enemies of the 
imagined ideal and “true” Argentine nation.  Not being Catholic or even Christian, their 
customs and beliefs were alien; they were seen as “materialists” in opposition to the spiritual 
essence of the Latin peoples; they were the sources of ‘skepticism,’ ‘tolerance,’ and 
‘relativism’ so threatening to the absolute truth provided by the Catholic Church (Rock 
1995:23).  The image of the “Jew” came to inhabit a multitude of categories that were in 
direct opposition of much that the nacionalistas held dear.  As Leys Stepan notes,  
[A]nti-Semitism was characteristic of a particular stream of right-wing thought in 
Argentina in the 1930s.  The Jews were stereotyped in everyday life and in the right-
wing press as an alien race; they were said to bring with them dangerous and 
unfamiliar ideas, such as communism, and strange languages and customs.  They 
were seen as disturbing elements, fundamentally foreign. [1991:143]  
 
For the most part, nacionalistas were opposed to immigration and foreigners in 
general. While Jews were probably the most “rhetorically active”—negative stereotypes and 
images of Jews were easy to resurrect, particularly in the 1930s—target of the Nationalists, 
                                                     
32 Portions of the protocols began to surface in a Russian newspaper in the 1903.  It portrayed Jews as joining 
together against the state by interfering with the economy, controlling the media, and inciting religious conflict.  
This piece of literature continues to circulate today, along with the allegations it makes against “the Jews.”  
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 for those who envisioned a holistic, culturally and physically homogeneous nation, the 
perimeters of difference was quite narrow.  With regard to the homogeneity of the nation, in 
the 1930s and 40s the eugenics movement began to dovetail with the goals of the 
nacionalistas: “The eugenists argued that their country’s potential for a true Latin identity 
was threatened by incommensurable fractions of non-Latin peoples…”(Leys Stepan 
1991:142), and some argued for a ban on “non-white” immigration.33  In many ways, the 
desires of the Argentine eugenics movement—to create a “racially” homogeneous (white) 
Latin nation—corresponded with the goals of the nacionalistas, and added a compelling 
biological layer to their vision of latinidad.  One notorious racist expression of the nationalist 
movement is the 1935 novel Oro (Gold), by Gustavo Martínez Zuviría.  In this novel, not only 
were Jews portrayed as plotting to take over the world economy, but as a distinct and 
unchangeable racial type.34  The question of Jews was infrequently mentioned in the journal 
of the Argentine Association of Biotypology, Eugenics, and Social Medicine (Leys Stepan 
1991:143).  (If they were mentioned it was mostly likely as Rusos, or Russians.)  However, 
the silence of the organization regarding Nazi’s Germany’s eugenic racism (the group was in 
no means unaware of German policies and there was a “German” section of the 
association) “speaks volumes,” and Leys-Stepan suggests that, “…anti-Semitism was an 
unspoken aspect of their racial ideology” (1991:144-145).  This suggestion deserves further 
inquiry in the future.  
By the late 1930s and early 40s, Argentine nationalism was reaching its peak.  Along 
with “liberalism,” “cosmopolitanism,” and “communism,” Jews continued to be positioned as 
foreigners and pariahs, particularly among the pro-Nazi segments of the nationalist 
movement.  In 1943 a military coup gave the right-wing nacionalistas the power to enact 
                                                     
33It is not entirely clear to me what constituted “non-white” in this social milieu.  Leopoldo Lugones was one who 
argued to close immigration to “non-whites” (Rock 1995:103).  
 
34“Judaism,” Martínez Zuviría wrote, “is as indelible as the color of one’s skin.  This is not a religion but a race” 
(Rock 1995:106).  
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 their goals (this dictatorship lasted until 1946 when Colonial Juan Domingo Perón, himself 
part of the ruling junta, was elected president).  One such act was to re-instate the teaching 
of Catholicism in state schools, revoking a 1884 law that established secular public 
education.  While Jewish and Protestant Argentines criticized the decree, the main political 
organization for the Jewish community, the DAIA (which had been formed in the 1930s), 
encouraged Jewish parents to demand that their children be removed from religious 
instruction, but the DAIA did little else to overtly confront Argentine leaders (Rein 2005:165).  
Their subtle approach—which was more akin to asking to be let alone than agitating for 
rights—in many ways foreshadows their stance toward Argentine leaders during the military 
dictatorship of 1976-1983 and more recently with the AMIA bombing.  As will be shown in 
subsequent chapters, the description Rein provides of the attitude of the DAIA in 1943 
resonates deeply with how the DAIA has positioned itself in more recent times: 
Why didn’t the Jewish leadership adopt a more combative attitude toward a military 
regime that considered only Catholics “good Argentines”?  It seems that this 
generation of Jewish leaders, born mostly in eastern and central Europe, were 
accustomed to quiet lobbying and requests for government protection and not to 
public protest or the mobilization of public opinion to put direct pressure on the 
authorities.  Furthermore, being at least partially aware of the fate of their brethren in 
the Old World, they did not lose their sense of proportion. [2005:165-166]  
 
In addition to the imposition of Catholic education, as well as a general discourse 
that promoted “Catholicism” as the proper and true nature of argentinidad, prominent Jewish 
families faced threats, Jewish associations were shut down by the military state, and 
citizenship was revoked for some naturalized Jews (Rock 1995:137).  This period in the 
1940s was probably the most overtly anti-Semitic in the nation’s history.35  More than other 
times in Argentine history, Jews posed a question to the nation and were imagined as a 
                                                     
35Some claim that in the 1930s and 40s, the Argentine government issued identification cards to Jews with small 
perforated stars of David on them, although this has been denied by the government.  See Ricardo Feierstein 
(2001) La logia del umbral. Buenos Aires: Galernal, and Stephen A. Sadow (2005) “Lamentations of the AMIA: 
Literary Responses to Communal Trauma” in Memory, Oblivion, and Jewish Culture in Latin America, Marjorie 
Agosín, ed. Austin: University of Texas Press.   
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threat to the very heart of argentinidad.  However, anti-Semitism never took off with the 
fanatic and seemingly deep-rooted zeal that it did in Europe.  Jews, while living in a social 
and political climate not entirely favorable to them or other Others, were able for the most 
part to continue their activities as Jews, and faced relatively little threat to their persons (the 
last organized attack against Jews was in 1919 during Semana Tragíca).  Anti-Semitic 
graffiti, isolation from certain sectors of society (like the military), and occasional 
discrimination marked Jewish-Argentine life then, as today.  
While some Jewish-Argentines I knew thought Argentina was an anti-Semitic 
country, most reported experiencing very little direct anti-Semitism in their daily lives.  I 
would argue that Jewish-Argentines, like Jews in many other countries, feel a complicated 
sense of belonging and not belonging, with certain events accentuating this tension.  The 
complexities of this “belonging and not belonging” will be discussed in the next chapter.   
The tensions of Jewish belonging and their experiences as both citizens who have 
successfully negotiated argentinidad as Jews, while also being targets of it, is due in part to 
the main contradictory visions that have informed ideas of Argentina.  Within the culture of 
liberalism as it has developed and been employed in Argentina—particularly in Buenos 
Aires—Jews have been tolerated and sometimes celebrated as part of a lively, 
cosmopolitan, urban culture, even if they were not the hoped for and imagined civilizing 
agents.36  At the same time, within the national imaginaries that celebrate an idealized 
“native” culture, championing Catholicism and homogeneity, Jews have found little 
purchase.  But that does not mean they have not found a place; even a margin can be 
imagined to have a ledge.
36 Recently in Buenos Aires one could attend an exhibit on Recently in Buenos Aires one could attend an exhibit 
on Yiddishkeit (Yiddish culture) at the national library, well-received and popularly attended plays with Jewish 
protagonists, among other cultural activities that attract the middle-class.  
III. Can a Jew be an Argentine? 
“Be a Jew on the inside and a man on the Outside” –Moses Mendelssohn 
 
Introduction: The Problem 
Buenos Aires, August, 20, 2004 Baruj’s office.  How does one live as a Jew and an 
Argentine?  This was, in short, the question I asked the elegantly dressed man sitting in 
front of me.  We were in his book-lined office facing the busy street Libertador, my recorder 
collecting the rowdy traffic noise along with our more subdued voices.  From the large 
window behind Baruj’s desk, winter light the color of weak tea eased into the room.  To the 
right of us was a wall of books—philosophy, history, pedagogical texts, Jewish history and 
philosophy.  Given a prominent place among the neat rows of bounded words was a picture 
of his three daughters.  We ordered coffees.  
Baruj, an extremely thoughtful and generous director of a science and technology-
centered private school in Buenos Aires, seemed quite excited, intellectually, to discuss my 
research and answer my questions.  In answer to my query about being Jewish and 
Argentine, he replied with the following explanation:
…let’s say to be a Jew in modernity, that’s to say, after the French Revolution as a 
starting date…is to become part of a global society.  The attempt to insert 
themselves in the global society has to do with what happened to Jews in their 
encounter with modernity…if you are orthodox and don’t integrate with the general 
society you only live in relation to this society, only participating as much as the 
society obliges of you…The other extreme is assimilation and the abandonment of 
Jewish practice.  Yes?  But to be a Jew in Argentina, or to preserve a Jewish identity 
is not a simple thing…1  
                                                     
1“…digamos ser judío en la modernidad, es decir después de la revolución francesa, por tomar una fecha, 
conlleva, es decir va acompañados de las características de la sociedad global. El intentar insertarse en la 
 
 Baruj does not, doesn’t ever, give a personal answer to this question.  Instead, with 
pedagogical intent he historicizes the issue and leads me to the root of my question. 
So can a Jew be an Argentine? Or perhaps the better question begins with how.  In 
the previous chapter I discussed the possibilities for Jewish citizenship and belonging from 
the perspective of dominant Argentine imaginaries and the formation of the nation-state.  
The strain of liberalism and cosmopolitanism that runs through Argentina whose adherents 
sought to (re)build a country out European immigrants—influencing its society and shaping 
its constitution—has allowed for the entrance, and for the most part, flourishing of Jewish 
life.  But what this Jewishness is, or can be, still remains a question.  As I will continue to 
show, there are limits to the claiming of Argentineness for Jews and others, even while there 
are intense structures of belonging.  Jews have achieved political citizenship in Argentina, 
but as is the case in many other countries where Jews reside, “social citizenship” expresses 
itself with ambivalence at times.  And their political citizenship, along with most Argentines, 
is often precarious as well, evident in the ways in which the government has handled the 
AMIA bombing, as I illustrate in the following chapters.  
In chapter one, the limits to Jewish belonging and citizenship in Argentina were 
discussed from primarily within Argentine social and political history.  However, another 
angle on this subject takes us outside the boundaries of Argentina proper and into a study of 
discourses whose histories begin in other times and places.  I am speaking here of the 
transformative ideas of the Enlightenment and what has come to be called “modernity,” and 
some European Jewish responses to these social and intellectual processes.2  Indeed, 
                                                                                                                                                                    
sociedad global tiene que ver con lo que pasaron todos los judios en la modernidad, es decir o eres ortodoxo y 
no te integras a la sociedad general, sólo vives en relacion con esa sociedad en aquellas cosas la sociedad te 
obliga ... Y el otro extremo es la asimilación, el abandono de las prácticas judias ¿si?. Pero ser judio en la 
Argentina, o sea preservar la identidad judia no es una cosa simple…” 
 
2I understand “Enlightenment” to refer primarily to the seventeenth and eighteenth century European movement 
that championed reason over religion, individual freedoms and free will, and universal notions of humanity over 
particularism.  I agree with Foucault’s definition of modernity as primarily an attitude: “…by ‘attitude,’ I mean a 
mode of relating to contemporary reality; a voluntary choice made by certain people; in the end, a way of thinking 
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 Enlightenment discourses such as liberalism, have come to circulate fruitfully in Argentina 
(and Latin America) with various effects and transformations, as I’ve outlined in the previous 
chapter.  In this chapter I examine what historically it has meant for Jews to become minority 
citizen-subjects within the model of a liberal nation-state.3  What is the nature of their 
citizenship, and what is lost and gained through the process of becoming citizens?  What 
understandings of self, nation, religion—and indeed, humanity—have to be circulating in 
order for Jews to become part of a larger body politic?  How does the historical construction 
of Jewishness open itself up to this possibility, and at the same time, profoundly trouble this 
process?  I explore these questions by means of one primary route: I discuss the “Jewish 
question” in European history and social thought and extrapolate upon what this problem 
reflects about the possibilities of Jewishness within a liberal nation-state.  For the most part I 
discuss the “Jewish question” in terms of the process of political citizenship in Europe that 
began in earnest with the French Revolution, but aspects of social citizenship —the ways in 
which one feels and sees oneself as “French” or “Argentine” will be noted as well.4  
While the main theater for this intellectual history is eighteenth and nineteenth 
century Europe, the problems it centers upon continue to suppurate and itch, from the 
streets of Mumbai, suburban apartment houses outside of Paris, bridges in Amsterdam, and 
                                                                                                                                                                    
and feeling; a way, too, of acting and behaving that at one and the same time marks a relation of belonging and 
presents itself as a task.  A bit, no doubt, like what the Greeks called an ethos. And consequently, rather than 
seeking to distinguish the ‘modern era’ from the ‘premodern’ or ‘postmodern,’ I think it would be more useful to 
try to find out how the attitude of modernity, ever since its formation, has found itself struggling with attitudes of 
‘countermodernity’ (1994:39).  See Bruno Latour (1993) for an analysis of the “content” and “work” of modernity.  
As I show below, Jewishness in the seventeenth, eighteenth and nineteenth centuries was constructed as a 
stubborn site of “countermodernity” or unseemly “hybridity” within a Europe increasingly defining itself under the 
signs of modernity. 
 
3For the purpose of this analysis, I leave the case of Jewish belonging and citizenship in the United States aside.  
First of all, Jews never had to undergo a process of “emancipation” in the United States.  Secondly, because of 
different social conditions and objectives, the history of Jewish life and constructions of Jewishness in the United 
States markedly deviates from the European, and Argentine, experience, although there are some key 
similarities.  To read this chapter through the lens of Jewishness in the United States removes Jewishness from 
contingent historical conditions, and simplifies the argument I am trying to make.  
 
4What is missing in this discussion, particularly in reference to Jewish subjectivity is a sustained discussion of the 
idea and function of “Diaspora,” and how seeing themselves as a people in exile has helped to shape Jewish 
subjectivity and practice, and complicate inter-community belonging.  
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 cement-barricaded buildings in Buenos Aires.  It is, in large part, the story of the birth of 
“universal man” and his bastard sibling, difference.  My goal in this chapter is not to ask, 
specifically, “how Jews are different,” but why and when this difference matters in particular 
times and places. 
The “Jewish question” as it developed in eighteenth and nineteenth century Europe 
involves multi-faceted histories with complex genealogies that deserve much more attention 
and space than I can give to them here.  Consider this chapter as an overture—an invitation 
to enter into what will become a much longer conversation outside the bounds of these 
particular pages. 
The Threshold 
Baruj does not give an outright personal exposition of his own struggles, and 
perhaps resolutions, to the question of being Jewish and Argentine.  But he does 
underscore this condition in his understated way: “to be a Jew in Argentina, or to preserve a 
Jewish identity is not a simple thing.”  He also mentions the two “poles” 
assimilation/sameness or separation/difference—that often tend to define the options for 
Jewishness within the framework of modernity.  These poles mark the boundaries of the 
debate about the Jewish question as it arose in eighteenth century Europe, but not the 
living.  As Baruj notes, the living is not a simple thing.  
This friction between assimilation and deliberately maintaining difference has been 
raging among European Jewish communities since Spinoza, and has been marking Jewish 
intellectual thought in the Enlightenment ruled west for just as long.  The ideas set forth in 
the age of Enlightenment opened a door, as it did for most of those living in its wake, and 
offered Jews the possibility to step outside of the rigid demands (and often physical 
perimeters) of their religious communities and join a newly emerging secular society.  They 
could lose the “shackles” of their particularity and join universal “common humanity.”  In 
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 practice, however, the choices were more complicated, the living more nuanced and 
precarious.  To a large extent, Jewishness under the sign of modernity was not rooted to 
one pole or the other, but is characterized by an intense loitering at the threshold.  And in 
this sense, Jewishness became a troublesome hybridity, and not a clearly demarcated sign 
of one extreme or another.5 
As Latour (1993) has elegantly illustrated, the practices of modernity typically rest on 
the purification of hybridity and the fixing of boundaries.  In the nineteenth century, as many 
Jews were most actively involved in negotiating between relinquishing the most profound 
features of their particularity and maintaining their separateness through adherence to a way 
of life coded as “nonmodern,” or “traditional” one could argue that Jewishness itself became 
marked by this instability: their unseemly difference was understood not in religious terms, 
but precisely by this flux.  In other words, Jews could never quite be purified, but remained 
on the threshold between nature (nonmodern) and culture (modern).  Given their 
“doubleness” it wasn’t clear exactly “who” Jews were, until biological racism located and 
fixed their difference in the body, with horrific effects. 
This threshold, then, is a site of much anxiety, as the act of straddling the particular 
and universal is continually active.  I experienced the ongoing performance of this anxiety in 
Buenos Aires, with the ways Jewish-Argentines sometimes were seen and felt themselves 
to be both Argentine and not-Argentine.  I, too, live within the disquiet of the threshold, 
vacillating between feeling “too Jewish” or not nearly Jewish enough, although not under the 
same logics as my Jewish-Argentine friends.   
While in many contexts contemporary Jewishness may be a much more complex 
amalgam than the two poles of assimilation and separation suggest, sometimes the 
                                                     
5Sander Gilman suggests the term “frontier” as a way of imagining the interstitial space of Jewish history and 
identity.  For Gilman, “frontier” moves Jewish history and understanding away from core/periphery models and 
emphasizes instead “…a history with no center; a history marked by the dynamics of change, confrontation, and 
accommodation…(1999:11).  And he also remarks that “the frontier becomes the space where the complex 
interaction of the definitions of self and Other are able to be constructed”(1999:12). 
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 extremes do feel like the only “real” choices—the threshold often feels uncomfortable, it is 
too intense, shifty, and uncommitted.  Jewishness, then, is a site of intense negotiation, and 
profound anxiety.  It is impure and precarious.  It offers the possibility of critique and 
counter-discourses to modernity.  Let’s turn now to some of the processes that have lead to 
this lack of fixity and the (incomplete) disarticulation of Jewishness from “tradition” and even 
religion.  
The Jewish Question: Becoming a Citizen and Joining “Humanity” 
The Jewish question, per se, is primarily an eighteenth and nineteenth century 
Western European political issue, concerned with the creation of citizens.6  Its social 
dimension, the corresponding problem of how Jews could be made to “fit” into the social 
fabric of various European nations once they became citizens, was subsumed within the 
larger political quandary.  Indeed, as a political question it gained particular urgency at the 
end of the eighteenth century beginning with the reorganization of state and society after the 
French Revolution.  The presence of Jews in Christian Europe had mostly been conceived 
as a “problem”—even a cursory look at European history will yield this knowledge—although 
the understanding of the problem and response to it changed according to place and 
circumstance.  For example, in the seventeenth century, the discourse about Jews began to 
shift from a dilemma framed in largely religious terms to a more overt political problem for 
“society.”7  This change in attitude toward the Jews reflected a larger epistemological shift in 
                                                     
6The nuances of this question will be explored throughout this chapter.  However, for the sake of initial clarity I 
define the “Jewish question” to concern the political fate of Jews in Europe vis à vis the secular, liberal nation-
state and civil society.  It was most productive in the eighteenth and nineteenth century with the reorganization of 
European states and society, and is informed by Enlightenment ideas regarding “sovereignty,” “secularity,” and 
“humanity.”  However, given the legacy of the Enlightenment and the continued hegemonic power of liberalism, it 
has not totally disappeared today, although it has become more of a social than overt political question. 
 
7I want to emphasize that despite the long history of Jewish marginalization (and worse, expulsion and violence) 
in Christian Europe, the making of Jewish difference must always be historicized as part of particular political and 
social contexts.  To do otherwise only reifies Jewishness within an amber drop of “timeless,” “mystical,” and 
“unyielding” difference, the same discourse that gives anti-Semitism much of its potency.  Unfortunately, Jews 
themselves are not innocent of contributing to this discourse. 
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 which an emphasis on religious truth and morality was challenged by a new way of knowing 
independent of divinely inspired knowledge. 
While the Jewish Question as it was formulated in Europe ceases to be a legitimate 
political question in many parts of the world, (there are indeed, other political “Jewish 
questions,” most notably to do with Zionism), the ideological dilemma it contains is still quite 
productive.  While the Jewish question may have ceased to be a political question in terms 
of granting citizenship, it still resonates and circulates in other political and social terrains.  
Like other “problematic citizens” Jewish belonging and loyalty to the nation—and indeed, 
their “Frenchness,” “Englishness,” or “Argentineness”—frequently comes under 
interrogation, particularly in times of crisis.8  There are certain times and places when the 
mostly dormant (or seemingly “resolved”) issues embodied in the Jewish question explode 
into contemporary daily life, as happened in late nineteenth century France with the Dreyfus 
affair.9  This rupture also occurred in a significant way—but not nearly as wide-reaching or 
devastating as in France—with the bombing of the AMIA in Buenos Aires.  Discussing the 
Jewish question is essential to historicizing the ways in which Jews entered the nation-state 
as both proper and improper subjects, and it also bears upon modern constructions of 
Jewishness and the challenges of belonging.  
The Jewish question is not really a question, but a problematic that contains a whole 
set of beliefs and ideas concerning the “human,” the “state,” and “society.”  It specifically 
arose as a problem confronting the newly forming secular and (more) egalitarian European 
nation-states, beginning in practice with the French Revolution.  From the perspective of the 
                                                     
8In recent times the specter of the Other in Europe, the United States and other liberal nation-states has become 
less about Jews and more about Muslims.  In a sense, the “Jewish question” has transformed into the “Muslim 
question.”  See, for instance, Baruma’s (2007) Murder in Amsterdam and Mufti’s (2007) Enlightenment in the 
Colony. 
 
9What is known as the Dreyfus Affair concerns, in the most concrete terms, the arrest of Captain Alfred Dreyfus 
under false charges of treason in 1894.  However, what is significant about this event is the social and political 
turmoil that preceded and followed it, in which Jews in France became a debate about the “Jewish question,” 
eliciting a public sphere wherein the very question of “Frenchness” was at stake.  
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 architects of this re-envisioned nation, the problem in brief was this: How can the Jews, 
conceived at the time primarily as an insular religious nation bound by a tradition rooted in 
laws and practices derived from the Old Testament, be incorporated into a secular political 
community conceived as having common goals and allegiances—a national community 
founded, at least ideally, as a break from religious superstition and the past?  How could 
they transcend their particularity and become citizens, not just of France, but enter into the 
abstract universal vision of humanity that was becoming hegemonic?  To be sure, this was a 
question that the architects of the French Revolution had to pose not just to Jews, but to all 
who were to participate in this new society as equals: Jews, Catholics and Protestants, 
aristocrats and commoners, city and country dwellers.10  
In France at least, Jews may have been Others, but they were for the most part 
considered reasonable others; that is, they were thought capable of reason—if often 
irrationally rooted in the “mysticism” of religious tradition—and thus were within the 
perimeters of potential citizenship.  It was a matter of reformation.  Whether or not Jews 
could be reformed was another matter.  There was the problem of determining, practically, 
how to incorporate this small, but visible, minority into the body politic.  There was also the 
problem of making them French. 
At the time of the French Revolution (1789) the territory unified as France had a 
small minority of Jewish inhabitants, both Sephardic and Ashkenazi, “scattered around the 
country in various settlements” (Marrus 1971:5).11  Until the revolution, Jewish communities 
formed somewhat autonomous areas that were granted particular privileges of self-
governance, but were also restricted in their activities.  Their security in terms of personal 
harm and the ability to live according to their laws and traditions, and indeed, provide for 
                                                     
10In general, Enlightenment thinkers positioned women in the home, outside of the political sphere and women 
weren’t granted political rights during the revolution.  They weren’t allowed to vote until 1944! 
 
11Paula Hyman (1987:25) estimates the population of Jews in France in 1789 as being 40,000.  
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 themselves, was capriciously determined in large part by the necessities or tolerance of 
local rulers.  While there may have been individual “court Jews” in the sixteenth and seventh 
centuries (never very widespread under French aristocracy) whose usefulness awarded 
them special dispensations and privileges, for the most part Ashkenazi Jews formed a 
distinct and decidedly non-privileged community, and interaction between Jews and non-
Jews was quite limited to prescribed economic exchanges.12  The situation for the small 
minority of highly acculturated Sephardic Jews (descendents of conversos—Jews who 
converted to Catholicism during the Inquisition, but privately remained Jewish—from Spain) 
differed from the larger, poorer, and more isolated Ashkenazi communities.  The Sephardic 
community was more integrated with their French neighbors and was seen as the “ideal” 
Jew from a particular French perspective (Hyman 1987:25).  To this end, the Sephardic 
community was granted citizenship before the substantially larger Ashkenazi population.  
However, as I elaborate upon below, the situation of the majority of the Jews in Western and 
Eastern Europe has significant consistency with the Ashkenazi population in France.   
Before the intellectual movement known as the Enlightenment really began to gather 
force and profoundly alter the lives of both Jews and non-Jews alike, European Jewish 
populations were primarily tightly bounded communities organized by Jewish law and 
attempted adherence to a way of life vitally informed by the past.13  As such their daily 
practices and rhythms were significantly different from the Christian societies within which 
many of them lived (the case was somewhat distinct with Jews living with Muslims and 
under Muslim rule).  While both Christians and Jews organized their lives, their 
                                                     
12See Marrus (1971) and Katz (1998). 
 
13The concept of the “past” in Judaism is complex and cannot be thoroughly elucidated here.  Suffice it to say 
that the prominence of the past in Judaism is different from being “stuck” in the past or without change.  Although 
the “distant past” had immense force in Jewish life, this relationship is dynamic.  The (selective) past was in no 
way passive, but was the source of interpretation of the present, and in a very real sense it constituted the 
present.  The “past” in “traditional” Jewish practice is not something to contemplate from afar, but to individually 
experience in the present.  As Yerushalmi (1996) emphasizes, this relationship with the past should not be 
confused with modern historiography, or with a nostalgic or cataloguing approach to the past.  As such, it is more 
akin to memory than history.  
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 epistemologies, and their practical concerns on tenets of faith, the content of these ideas 
and practices differed markedly.  For Jews, matters of daily life, such as food preparation, 
eating, and caring for the body were ritualized and bounded by strict particular laws, which 
also served to differentiate Jewish populations from their non-Jewish neighbors.  Indeed, it 
can be said that the overall outlook and purposes of the Jews were remarkably different 
from their Christian neighbors.  After all, Jews were living in a world in which the Messiah 
had not yet arrived.  And their understanding of themselves as exiles in foreign lands, along 
with other’s perception of them as such, deeply shaped their interactions with those around 
them.   
It should be noted that before Jewish encounters with modernity significantly 
challenged and changed Jewish thought and practice, the condition of exile was not defined 
in political terms.  Rather, exile was understood as a religious predicament, specifically as a 
punishment from God.  For a people whose lives in exile became a kind of ritualization of 
that exile and a legitimization of their marginality in “foreign lands,” insularity and apartness 
became, under this vision, purposeful and necessary for communal survival.  Jewish life was 
in essence concerned with the practice of making and re-making pre-exilic Judaism—an 
attempt to fulfill their relationship with their God as a “chosen people,” and bring about the 
conditions for redemption, despite the incongruence of practice and place.14 As Jacob Katz 
writes, “The special feature of Jewish society was its total reliance on the distant past; for 
Jewish tradition regarded everything of value in Jewish religion—law, learning, and culture—
as stemming from ancient times” (1998:5).  Moreover, this was a collective and daily 
endeavor.  Jewishness itself, then, to a large degree, entailed its own ostracism, both in 
practice and orientation.  Living as strangers in foreign lands was not just an unfortunate 
                                                     
14Many of the practices of pre-exilic Judaism, or ancient Judaism, were intrinsically tied to place, specifically the 
land defined as biblical Israel and the holy temple.  Certain injunctions could not be fulfilled without access to this 
ascribed sacred space and thus had to be reinterpreted,or put aside altogether in exile.  Contemporary 
synagogues or “temples” should not be confused with this specific space.  
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 historical condition, but was constitutive of Jewish subjectivity.  To some extent, I argue, 
aspects of this subjectivity (inherited, oriented in relation to particular times and places) 
manifest today within both religious and secular Jewish expressions of identity.  
However, it was a two-way process, for while Jews often may have sought a 
measure of independence and exclusivity, they were greatly aided in this process by harsh 
oppressive measures and restrictions: 
Generally outside a very few enclaves of toleration (notably Holland, and then 
England from the seventeenth century), and until the very end of the eighteenth 
century, Jews lived throughout the Christian and Islamic world under some 
combination of legally institutionalized disabilities and the threat of violence at the 
hands of lord and mob alike.  Regulated, restricted, or even totally denied were the 
Jew’s right of residence, his occupation, his freedom of movement and public 
worship, his effective recourse to justice, his right to property, his dress, his right to 
bear arms, even in some countries, his right to marry and rear a family.  The Jews, in 
a word, were not properly part of civil society, but set apart from it… [Vital 1975:24] 
  
This grim picture of Jewish life in Europe before the French Revolution can be 
tempered by exceptions—moments or places when Jews and Christians co-existed in 
relative peace, but never equality—and indeed, Jewish and non-Jewish relations differed 
somewhat from region to region, hamlet to hamlet (Katz 1998).  For example, the 
relationships between Jews, Christians, and Muslims in Muslim Spain is often cited as a 
particularly dynamic time, when social practices were at odds with the circumscribed life of 
Jews in other parts of Europe.15  Jewish life was in large part characterized by a negotiation 
between the demands placed on them from the society around them and the injunctions of 
their faith.  To this end, it is somewhat a distortion to give a picture of Jewish life as totally 
separate and unchanging.  Jewish and non-Jewish interaction was limited, but Jewish life 
                                                     
15See for example, James Clifford (1994) “Diasporas” in Cultural Anthropology, vol. 9, No. 3, pp. 325-326; For a 
view on Jews in a larger North African/Meditteranian context see Solomon Dob Fritz Gotein (1967-93) A 
Mediterranian Society: The Jewish Communities of the Arab World as Portrayed in the Cairo Geniza. Six 
Volumes. Berkeley: University of California Press. Also, Amitav Ghosh (1992) In an Antique Land. London: 
Granta Books.  
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 and practice was modified in relation to the larger societies within which they dwelled.16  One 
can imagine that in some cases, such as in Muslim ruled Spain, Jewishness had an effect 
on general society as well.  Keeping the above exceptions and nuances in mind, the overall 
picture of Ashkenazi Western and Eastern European Jewry, reflects the highly marginal, 
oppressive, and separatist situation iterated above.  Nevertheless, Jewish life was not 
immune to or completely ignorant of the larger social, economic, and political trends taking 
place around, and in some cases through, them. 
Thus, by the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, individual Jews in Western 
Europe were beginning to feel the effects of and participate in the intellectual spirit that was 
transforming aspects of European society and politics.  Ideas prominent in Enlightenment 
thought—reason, not religion, as the author of truth and the equalizing essence of human 
kind, the freeing of the “individual” from the arbitrary demands of power and community and 
his birth as an autonomous, “free” subject —began to filter into Jewish life, and slowly 
change the ways in which Jews understood themselves.17  For the most part, these ideas 
were interpreted through Jewish intellectual thought and understanding, producing the 
Jewish Enlightenment, or Haskalah.  In effect, the work of the Enlightenment came to 
radically transform Jewish life, perhaps even more profoundly than Christian Europe.  I 
return to these subjects later.  My point here is that by the time of the French Revolution, the 
ideas that ushered in this new political and social entity were not wholly unknown to 
individual or even communities of Jews in parts of Western Europe.  And indeed, the 
                                                     
16For more on this period, see Jacob Katz’s work, particularly Out of the Ghetto and Exclusiveness and 
Tolerance: Studies in Jewish-Gentile Relations in Medieval Times.  Both David Vital’s A People Apart: A political 
History of the Jews in Europe, 1789-1939 and Paul Mendes-Flohr and Jehuda Reinharz’s edited volume The 
Jew in the Modern World, provide ample background to Jewish life pre-emancipation. 
 
17In the seventeenth century, the philosophy and life of Baruch Spinoza has been said to be “…the first modern, 
secular Jew” (Mendes-Flohr and Reinharz 1995:55).  Or at least Spinoza is the first “modern secular Jew” we 
know about. 
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 eventual success of the French Revolution and the spread of liberal and democratically 
organized states depended, in part, on Jewish participation and desire.  
Jewish Emancipation in France 
“We are now, thanks to the Supreme Being, and to the sovereignty of the nation, not 
only Men and Citizens, but we are French-men!” –Berr Isaac Berr (1791) 
 
It was meant to be a revelation.  A gift.  For many Jews, the emancipation brought 
about by the French Revolution was precisely this: a gift, an opportunity.  The gates were 
finally open, the streets were to be free to roam, economic strictures were to be loosened.  
The Jews were let out of the ghetto, literally and figuratively, and were to become citizens.  
When speaking of this time period, and speaking of the Jews (although there were other 
marginalized groups at the time) one cannot emphasize the word enough: citizen.  While the 
overthrow of the monarchy and the development of the Rights of Man were truly 
revolutionary, the consideration of making Jews citizens was a minor revolution in its own 
right.  Jews were to become French, with all the rights and responsibilities that it would 
entail.  Legally at least, they would cease to be social outcasts and problematic political 
subjects, and become united with their fellow humanity (or at least “Frenchmen,” who 
arguably represented universal humanity!).  They were permitted to participate in civil 
society, and choose not to be marginal or anathema to it.  For those Jews already peering 
through the unstable threshold defined as between “tradition” and “modernity,” the French 
Revolution finally let them take a tentative step through.  But political emancipation is not 
social acceptance.  As I show below, Jewish entry into French society was rather 
circumscribed and troubled for both Jews and non-Jews—more complicated than perhaps 
either the Enlightenment believing Jews and non-Jews imagined.  And in fact, full Jewish 
entry into the republic was not a given, and was not immediately granted.   
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 Whatever the feelings of the leaders of the new French nation and its recently 
incorporated French citizenry toward the Jews, the stated goals of the Revolution—
brotherhood, equality, and liberty—stipulated that something had to be done about them.  
Even though the French Revolution was inspired in part on these utopian ideals, there was 
still a question of whether or not Jews could be French citizens.  (And indeed, despite the 
claims of the Revolution, the dominant thinking at the time was hardly inclusive of all.) On 
December 23, 1789 the French National Assembly met to specifically discuss the fate of the 
Jews living in the nation, during which points for and against the granting of equal rights for 
Jews were posited.18 There were citizens who fought for the right of Jews to join them in 
citizenship, but only under certain conditions.  Count Stanislas de Claremont-Tonnerre, an 
advocate for equal rights for Jews, said the following at the meeting:  
The Jews should be denied everything as a nation, but granted everything as 
individuals. They must be citizens…there cannot be one nation within another 
nation…It is intolerable that the Jews should become a separate political formation or 
class in the country.  Every one of them must individually become a citizen; if they do 
not want this…we shall then be compelled to expel them. [Debate on the Eligibility of 
Jews for Citizenship1995:115, emphasis added].  
 
I will return to the significance of this passage for the Jews in France in a moment.  
Arguments against making Jews citizens cited their seemingly intractable insularity and 
corporatism, their longing for another homeland, and the intense dislike “the people” have 
for them.  As one prominent Frenchman from Lorraine skeptical of granting Jews citizenship 
remarked, “The people detest them…” (Debate on the Eligibility of Jews for Citizenship 
1995:116).  According to these objections, Jews could never be “of” France without 
significant reformation—that is, assimilation.  However, despite the misgivings of some of 
the participants at the debate—and the generalized dislike and suspicion of the French 
populace toward the Jews—Jews were eventually granted citizenship on September 28, 
                                                     
18See the “Debate on the Eligibility of Jews for Citizenship” in The Jew in the Modern World, Paul Mendes-Flohr 
and Jehuda Reinharz eds. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press.  
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 1791.  (The more assimilated and cosmopolitan and thus viewed as less problematic 
Sephardic community was granted citizenship in 1790).  The declaration of their citizenship 
made all previous local decrees concerning their activities and legal rights and limitations 
null and void.  Given the date of this declaration (roughly two years after the revolution), it is 
clear that absorption of France’s substantial Jewish population was not an easy decision.  
However, it was a necessity. 
The necessity of incorporating the Jews as French subjects is encapsulated in the 
remarks by Count Stanislas, above.  As the Count makes plain, it was common at the time 
to speak of the Jews as a “nation.”  The ways in which Jews were conceived in terms of 
“nationhood” by themselves and by others, and the changing understandings of the term 
itself, is a fascinating but complicated, long story that cannot fully be told here.  We can 
gather, however, at least one general sense of nation that Count Stanislas refers: that of 
belonging to a discrete, insular community with its own desires and objectives.  On the one 
hand, the corporatism and separatism of the Jews contradicted the spirit of the new society, 
a society based, in part, on a broad “brotherhood,” individualism, and secular ideals, not 
clannishness and religious authority.  Alternatively, the conception of Jews as a nation with 
its own, potentially nationalistic, purposes and goals was not acceptable within a process 
that sought a cohesive national identity and a centralized government.19  As the Count 
asserts, “ …there cannot be one nation within another nation.”  The Jews could have been 
expelled, outright, as they were in 1394.  But the social and political situation of 1789 was 
                                                     
19There is little evidence of organized national political aspirations—Zionism—among European Jews in the 
eighteenth century, or before.  For Jews at this time, the return to Israel as a political movement rooted in 
concrete actions made little sense, as it was predicated on a host of fantastical events, the most important being 
the return of the Messiah.  Adherence to the Torah and performing Mitzvot, or following the laws, customs and 
practices of Halakhah, was seen as preparing the ground for the return of the Messiah and an end to exile.  But 
this was hardly a call to arms or political pressure that resulted in practical steps taken toward this end.  In fact, 
to hasten the end of exile was seen as direct refutation of God’s will. The religious anti-Zionist group, called 
Neturei Karta, represent these beliefs today.  It wasn’t until the late nineteenth century and the reinterpretation of 
Judaism from the perspective of modernity, that Zionism as a secular political movement began to gather force 
(see David Vital’s The Origin of Zionism and Daniel Boyarin and Jonathan Boyarin (1993) “Diaspora: 
Generational Ground of Jewish Identity” Critical Inquiry 19 (4):693-725, for an in depth treatment of this topic).  
Presumably, those Frenchmen concerned with the potential nationalism of the Jews were questioning Jewish 
commitment to a national purpose—however ungrounded—other than their own. 
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 radically different than 1394.  The participants at the Debate about Jewish citizenship 
acknowledged the “usefulness” of Jews in matters of economy and finance, and beyond 
this, incorporating the Jews was a way to underscore the power of their vision.  A hasty 
expulsion without the opportunity to become citizens could seriously delegitimize the 
underlying principles of the Revolution.  Arguing the “Jewish question” was in effect, testing 
the precepts of the Revolution.20  In fact, Jews made up a very small proportion of the 
population of France, and one could ask why the Jewish question was such a debatable 
issue in revolutionary France (and in other parts of Europe as well, such as the German 
states).  Why would a small minority community, thought of as backward and deficient in 
most every way, and without legitimate political power, preoccupy the intelligentsia and 
politically powerful of Western Europe as much as it did in the eighteen and nineteenth 
centuries?21  Citing an article by Ronald Schechter, the historian Jonathan Hess writes, 
…Jews were chiefly of symbolic significance to the French.  Viewed by traditional 
prejudice as the ultimate anti-citizen, Jews thus offered the perfect test case for 
revolutionary principles of the moral transformation of both individuals and the 
French nation as a whole…In debating the moral and political transformation of the 
Jews, the French were testing the limits of the very concept of political universalism. 
[2002:5] 
 
Following Schechter, it can be argued that within Europe, Jews became an important 
litmus test for the power of Enlightenment ideals to transform and remake society into a 
secular and rational space, and create a universalizing vision of humanity.  (A similar test 
can be said to have been underway in the European colonies at the time, although with 
differing purposes and outcomes.)  The transformation of the Jews into enlightened 
                                                     
20For more insight into this period with regard to the Jewish question in France, see Arthur Hertzberg (1968), The 
French Enlightenment and the Jews, New York: Columbia University Press. Also Paula E. Hyman (1987) “The 
French Jewish Community from Emancipation to the Dreyfus Affair” in The Dreyfus Affair: Art, Truth and Justice. 
N.L. Kleebatt, ed. Pp. 25-36 Berkeley: University of California Press.   
 
21For example in the German states, Jonathan Hess notes that the “…Nazi historian Volkmar Eichstädt 
documented in his 1938 Bibliography of the History of the Jewish Question that more than 3,000 titles dealing 
with Jews, Judaism, and Jewish emancipation had inundated the German book market by 1848…” (2002:4).  
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 Frenchmen was thus a political necessity in two senses:  It diffused the specter of a 
potentially unpredictable fifth column and it put the assertions of the Enlightenment into 
rigorous practice, by making a citizen out of the stranger.  
This citizen, however, was singular, and predicated on an individual self.  The only 
way Jews could be granted entry as citizens was as individuals.  Jews as a corporate entity, 
and by extension, Jews as Jews, would be given nothing; a Frenchman who happened to be 
a Jew, ostensibly everything.  This was the intent, at least.  In effect, Jewishness had to be 
re-fashioned into something palatable for the new French nation.  As Wendy Brown states,  
To be compatible with membership in the French republic, Jews had to be 
individuated, denationalized, decorporatized as Jews.  To cohabit with Frenchness, 
Jewishness could not longer consist in belonging to a distinct community bound by 
religious law, ritualized practices, and generational continuity; rather; it would consist 
at most in privately held and conducted belief. [2006:52] 
 
According to the underlying logic of French (universal) citizenship, the evolving 
constellation of beliefs and practices that had maintained Jewish distinctiveness throughout 
the years of exile were no longer needed.  France could become their “home.” As individuals 
they were free to practice their faiths and live in accordance with their laws, as long as those 
laws were in agreement with and subservient to the laws of the new French nation.  
However, this breaking of Jewish “corporate” identity into “individual” practice represented a 
serious departure from a defining feature of Jewish life as it had historically developed in 
France, at least for the Ashkenazi.  This fracturing of corporate identity would occur 
throughout the process of emancipation.  Thus most Jews were challenged to conceive of 
themselves in entirely different and alien terms, entailing a radical shift in belief and practice.  
Frenchness as a secular and cosmopolitan attitude with an emphasis on the individual, was 
incommensurable with the ways in which Jewishness had come to inhabit most of Europe 
(as it was I’m sure for a lot of other groups).  The act of becoming citizens and the whole 
emancipatory process, then, was shot through with loss.  Whether or not this rupture was 
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 more abrupt or profound for the Jews than for others in Europe, is arguable.  What is clear is 
that grounds for becoming French—the reformation of the Jews—entailed not just their 
transformation, but in a significant sense their ceasing to be Jewish as it was previously 
known.  
Even after the September 1791 decree, Jewish citizenship in the fullest sense of the 
word was not guaranteed.  Legal equality was granted, but social acceptance in France 
continues to be an ongoing process.  Moreover, following pressure from particular sectors of 
the Republic, the rights of French Jews to engage in certain economic activities and reside 
in particular areas was prohibited by decree in 1808 (this decree, however, was not renewed 
after it expired in 1818).  The passing of this decree—which appreciably curtailed civil rights 
for Jews—is a significant example of the ambivalence and precariousness of Jewish 
citizenship in post-revolutionary France.22   
Yet, this ambivalence eventually existed alongside a flourishing of this new French 
Jewishness.  As Marrus (1971) points out, Jewish entry and participation into French society 
was, due to various factors, relatively quick and comprehensive.  By the end of the 
nineteenth century, “French Jews had emerged from the ghetto and were scattered 
throughout the French social structure.  They no longer perceived life in the same way as 
before and they differed fundamentally [from previous generations of Jews] in the kind of life 
they led” (Marrus 1971:49).  Five years before the arrest of Captain Alfred Dreyfus for 
treason in 1894, the Jews of France celebrated the centennial of the Revolution with great 
enthusiasm: “One rabbi gratefully proclaimed in a sermon on the occasion, ‘We have 
adopted the customs and traditions of a country which has so generously adopted us, and 
today, thanks to God, there are no longer any but Frenchmen in France” (Hyman 1987:25).  
While Jews to a greater and lesser degrees had declared French identity as their own, their 
                                                     
22See “The ‘Infamous Decree’ (March 17, 1808) in The Jew in the Modern World, Paul Mendes-Flohr and Jehuda 
Reinharz, eds. Oxford, U.K.: University of Oxford Press.  
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 position within French society was revealed to be precarious, as the Dreyfus affair (roughly 
1894-1906) and the later Vichy regime (1940-1944) made evident.  The courtship of 
Jewishness and modernity and the political emancipation of Jews in France, while 
engendering a tremendous transformation in society, did not guarantee a full embrace of the 
arms of the Republic.  
The example of French Jews provides an early and dramatic example of the 
“working out” of the Jewish question in Europe.  In making the leap from particularism and 
strict religious authority to an abstract, universal humanity, Jews were given the opportunity 
to gain political equality and access to parts of society previously dark to them.  This act of 
walking through the threshold, between “tradition” and “modernity,” religious Jewish 
authority and knowledge and rational secularism, the particular and the universal, continues 
to be a messy, hybrid affair.  In the process of stepping through, a new version of 
Jewishness and modernity was, and continues to be, negotiated.  But the process of 
permitting entrance to the Jews, also entailed, to some extent, changes in the ideas of 
“humanity” and “universalism” to include Jews.  However, this admittance was enacted 
largely on non-Jewish terms.  Many Jews welcomed these social transformations as an 
opportunity, despite the losses it entailed.  But what did this transformation mean more 
specifically for Jewishness?  Obviously, Jewishness did not disappear completely, even 
among communities that are considered to be highly assimilated.  It became a hybrid thing, 
a loitering at the threshold, a frontier subjectivity. (I reject Sartre’s argument that Jews exist 
because of anti-Semitism, although anti-Semitic attitudes toward Jews do help to resurrect 
Jewishness even in the most assimilated individual.)23  What attitudes, identities, and 
practices emerged with these new articulations of Jewishness?  What does an analysis of 
                                                     
23Sartre, Jean-Paul (1976) Anti-Semite and Jew. New York: Schocken Books. 
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 Jewish emancipation reveal about the construction and regulation of difference within 
modernity?  What does it say about how the liberal nation-state accommodates difference?   
Jewish Emancipation and the Problem with Difference 
“The baptismal certificate is the ticket of admission to European culture…” –Heinrich 
Heine, 1823 
 
The whole process of turning Europe’s Jews into citizens and granting them equal 
rights is generally termed emancipation.24  But emancipation is not a straightforward 
concept.  The question still remains, emancipation into what? 
As I’ve already discussed, the combination of the social and political openings 
sparked by the Enlightenment and the subsequent processes of political emancipation 
precipitated a kind of crisis for Jews who continued to live in bounded, tightly organized 
communities.  Those Jews already touched and taken in by the ideas of the Enlightenment 
sought to reconcile Jewish life as they inherited it with the social and cultural currents of 
their neighbors or fellow citizens.  Looking beyond the insularity and relatively narrow 
perimeters of much of European Jewish life, they sought intellectual and personal freedom 
through the seductions of the Enlightenment.  However, for a significant portion of Jews, as 
with Christians, the political and cultural changes brought about were not welcome.  For 
these Jews, this growing force of change threatened the established authority of the 
community and a whole way of life that was propelled not by looking to a distant future (or 
linear marked time), but by a dialectical relationship between present and past.  It was a life 
marked by precariousness and periods of overt persecution, but within the logic of Jewish 
understanding, this was part of being in exile, and to some extent constitutive of their 
subjectivity as Jews.  Despite the promises of emancipation and modernity, not all Jews 
                                                     
24The term “emancipation” was historically tied specifically to England.  However, it has come to be applied more 
generally to the processes of political incorporation of Jews in Europe.  See Jacob Katz (1964) “The Term Jewish 
Emancipation: Its Origin and Historical Impact” in Studies in Nineteenth Century Jewish Intellectual History, 
Alexander Altman, ed. Pp. 1-25, Cambridge: Harvard University Press. 
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 were anxious for a change of their status or a radical opening of possibilities.  There were 
Jewish communities and individuals that rejected the promises of modernity—this was the 
case in particular among some Eastern European Jewish communities, for whom 
connection with the transformative processes of the Enlightenment came late (Vital 1975).  
But for the most part, the process of emancipation was welcomed, or at least 
accepted, in Western Europe.  Emancipation was a doubled process— political 
emancipation within the realm of the nation-state, and also emancipation from strict religious 
Jewishness—and this led to multiple possible orientations for Jews toward the latter.  These 
positions ranged from reinforcing and reinvigorating Jewish observance to renouncing 
Jewishness altogether.  Many Jews hovered in between and tried to find mediating practices 
to accommodate both Jewishness and the attitudes, habits, and practices of their respective 
nations.25  Regardless of the path individuals took, European Jews had to learn to live as 
incorporated members of a larger society that for all intents and purposes contradicted their 
worldview and practices.  Despite the desires of individual Jews to join with European 
societies, in many cases the society they were to be absorbed into was hostile toward them.  
So what could one do?   
As the historian David Vital put it, “The process of assimilation hinged on retaining 
membership in two, in important respects incompatible and traditionally hostile, cultures—or, 
with greater traumatic effects, seeking to pass from one to the other entirely” (1980:26).  As 
we saw in the French case above, for the most part belonging in society was not done on 
Jewish terms.  It was the Jew and Jewishness that had to change, while society tolerated 
this process.  However, there was one prominent Jewish figure that sought to enter society 
on different terms.  
                                                     
25Along with other members of society, the affiliations multiplied and fractured, as over time other aspects of 
identity and belonging came to be emphasized, such as gender, sexuality, and politics. 
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 One of the most prominent figures of the German enlightenment and “Jewish 
enlightenment” or haskalah, is Moses Mendelssohn, a German Jewish philosopher who 
lived and wrote in the eighteenth century.  Mendelssohn wanted to hold on to aspects of 
traditional Judaism while at the same time participate fully in the society around him.  His 
claiming of Enlightenment ideas is present in the famous statement attributed to him,  “Be a 
Jew on the inside and a man on the outside.”   
One of the factors in the debates that comprised the Jewish question throughout the 
nineteenth century was the belief that Jews were part of an “antiquated” religion, mystical, 
and more rooted in the East than the West.  An influential eighteenth century German 
supporter of Jewish emancipation, Christian Wilhelm Dohm (a contemporary interlocutor of 
Mendelssohn’s), referred to Jews as a “nation” of “unfortunate Asiatic refugees” (Hess 
2002:2).  Moreover, Jews, or more accurately, ancient Hebrews, became an object of study 
within the growing field of “Orientalist studies” in eighteenth and nineteenth century Europe.  
In these senses, they were hardly seen as ideal candidates for participation in a modern, 
secular state and society.  They were perceived as other in both their outlook and origin.  
Mendelssohn, a friend of Kant’s and a prominent participant in the Berlin Enlightenment, 
struggled to rectify Judaism with political integration.  He sought not assimilation in the 
sense of losing or profoundly modifying one’s Judaism, but instead, he argued in his essay, 
Jerusalem (1783), that Judaism was compatible with the emerging modern state and the 
ideas of sovereignty so central to thought in this period.26  In other words, he argued that 
Jews as Jews could be members and useful participants of a modern liberal society, and 
that Judaism was perhaps a more suitable foundation for this society than Christianity.  As 
Jonathan Hess (2002) has pointed out, Mendelssohn and others offered up a different 
                                                     
26It should be made clear that Mendelssohn’s Judaism is not the same as the “traditional” relgious Judaism of the 
ghetto.  Mendelssohn is an Enlightenment actor and this is reflected in his vision of Judaism, which he presents 
in terms that mimic aspects of Christianity.  He presents Judaism within terms of Christianity, such as the notion 
of “confession.”  Nevertheless, as Hess points out, “Judaism may indeed be constructed as a religion in mimicry 
of Christianity, but this act of mimicry is a subversive one vis-à-vis its object…” (Hess 2002:97). 
 109
 version of modernity and universalism—one that could accommodate Judaism not as an 
anachronistic religion, or a threat to universal values, but as intrinsically compatible with 
society’s emerging ideals.  Through a critique of Christian imperialism in his essay 
Jerusalem, he questions the compatibility of a “secular political order” with Christianity (Hess 
2002:95).  Elsewhere Mendelssohn states that in contrast to Christianity, “…Mosaic law was 
in its purest form devoid of coercive force (Hess 2002:95).”  In a private letter to Wilhem 
Dohm, he goes even further, referring to Christians as “…conquerors, oppressors and slave 
traders” (Hess 2002:92).  
I agree with Hess that an evaluation of Mendelssohn’s conception of Judaism is less 
important than the ways in which he actively challenges Christian discourse, and 
passionately argues for a place for Judaism in the society and civic life of Europe.27 
Mendelssohn’s argument is remarkable in its public Jewish critique of Christianity—a sure 
sign of the work of the Enlightenment movement.  Mendelssohn’s combative stance toward 
the vision of modernity being formulated in eighteenth century Berlin is an example of how 
Jews actively negotiated their position within this emerging vision of society, and did not 
always passively accept the terms of the debate.  It is also an example of how Jews from 
within Judaism contributed to the cacophony of voices and positions that we would come to 
call “modern.”  
What’s “Universal” About “Universal Man”? 
Ultimately, a robust Jewish claim on the ideas and structures we call “modernity” was 
ceded to more powerful discourses circulating at the time.  These discourses, coded as 
secular, universal, and oriented toward and creating the individual (in the form associated 
with liberalism), expressed liberation in the minds of its champions at the same time as it 
                                                     
27To this end Hess writes, “…I am concerned less with the philosophical inadequacy of Mendelssohn’s defense 
of Judaism as a ‘revealed legislation’ than with the polemical unity of his argument, the way he systematically 
confronts, subverts, and reformulates the positions of his opponents”(2002:95). 
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 advanced a Western, Christian and male vision of humanity.  Moses Mendelssohn 
represents one attempt, from a Jewish perspective, to change the terms of the project and 
provide a space for Jews to actively and legitimately participate from within Judaism. 
Ultimately, the dominant vision of political universalism that ushered in the process of Jewish 
emancipation required a baptism of sorts: to enter the water as a Jew and emerge a man.  
The process of Jewish emancipation and (often Jewish desired) transformation of 
Jewishness vis à vis the forces of modernity is not only relevant to Jews or Jewish studies.  
Rather, it is one example, one of the emblematic examples within Europe (the colonies were 
another, not unrelated, matter), of the ways in which emerging discourses about the 
“human,” “liberty,” and “society” in the seventeenth, eighteenth, and nineteenth century 
dealt, and continue to deal, with difference.  An analysis of the Jewish Question is an 
important early example of the tensions and contradictions involved in making liberal 
citizens out of non-white and non-Christian people, a process that extends from the 
eighteenth and nineteenth century into the present.  Today, the prominence of the idea of a 
universal secular human subject anchored to individual “freedom” has engendered a 
significant amount of anxiety—and in some cases explosive violence—for some minority 
groups living in the liberally informed nation-state.  Aamir Mufti argues that the Jewish 
question in particular bears upon, for example, the predicament of Muslim Indians in the 
post-colonial state.28  As Mufti frames it, the crisis of Muslim identity is traceable to the 
“problematic of secularization and minority in post-Enlightenment liberal culture as a whole,” 
and the working-out of these problems in Europe was done most explicitly with Jews and 
through the Jewish question (2007:2).  
What an analysis of the Jewish Question reveals, then, is not so much what is 
“wrong” with Jews or what precisely makes them different, but what is peculiar or 
                                                     
28See Mufti’s (2007) Enlightenment in the Colony. Princeton: Princeton University Press. 
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 problematic about these visions about society and the human—particularly when they are 
yoked to citizenship and the power of the nation-state.  For within the supposedly equalizing, 
universalizing force of much Enlightenment thought, Jews and other minorities are granted 
“freedom” precisely through their dissolution.  “It’s as if you are mentally disappeared,” a 
young Muslim Dutch woman says in describing living as a religious minority in Holland 
(Baruma 2006:139).  As has already been well documented in other places, the discourses 
and events that we have come to call the Enlightenment are not neutral or objectively 
universal (coercively and seductively universal might be a better way of putting it).29  The 
Enlightenment push for secularism and embrace of rationality are despite their claims 
otherwise rooted in political and social traditions dominated by Western forms of Christianity.  
Although the Enlightenment was based in large part on a rejection, or perhaps, 
reinterpretation, of religion and its resurrected partners “tradition” and “superstition” as the 
source of epistemological or moral truth, the European societies that emerged were still, 
primarily, Christian places. (Nor were the “religious” and “rational” realms ever completely 
purified!) 
An example of something seemingly universal or neutral is “time.”  The weekday and 
the yearly calendar were (and are) structured around Christian time—with the Jewish 
Sabbath and holy days increasingly at odds with the financial and social rhythms of the 
societies around them.  But it’s not just a matter of structuring the political and social life of a 
society in certain ways, but reflects a different logic of understanding the relation between 
past and present, or the motion (or lack of) of time.  Dominant conceptions of time in the 
West are linear, perhaps reflecting the eschatological purpose of Christian time, rather than 
the non-linear movement of Jewish Messianic time.  Similar problems confronted and 
continue to confront Muslims and those of other religious faiths and cultural traditions.  Thus 
                                                     
29See for example, Walter Mignolo (2002) “The Enduring Enchantment (or the Epistemic Privilege of Modernity 
and Where to Go from Here)” The South Atlantic Quarterly 101(4): 927-954. See also Paul Gilroy (2000) Against 
Race. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.  
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 while the modern nation-state was to be predicated on a separation of church and state and 
“universal” rights, the temporal structure of society and social custom made it difficult for 
Jews and other religious groups to fully participate without shedding important aspects of 
their faith or understanding of the world.  This compromise was not imposed upon faithful 
Christians, however.  In other words, political economy and the organization of society and 
state in the West was tacitly built on religious, that is, Christian worldviews that became 
coded as “secular,” “normal” or “universal.”  To a large extent, then, secularity was 
compatible with Christianity in ways not possible with Judaism or Islam.  Walter Mignolo 
acknowledges as much when he writes, “Secular thinkers criticized religion that became the 
‘opium of the people,’ although Christianity remained complicit with secular discourse, since 
Christianity could not have been placed at the same level…with Islam, Buddhism, Hinduism, 
or even [!] Judaism”(2002:934). 
The ecumenical reach of the Enlightenment, and its goals of “emancipation” and 
“progress,” are ideas that are not difficult to rectify with certain interpretations of Christianity.  
Indeed, they found a nice fit in colonization projects and the logics of the missionary.  
Enlightenment ideals and the political and social structures they brokered are universal only 
in the sense that they demand a critical level of assimilation of difference.  “Others” either 
had to conform to this so-called universal, remain social pariahs, or were outside of the 
bounds of knowable, acceptable humanity, from a European male perspective, to be 
considered for inclusion in the “universal” in the first place.30   
Daniel Boyarin and Jonathan Boyarin (1993) pinpoint the location of this 
universalizing discourse in the Pauline texts.  Paul, a radical Jewish figure represents a 
“universalizing of the Torah” and a breaking through of Jewish “particularism” (1993:694).  
The baptismal process entailed “substituting an allegorical genealogy for a literal one…in 
                                                     
30I think that the idea of gender offers a slightly different problematic that I cannot address here.  
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 baptism, all the differences that mark off one body from another as Jew or Greek…male or 
female, slave or free are effaced, for in the spirit such marks do not exist” (1993:695).  
These are the roots of Enlightenment thought, the Boyarins argue, and also the source of its 
coercive force.  The Boyarins cite Elizabeth Castelli: 
Paul’s appropriation of the discourse of mimesis is a powerful rhetorical move, 
because this language identifies the fundamental values of wholeness and unity with 
Paul’s own privileged position vis à vis the gospel, the early Christian communities 
he founded and supervises, and Christ himself.  Here is precisely where he makes 
his coercive move. To stand for anything other than what the apostle stands for is to 
articulate for oneself a place of difference, which has already been implicitly been 
associated with discord and disorder. [1993:696]    
 
Paul’s discourse was not anti-Jewish or anti-Semitic, rather it was articulating a 
different grounds for Judaism, one that differed radically from extant forms of Judaism.31  
However, Paul’s discourse of universality in both of its pre and post-Enlightenment versions 
became in a significant sense the foundation for the Jews’ troubled presence in the Christian 
world.32  Their refusal to accept Christ as Messiah and become “one in Christ” represents an 
enduring critique of Christian truth and a problematic site of disorder, frustrating the 
universal vision of Christianity.  In the seemingly secular discourse of the Enlightenment, 
however, Jews were given a more palatable, seemingly neutral or non-Christian, discourse 
of universality to enter into and absorb.  The political and social factors that made European 
Jews “ready” to embrace—if often tentatively and partially—Enlightenment promises, cannot 
be attended to here.  It can be said, however, that many Jews chose to negotiate with the 
discourse of universality and citizenship, even though it entailed a radical rearticulation of 
their beliefs and way of life. 
                                                     
31The Boyarins write, “True Jewishness lay, according to Paul, precisely in renunciation of difference and entry 
into the one body of Christ” (1993:697). 
 
32This is not to lay absolute blame on Christians or Christianity for all Jewish troubles.  Nor is it meant to be a 
condemnation of Christianity or the utopic vision of the Pauline texts.  Indeed, Paul’s vision and the discourses 
that sprung from it envision an “ideal” world freed from the prejudices and constraints of particularism and 
difference. Yet, as these ideas became yoked to absolute truth and political power they were used in coercive 
and imperialistic ways even as they have enabled equality in other ways. 
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 In practice, while strictly religious Judaism may have faded amongst a large 
percentage of the population, Jews, particularly in Western Europe, accommodated 
themselves by reinterpreting their faith and entering more widely into gentile society.  
Jewishness bloomed into a spectrum of possibilities, rather than the sole options of adhering 
to strict laws and normative traditions or leaving the community all together.  It is more 
accurate, perhaps, to think about degrees of assimilation and processes of acculturation.  
Scholars such as Hess and Paul Mendes-Flohr (1999) emphasize that the social and 
political changes brought upon and often embraced by European Jews in the late eighteenth 
and early nineteenth century were characterized by a process of acculturation, as well as 
assimilation.  By the late nineteenth century, Jews in Western Europe were not just in the 
culture, but creating it, and participating in a wide variety of social milieu, even if from a 
position of marginality.  However, even as they did this, the rise of a kind of nationalism that 
sought to link territory with a bounded, primordial “people,” combined with new racial 
sciences, would drastically unsettle the processes of Jewish belonging and citizenship, as 
well as provide fertile ground for the growing Zionist movement.   
Once the ideas and practices associated with biological racism began to circulate 
widely and deeply within European culture, Jewish difference became innate and 
unchangeable, no matter the level of assimilation or acculturation.  According to this logic, 
Jewishness remained as an indelible stain despite shedding one’s religious beliefs and 
adopting the custom, dress, and social mores of the general culture.  Jewish difference 
became absolute, obstinate, and inassimilable.  One could cast off any historical, religious, 
or cultural claims of Jewishness, as many European Jews did, only to later be called “home” 
by the discourse of biological race, encoded in the Nuremberg laws. 
Even as Jews “passed” into German, or French, or Dutch society (where in cities like 
Amsterdam there was actually quite a long history of interchange between Jews and non-
Jews), dressing and speaking like their co-citizens, engaging in lively intellectual debates, 
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 contributing to the political culture of the time, and in many cases converting to Christianity, 
the burgeoning hold of biological racism coupled with an insurgence of nationalism checked 
this passage, culminating finally, and tragically, with the death camps.33  
Conclusion 
In the previous pages I have provided an overview of the ideas, processes, and 
debates surrounding the Jewish Question and the emancipation of European Jewry.  I have 
tried to show how the successfulness of this process depended on an individualization and 
privatization of Jewishness, in relation to a public, national persona.  I have also discussed 
how, by virtue of this bifurcation, Jewishness came to be marked and experienced as being 
betwixt and between possible identifications.  Jewish citizenship and belonging, then, 
become sites of ambivalence and intense, ongoing negotiation.  While the same can be said 
for other groups in a given nation-state, given the ways in which Jews have been historically 
produced as “other” or “stranger,” I argue that this precariousness is more easily exposed 
and subject to critique.  
What does the Jewish Question say, if anything, about Jewish belonging in 
Argentina?  Except perhaps during the rise of ultra-nationalist movements in the 1930s and 
40s, the Jewish Question, as a political concern, never really arose in Argentina.  As I’ve 
previously discussed, Jews were admitted into the nation under the liberal project that was 
unfolding in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century.  They were one group among 
many who would become Argentines, at the loss of their particularity (it was hoped).  As 
                                                     
33Hannah Arendt provides a searing critique of assimilation on precisely these grounds.  For Arendt, assimilation 
as the resolution of the Jewish question is at best politically naïve and perhaps disgraceful (as a parvenu) and at 
worst, incredibly dangerous.  Arendt argued that the best option for Jews was to become pariahs to the society at 
large, and even among the Jewish community if necessary, fight for political rights as Jews and provide a critique 
of the status quo.  In other words, Arendt, reflecting on the rise of totalitarianism and the demise of European 
Jewry, saw a danger in fighting for inclusion based on an abstract, universal conception of humanity.  As she 
writes, “The conception of human rights, based upon the assumed existence of a human being as such, broke 
down at the very moment when those who professed to believe in it were for the first time confronted with people 
who had indeed lost all other qualities and specific relationships—except that they were still human.  The world 
found nothing sacred in the abstract nakedness of being human…” (Arendt 1979:299). 
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chapter one demonstrates, however, the waves of immigrants that eventually came to 
Argentina, mostly through Buenos Aires, challenged the vision of “Argentina” imagined by 
elites in profound ways.  However some immigrant groups, such as Italians, were able to 
capture and reshape Argentinidad in ways that, over time, became “natural.”  Jews, at the 
same time as they adopted significant aspects of Argentine culture—ways of feeling, of 
thinking—also retained a level of particularity that distinguished them from those for whom 
dominant constructions of Argentinidad could be embraced and reshaped with little 
contradiction.  At play in articulations of Jewish difference in Argentina is the ways in which 
Catholicism has become an important vehicle through which to express Argentinidad, 
particularly outside of Buenos Aires.  The ways in which Jewish Argentines both belong and 
don’t belong in the nation is informed in part by the engagement of Jewishness and 
modernity discussed above.  
In many ways, the event of the AMIA bombing, while perhaps not formally raising the 
Jewish question, animated the concerns and problems of the Jew as minority citizen-
subjects.  It was not just that the assumption of physical safety of Jewish Argentines was 
shattered (by an external terrorist threat and the alleged complicity of some Argentine 
citizens), but that their claims to Argentinidad were also vulnerable.  Specifically, it became a 
site of rupture within the discourse of assimilation and acculturation of the Jews in 
Argentina, and initiated a public sphere where Jewish belonging could be discussed and 
questioned.  To this end, my good friend José can express that “somehow or another the 
Jewish community never was fully considered Argentine…the feeling I have is that 
Argentine identity for the Jews requires in some way an elaboration, it is not a natural 
situation.”34
34“que de alguna manera la comunidad judía nunca fue plenamente considerada como argentina… yo la 
impresión que tengo es que la identidad argentina de los judíos de alguna manera requiere de una elaboración, 
es una opinión, requiere de una elaboración, no es una situación natural.” Interview May 23, 2004 in Buenos 
Aires.  
IV. Inside and Outside the Nation: The Bombing of the 
AMIA  
My problem began after the AMIA bombing, when they asked me if my daughter was 
a Jew or an Argentine… --Sofía Guterman  
 
Introduction: The Vulnerability of the Body 
Buenos Aires, August 21, 2004.  I think about how easily harmed a body is.  
Frequently, I have these thoughts during the day, as I navigate my way through the busy city 
streets.  Everything, every surface and situation vibrates with the possibility of destruction.  
As I walk down the sidewalk, I look down at my hands, the skin thin and transparent, 
revealing the sustaining networks inside.  Everything is too close to the surface I think, too 
visible and easily tampered with.  Even the hard parts of our bodies—bones, teeth, 
cartilage—offer little protection against just a little too much pressure, an excess of force.  
Just look at that bloody clump in the middle of the street, bones crushed, feathers matted, 
beak flattened.  It could be me, or you for that matter.  Anytime, anywhere.  You never know.  
Babies and toddlers ride shotgun with their parents, they rock in the seat as the car 
comes to a stop.  I can’t help but imagine what will happen if the vehicle is casually bumped 
from behind.  The appalling informal nature of risk.  The other day, while walking in 
Recoleta, I came across a destroyed car, seemingly abandoned on the side of the street.  
The windshield on the driver’s side had a perfect hole the size of an adult human head.  The 
connection of the body and the windshield an intimate one; the glass shattered around it like 
the concentric circles of a stone tossed in water.  I turn my head and walk faster down the 
street, toward the flashing lights of the shops and cinema, filled with people at rest, carefree 
and laughing. 
 
 *** 
Buenos Aires, July 18, 1994.  Andrea wakes early that winter Monday morning.  She 
wants to leave her apartment before 9:00 AM to go to the AMIA building, located on Pasteur 
Street, and register at the job center there.  She’s interested in a job at a nursery school, 
and after discussing the matter with her mom, thinks that the job center at the AMIA could 
help her.  But first she is going to check another nearby nursery school for job possibilities.  
Her mother, Sofía, is anxious that morning about Andrea’s plans—there were a series of 
ominous dreams, and Sofía had had strange chest pains for most of the night and morning.  
She tries calling her daughter, but the machine picks up.  Apparently, she had already left. 
It is a typical winter morning in Buenos Aires: a bit colder than most, but sunny and 
bright.  At around 9:30 AM Andrea put in an application at the nursery school.  She was only 
three or four blocks away from the AMIA building on Pasteur Street.  Pasteur Street, and the 
Once neighborhood, has special significance for her.  She and her family used to live on this 
street, just a few doors away from the AMIA.  In a way, walking down Pasteur was like 
coming home.  As she walks, people are engaged in their morning rituals and routines—off 
to work, children to school, the small confiterías on calle Pasteur steamy with coffee and 
casual conversation.  A mother walks with her son along the street, people load and unload 
trucks, someone stops briefly to purchase something at a small store.  Underneath the city, 
students and other commuters dose or read on the Subte (subway), on their way to work or 
school.  At some point before 9:53 AM Andrea enters the AMIA. 
They say that when the bomb detonated at approximately 9:53, its presence could 
be felt in the surrounding neighborhoods.  Windows rattled, floors vibrated.  What was that? 
Sofía, in her apartment, felt nothing even though her neighbors later report feeling the power 
of the explosion.  Her chest hurt, and she had been busy getting tutoring materials together 
for her students.  Andrea’s fiancée, looking for Andrea, calls Sofía at around 10:10.  A little 
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 while later Sofía’s husband calls, and says that many of their old neighbors from Pasteur 
Street had been calling him.   
“Why?” Asked Sofía.   
“Because they blew up the AMIA,” He said.   
“Andrea went there,” Sofía replies. 
The search and rescue operation went on for days.  On the eighth day of searching 
for the bodies and potential survivors of the bombing, they found Andrea’s body, her chest 
compressed by a piece of cement.  “And from that day,” Sofía iterates, “begins another kind 
of life.”1 
With 85 people dead and hundreds injured, the bombing of the Asociación Mutual 
Israelita Argentina (from now on, AMIA) remains the largest terrorist attack in the country’s 
history.  While Argentine and other state intelligence agencies have pin-pointed several 
Iranian nationals as the main suspects, to date, key alleged perpetrators have not been put 
on trial, basic facts about the bombing remain unknown or controversial, and government 
officials including former President Carlos Menem and the judge in charge of the AMIA 
case, Juan José Galeano, have been implicated in a cover-up.  Moreover, the Argentine 
state has been petitioned through the Inter-American Commission for Human Rights at the 
Organization of American States for its failure to provide what are deemed basic human 
rights in a liberal democracy—security and justice.2  For the family members of the victims—
los familiares—the past 15 years have been marked not only by the pain of personal loss, 
but by the elusive, maddening search for information and justice.  Some have given up hope 
in ever achieving justice through the courts, others have put their efforts in demanding that 
the Argentine state fulfill its responsibilities to its citizens—in short, insisting that the state 
                                                     
1The narrative about Andrea was taken from my interview on July 1, 2004 with her mother, Sofía Guterman, at 
her home in the Villa Crespo neighborhood of Buenos Aires.   
 
2The Argentine state that is invoked here is a narrowly defined institution that needs to be brought into the sphere 
of “proper” liberal democratic practice.   
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 and society realize the liberal democratic principles the transition to democracy in 1983 is 
supposed to guarantee.  Framed this way, the fight for justice for the AMIA bombing 
engages the discursive work of middle-class Argentine human rights organizations, and also 
connects to the liberal traditions that have formed the idea of the nation since 
independence.3  For many, the bombing of the AMIA has become one of the emblematic 
examples of the weak state of Argentine democracy, and the continued reign of the “culture 
of impunity.”  Indeed, for some actors, justice for the AMIA bombing is not only important for 
the victim’s families, but for the nation itself, with “memory” becoming, as with the last 
dictatorship, a crucial agent against impunity and the official amnesia that accompanies it.  
This chapter specifically discusses details about the AMIA bombing, along with the 
history of the institution and its function within the Jewish Argentine community.  I follow this 
discussion by looking at the ways in which the public and state responded to and framed the 
AMIA bombing within discourses of exclusion and inclusion.  Central to these discussions 
are the ways in which Jewish Argentines position themselves and are positioned by the 
state and fellow citizens.  In many respects, the explosion of the AMIA building is a site of 
multiple kinds of ruptures: of bodies, lives, dreams of liberal democracy and Jewish life 
within it.  In other respects, however, it is a site where people and imaginaries have come 
together, as memories of the “dirty war” mingle with memories of the Holocaust, and Jewish 
and non-Jewish Argentines come together to mourn, make sense of the violence, and 
ponder the state’s role in this act.  
The Bombing in Context 
The bombing of the AMIA was not the only attack of this type to occur in Argentina.  
Two years prior to the destruction of the AMIA, the Israeli embassy in downtown Buenos 
Aires was bombed and completely destroyed.  Both bombings are connected in the minds of 
                                                     
3See chapter one for an overview of how liberal ideals helped to shape the nation.  The specifics about the 
struggle for justice and human rights are detailed in chapter five. 
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 Argentines, their targets ostensibly “Jews,” their shared location, Buenos Aires.  They are 
also powerfully linked in the ways the state responded to both bombings—both have 
become examples of impunidad.  While the two attacks share many features, they have 
substantively different consequences when considered through the lens of citizenship and 
national identity.  The embassy, while located in Buenos Aires, functions symbolically as a 
piece of Israel in Argentina.4  While many of those killed in the bombing were Argentine 
citizens, the target itself is more ambiguously Argentine that the AMIA.  
Given this past act of violence, some argue that the bombing of the AMIA was to be 
expected, and yet when it arrived the country appeared to be completely unprepared.  The 
day after the AMIA bombing, Página/12, a popular left-leaning national newspaper ran with 
the headlines, “Otra Vez” (Again).5  It felt expected because the Argentine metropolis 
experienced a similar attack two-year years earlier, and yet like this previous act, the 
government seemed completely unprepared.  Since 1992, not much had changed in 
security or intelligence to hinder a similar act of violence, and the investigation into the 
Israeli embassy bombing appeared stalled.  Evidence also surfaced that the Argentine 
secret service, along with other governments, knew there was going to be another attack in 
Buenos Aires, and yet neglected to act.6 
The Israeli embassy was bombed on March 17, 1992.  The embassy, located in an 
attractive old-fashioned building on a corner in downtown Buenos Aires, was completely 
destroyed by a car bomb.  Twenty-nine people, Israeli and Argentine nationals, were killed 
in the attack.  Islamic Jihad (a part of Hezbollah) asserted responsibility for the bombing, 
stating that it was in response to Israel’s assassination of Hezbollah’s leader at the time, 
                                                     
4And perhaps is actually a piece of Israel in Argentina—I’m not sure if when one enters the Israeli embassy if one 
is actually under the jurisdiction of Israeli law.  
 
5Página/12, Martes 19 de Julio de 1994, pp.1. 
 
6This was conveyed to me by Laura Ginsberg on December 14, 2004 and is also put forth by Rotella (1999) and 
Escudé and Gurevich (2003).  
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 Sheik Abbas al-Musawi, earlier that year.7  The attack on the Israeli embassy in Buenos 
Aires forms part of a string of attacks against Israeli and Jewish targets worldwide between 
the years 1992-1994.8  However, the possible role of Hezbollah along with Iran and Syria, in 
the Israeli Embassy bombing rests at the level of allegation.   
At the time of my fieldwork (2004-2005), there seemed to be little political will on the 
part of Argentines or Israelis to apprehend those suspected to be responsible, even though 
it is widely believed that this bombing is linked by ideology and perpetrators to the later 
AMIA bombing.  Like the AMIA bombing, members of Argentine security forces came under 
suspicion as accessories or having prior knowledge of the attack, although these allegations 
have not been taken to court.  The case still remains unsolved—at least officially.9   
Carlos S. who lost his daughter in the bombing of the embassy, is one of the only 
Argentines actively involved in championing the case.  Carlos had been following the case 
closely and had recently been given access to government files regarding the investigation 
of the 1992 bombing.  An elderly gentlemen with warm eyes set in a gently aged face, he 
told me the story of the embassy bombing, his daughter who was killed, and the ongoing 
investigation.  Insistent but not angry, he leaned over our table, strewn with empty espresso-
sized cups, and said, “… the bombing of the [Israeli] embassy is clear, they know who were 
the authors—a small section of the Argentine intelligence agency…the Israeli intelligence 
agency and other countries already know perfectly who were the authors of the bombing.”10 
                                                     
7See Gurevich (2005:3) mentions another possible reason for the attack, citing Argentina’s break with neutrality 
in sending to two ships to participate in the Gulf War against Iraq. 
 
8See The New York Times, “A Bleak History: Three Decades of Attacks on Jewish Targets and Israelis Abroad, 
October 8, 2004.”  
 
9In 2008 the man widely believed to be behind the two attacks in Buenos Aires among others, the Hezbollah 
leader Imad Mughniyeh was killed in a bombing in Damascus.  Hezbollah blames Israel, while Israel continues to 
deny involvement.  
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 The reasons why neither the Argentine nor the Israeli state, haven’t enacted formal 
judicial procedures in regards to the Israeli embassy bombing are complex and are not 
entirely unconnected to the AMIA case.  The issue of justice, particularly in relation to the 
AMIA bombing, will be addressed in chapter five.  In relation to the Argentine state, the two 
bombings are linked in the minds of many Argentines through the view that the state has 
failed in its role to provide security and protect its citizens, and tolerates and facilitates a 
culture of impunidad.  The fact that two years after the bombing of the Israeli embassy there 
had been no conclusive steps toward solving the case was seen to send a clear message to 
the international world: crimes remain unpunished in Argentina.  The tacit impunity given the 
perpetrators could be seen as a green light inviting similar acts of terror and crime in 
general, and as I’ve already stated, many of the victims of the AMIA bombing hold the 
Argentine government responsible for fomenting such conditions.  With the bombing of the 
Israeli embassy in mind, I turn now to specifically address the AMIA bombing. 
A Rupture in the City; a Puncture in the Heart 
 
Buenos Aires, December 14, 2004.  It is an incredibly hot summer morning, and by 
9:00 AM the temperature is well into the eighties.  I am sitting in a corner confitería in the 
neighborhood of Villa Crespo (often referred to as Villa Kreplach because of the number of 
Jews who live there), talking with a remarkable woman.11  Remarkable because after ten 
years she seems to never tire of denouncing the Argentine and Israeli governments, Jewish 
community leaders, and others she accuses of impunidad.  Remarkable because she has 
been unwilling to change her argument or her tactics, despite the criticism she receives from 
the Jewish Argentine community, and her alienation from other family members of the 
victims.  Laura lost her husband in the bombing.  
                                                                                                                                                                    
10“…el atentado a la embajada está esclarecido, se sabe quienes fueron los autores, los servicios de inteligencia 
argentinos, un pequeño sector, los servicios de inteligencia israelíes y de varios países más ya tienen 
perfectamente ubicados quienes fueron los autores del atentado.” 
 
11 Kreplach is a kind of dumpling, often meat filled, popular in Ashkenazi cooking.  
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 In the photos I’ve seen of Laura Ginsberg, she appears with a face that betrays 
extreme pain or tension.  An accomplished rhetorician, her words can cut as much as they 
evoke empathy and sadness.  But when I am with her in person she seems relaxed, her 
face open and friendly, her demeanor generous.  She is casually dressed in a tank top and 
has short brown hair that gently frames her bespectacled face.  It has taken me months to 
arrange a meeting with her, a consequence of my nervousness in approaching her as much 
as her demanding schedule.  She had been difficult to track down, as she was very busy 
between her work at the university and her public role in pressuring the government to stop 
covering-up the AMIA investigation, and to call out the impunity she sees burying the case.  
Once a prominent member of Memoria Activa, Laura left (or was forced to leave—this 
remains a point of controversy) to form her own group, APEMIA (Agrupación por el 
Esclarecimiento de la Masacre Impune de la AMIA, Association for the Clarification of the 
Unpunished Massacre of the AMIA Bombing), perceived as more direct and forceful in their 
reclamations than Memoria Activa, and aligned with less mainstream currents of political 
activism.  Yet, while many people I spoke with didn’t agree with her politics and non-Zionist 
position on Israel, I was often told that she had the “clearest” vision of the bombing and the 
state’s crimes in relation to this attack. 
Laura had recently given a long interview in a weekly newsmagazine (which was the 
cover story) regarding her views on the investigation of the bombing and the ways in which 
the state needs to be held accountable for their actions in relation to the attack. With my 
quiet, tentative Spanish and academic project, why would she want to talk with me?  We 
eventually found a 45-minute window in her schedule to talk.  We ended up talking for more 
than 4 hours over two meetings.  
She immediately put me at ease.  And rather uncharacteristically for those most 
affected by the AMIA bombing and publicly involved in the struggle against impunity, she is 
incredibly patient: after giving a long, complicated answer to a question, she looks at me and 
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 asks what other questions I have, or what else I want to know.12  Sitting by the window in a 
nondescript corner restaurant, the sidewalks busy with morning pedestrian traffic—ordinary 
people involved in their own hopes and struggles, not anticipating any shock or significant 
change in their routine—Laura tells me about the day, seemingly so ordinary, when she 
received her own shock: 
I remember the morning when it happened.  I was going to work and when I arrived a 
co-worker came up to me and told me what had happened, and I never imagined 
that it would be of the magnitude it was, until I arrived at Pasteur street, I arrived an 
hour and half later, I work quite far…obviously the memory I had at that moment is 
that I couldn’t understand how this could happen again, because we’ve already had 
a bombing here [in Buenos Aires].  That was the first sensation.  I knew that my 
husband was there, and well, soon after we arrived at Pasteur and when I saw the 
dimension [of the bombing], all of the people, the number of ambulances, I realized 
that it wasn’t a minor thing…I looked for him for 3 days until the morgue called me 
and they told me that the body of my husband had been found.13  
 
Laura’s reaction to the bombing reflects some common sentiments experienced by 
familiares.  A sense of shock, of incomprehension, the unsettling sensation of familiarity, 
that this had happened before, just two years previous, with the bombing of the Israeli 
embassy.  In the days, months, and years that followed, as Laura and other familiares tried 
to accommodate their grief with the relentless, daily demands of living, incomprehension 
and shock of the bombing were replaced by anger and by understanding too much: the 
AMIA bombing was becoming another example of impunidad, another “official story” 
constructed by powerful and interested parties to occlude rather than reveal, maintain the 
status quo rather than create new possibilities.  Laura, along with other familiares and 
                                                     
12This is not a criticism of others, most of whom were incredibly generous and kind with me, but a reflection of 
how tired people were, after so many years of struggle and grief.  
 
13Bueno, recuerdo la mañana que ocurrió. Yo estaba viajando hacia mi lugar de trabajo y cuando llegué me 
encontré con una compañera de trabajo que fue la que me dijo lo que había ocurrido y yo jamás imaginé que 
tenía la magnitud que tuvo hasta que llegué al calle Pasteur que llegué como una hora y media más tarde, yo 
trabajo bastante más lejos… obviamente el recuerdo que tengo de esos momentos es que no podía entender 
cómo había pasado otra vez porque acá ya habíamos tenido una bomba. Esa fue la primera sensación. Yo 
sabía que mi marido estaba allí y bueno al rato que llegamos a Pasteur y cuando vi la dimensión que eso tenía 
por la cantidad de gente que había, la cantidad de ambulancias me di cuenta de que no había sido un hecho 
menor…lo busqué durante tres días hasta que me llamaron de la morgue y me dijeron que habían encontrado el 
cuerpo de él. 
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 Argentine citizens, had become all too wary about the version of events provided by the 
state, as during the “dirty war” the state masterfully wove visions of reality that had little 
correspondence with the daily life experience of many Argentines.  The attack on this 
Jewish institution was, for Laura, clearly an Argentine story, rooted in the politics and history 
of the nation.  As this chapter and the next will proceed to show, this perspective is 
contentious.  
Later, I stand in front of the shiny citadel of the new AMIA building.  The new building 
gleams, a fortress of modern architecture on a street of modest structures.  You might forget 
that the AMIA was a sight of destruction and death if it weren’t for the names of the victims 
spray-painted on the wall outside.  You might forget, except that if you passed security and 
went inside its walls you would see pieces of the old building and scorched papers and 
objects retrieved from the debris.  You might forget, but you can’t, really, because in some 
form or another the AMIA bombing is mentioned in an article in the morning paper you just 
read.  I try to imagine those moments immediately after the old building collapsed.  The new 
building is a palimpsest: traced within the new, shiny building is the older one, both 
destroyed and intact.  Here is a scene, culled from pictures, other people’s descriptions, and 
imagination: 
The face of a building torn off, jagged lines of ceilings and floors that now lead 
nowhere but into the smoky, debris filled air; the ground a large crater of jumbled pieces.  
Dust.  Charred books, files—the detritus of archives, offices.  People screaming—those up 
above, peering over the edge of what used to be their office, others down below, buried or 
searching for survivors.  Some frozen, dumb-struck by the destruction, unsure whether they 
are dead or alive.  Broken rocks, pieces of furniture, black marble glinting in the hazy air.  
Bodies, pieces. Blood. 
As I discussed in chapter one, Jewish immigrants had been living on Argentine soil in 
significant numbers since the latter two decades of the nineteenth century, and have, not 
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 unproblematically, adopted Argentina as their country.  At the same time they have been 
successful at organizing for their particular communal requirements; the formation of the 
AMIA met many of these needs.14  Located on a short five-block city street in the Buenos 
Aires’ neighborhood of Once, it is an institution that, since at least the 1930s, has had 
practical and symbolic importance for a large portion of the Jewish Argentine community.  
The AMIA is a distinctly local Argentine institution and began life in 1894 as a Jewish burial 
society, or Hevre Kadisha.  Unable to bury their dead in the national (Catholic) cemeteries 
without submitting to baptism, and wanting to preserve their own highly ritualized treatment 
of the dead, the Ashkenazi Jews who settled in Buenos Aires created their own institution 
and cemetery to care for the deceased.  In the 1930s, the Hevre Kadisha became 
institutionalized as the AMIA, and expanded over time to include community archives, social 
services and outreach programs, a teacher training academy, cultural activities, the office of 
the chief rabbinate, and a job center, among many other things.15  It is also an important site 
for the documentation of Jewish Argentine life, although much of the records and documents 
of this history were destroyed in the bombing.  The inauguration of the old AMIA building 
took place in 1945, and through the services provided, the AMIA became an important site 
of Jewish specificity within the nation.16  With tragic irony, the year of the bombing, 1994, the 
AMIA was preparing to commemorate its one hundred year anniversary—as its first 
incarnation as a burial society was in 1894—which was also going to be a celebration of one 
hundred years of Jewish life in Argentina.   
                                                     
14Initially the AMIA was an Ashkenazi institution, and thus not necessarily welcoming of or useful for Sephardic 
Jewry.  As the Jewish community has consolidated somewhat over the years, the AMIA has come to serve the 
collectivity as a whole. 
 
15See Judith Laikin Elkin’s (1998) important work, The Jews of Latin America. New York: Holmes and Meier.  
Also, Ricardo Feierstein’s (1993) Historia de los Judíos Argentinos. Buenos Aires: Planeta.  
 
16Jewishness in Argentina also flourishes in political clubs, choruses, large social and sports clubs, the theater, 
synagogues, and a system of Jewish schools, as I mention in chapter one. 
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 Unlike most other Latin American countries (Brazil and Mexico being notable 
exceptions), the Jews of Argentina are scattered throughout many of the major cities outside 
of Buenos Aires (Elkin 1998).  However, Buenos Aires has the largest community of Jewish 
Argentines, and the functioning “core”—both administratively and culturally—of the 
community is considered to be in Buenos Aires.  This in part reflects the size of the Jewish 
Argentine population in the city, and is also a manifestation of the centrality of Buenos Aires 
to the governing and imagining of Argentina.  The AMIA is often portrayed to be the nucleus 
of that center—institutionally and symbolically—particularly after the bombing.17  
The AMIA building also came to house the offices of the Delegación de Asociaciones 
Israelitas Argentinas (from now on DAIA), a political organization that was founded in 1935 
to combat the rising anti-Semitic and discriminatory practices that accompanied the surge of 
right-wing nationalism, as I noted in chapter one.  The role of the DAIA and the controversy 
that surrounds it will be elaborated upon in the next chapter. 
The AMIA is an institution that in many ways reflects both the acceptance of Jewish 
specificity in Argentine life, and amplifies Jewish difference (both self-imposed and ascribed) 
within a society that largely frames itself as Catholic.  It is much more than a social club, or a 
place for Jewish learning and enrichment—it is a place where certain specific needs for 
maintaining Jewishness can be found, such as proper treatment and burial for the dead and 
the education of children.  While the people it serves are Argentine citizens, the AMIA is a 
place where the historically inscribed particularities of Jewishness may be emphasized over 
national identity.  The AMIA, then, is an institution that accommodates privately some of the 
essential needs of a particular collectivity that are not met by the society at large, and as 
such it is a prominent marker of Jewish difference in Argentina.  An article that appeared in 
the daily newspaper Página/12 the day after the bombing states that, “The building at 633 
                                                     
17This is view is from the perspective of Buenos Aires and represents the dominance, institutionally and in the 
national imaginary, that the city has over the rest of the country.  From the perspective of Jews in other cities, it is 
not a wholly uncontroversial claim. 
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 Pasteur was practically the Casa Rosada of the Jewish collectivity.”18  The Casa Rosada is 
the Presidential Palace in Buenos Aires—the seat of executive power.  This same assertion 
was made in an interview I had with former AMIA president, Abraham Kaul, who 
characterized the AMIA as “el gobierno de la comunidad Judía”—the government of the 
Jewish community.19  These comments point to the importance of the AMIA to Jewish 
Argentines, but it also presents an image of a nation within a nation, parallel to the state, 
and possibly construed as beyond the responsibility of the state—or a threat to it.  The 
existence of a separate Jewish governing body has deep historical roots that extend far 
beyond recent Argentine history, reflecting a means of community survival, and the 
somewhat autonomous position of Jews in the lands and societies in which they lived.  (And 
as I illustrated in the last chapter, this “corporatism” is what the architects of the French 
Revolution felt they needed to break down in order to make citizens out of Jews.)  The AMIA 
(and DAIA) can be seen as a continuation of that tradition, although to a lesser degree.  In 
some ways, the AMIA represents the limits of argentinidad’s claim on Jewishness, and the 
limit of the latter’s absorption into the former.  The AMIA as a site of possible destabilization 
of Argentine identity may partially account for the narrative confusion over identifying or 
claiming the victims of the attack as Jews or Argentines.  A further discussion of the 
construction of Jewishness as politically and socially separate from the nation will be 
explored below, along with some counter-narratives that challenge this vision.     
The AMIA bombing not only tore through the material and symbolic heart of a 
minority community, but also substantially shook the national imaginary of who or what 
could be considered Argentine.  The fact that the attack was carried out against a 
particular—and quite established—minority population raised serious questions about 
                                                     
18Página/12. 1994. “El edificio de Pasteur 633 era prácticamente la Casa Rosada de la colectividad Judía.” Pp. 
11. 19 de Julio, Buenos Aires.  
 
19This interview took place on August 4th, 2005 in his place of business.  He had recently stepped down as 
president of the AMIA.  
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 national belonging and the limits of citizenship, as well as the status of Argentina’s raw and 
delicate democracy.  Correspondingly, discussion after the bombing frequently centered on 
some of the following concerns:  How and why did Argentina become the target, again, for 
such an act?  Was Argentina actually a target, or simply a convenient staging ground to 
attack the (non-national) enemy?  Were the victims, then, “innocent civilians” and 
“Argentines” or “culpable” and essentially “foreign” Jews?  What role did the Argentine state 
and society have in the bombing?  How “healthy” is Argentina’s democracy?     
On the one hand, these questions point to an ambivalent position of Jewish subjects 
vis-à-vis the state and society.  This ambivalence, I argue, is not something that is 
necessarily overtly manifest through specific acts, such as anti-Semitism, or a state policy of 
discrimination—although anti-Semitic actions and discourse have been and continue to be 
quite present in Argentina.  Nor does it necessarily mark the everyday life of Jewish 
Argentines as “separate” or “different” from other Argentines, particularly within the middle 
class.  Instead, I see this ambivalence or precariousness as latent within dominant ways of 
thinking and feeling “Argentine” that articulate particular assumptions and opinions regarding 
“Jews” and “Jewishness.”  At the same time, this precariousness is also an articulation of a 
certain kind of Jewish subjectivity, in which to be a Jew in the diaspora is always potentially 
unstable, and occupies the position of stranger.20  It is after a shattering event like the AMIA 
bombing that these often unexpressed thoughts and feeling are often expressed, and 
perhaps accentuated.  
While the bombing and its aftermath exposed the uneven sutures of Jewish 
belonging, it also placed Jews squarely within certain histories and memories that circulate 
powerfully in Argentine society, and reflect the precariousness of all Argentine citizens.  
Some of the questions posed in response to the bombing point to generalized feelings of 
                                                     
20This realization was made even more apparent to me during a recent Passover Seder, where it is repeated 
many times that Jews will be strangers. The effect of reciting these words year after year cannot but effect a 
certain kind of subjectivity based on dislocation and foreignness.  
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 uncertainty, distrust, and ill-will toward the state that circulate generally within much of 
Argentine society: animated in the streets, coffee houses, theaters, and analyst offices of 
Buenos Aires.  The questions raised by the bombing, then, are not questions that are 
necessarily of interest to the Jewish-Argentine collectivity or only affect them, but engage 
popularly expressed currents of national anxiety, insecurity, and suspicion.  In some ways, 
the AMIA bombing can be seen as disrupting a narrative of marginal Jewish citizenship: 
within the culture of impunidad, the citizenship of all Argentines is potentially compromised, 
with the possible exemption of those who attempt to exercise absolute power above the law.   
Who were the Victims of the AMIA bombing? 
And because their voices cry out from the center of the land, we demand justice. –
Laura Ginsberg, 199721     
 
Plaza Lavalle, Buenos Aires. July 19, 2005.  When I saw Marcos he appeared visibly 
upset.  He was tightly gripping a copy of the popular daily newspaper, Clarín.  It was a day 
after a weekend of actos commemorating the 11th anniversary of the AMIA bombing, and the 
main newspapers devoted front-page coverage to the events and to the status of the 
investigation of the case.  The AMIA bombing was once again occupying the nation’s 
attention, although it is rarely entirely absent from the news.  Those who slowly gather to the 
plaza that cold winter morning are somewhat weary after the emotional and busy weekend.  
The weeks leading up to the anniversary are always unusually active with government 
meetings, official visits from the American Jewish Committee and other interested parties, 
and a general focus of media attention on the bombing and Jewish Argentine community. 
There was a buzz at the Memoria Activa anniversary acto last night, as the Senator Cristina 
Fernández de Kirchner had unexpectedly attended (she is now President of the nation), her 
presence seeming to be an indication that she takes the claims of the social movement 
                                                     
21Ginsberg, Laura (2002) “Active Memory” in The Argentina Reader, Gabriela Nouzeilles and Graciela Montaldo, 
eds. Patricia Owen Steiner, trans. Durham: Duke University Press.  
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 seriously.22  Like her husband Néstor Kirchner, as President Cristina Kirchner has made 
human rights an important aspect of her political agenda.    
Thus when Marcos runs up to me, I thought he was going to report something about 
Senator Kirchner, or one of the many speeches given over the weekend.  Marcos, a long-
time participant of Memoria Activa, is generally mild-mannered and quick to smile, but this 
day he forcefully thrusts the front page of Clarín into my hand and angrily points to a picture 
that occupied a portion of the front cover of the paper.  It was a fairly standard photo of the 
crowd of people attending the ceremony.  However, the photo focused on an area of the 
crowd (there were thousands of people) where an individual had held up an Israeli flag.23  
Marcos was outraged that someone would raise an Israeli flag at the event, and that the 
most widely read newspaper in Argentina would choose that image as emblematic of the 
commemoration.24  (At the two large community anniversary actos I attended, Israeli flags 
were not commonplace—I don’t remember seeing one at either, although the bombing of 
the Israeli embassy is always mentioned.)  The intent of the person waving an Israeli flag at 
an AMIA acto are unknown—it’s possible that it could have been in remembrance of the 
embassy bombing—but the appearance of the flag hails and fortifies particular feelings and 
discourses about Jews, citizenship, and belonging.  Marcos feared that the widely publicized 
appearance of the Israeli flag would work to further remove Jewish citizens and the bombing 
from the national sphere—the image effectively solidifying a perception that elides the 
                                                     
22The unannounced appearance of the Senator was quite impressive.  Memoria Activa holds a separate acto 
from the much larger community affair held on Pasteur Street, and in general, government officials only attend 
this large central event.  The Memoria Activa actos only draw a fraction of the crowd that the central acto does—
hundreds as opposed to thousands.  The presence of the Senator was a sign of the legitimacy, and to some 
extent power, of Memoria Activa to interpolate the state—separate from the “official,” organized Jewish Argentine 
community. 
 
23The byline under the photo reads, AMIA: “No alcanza con los gestos,” (taken from two of the speeches given at 
the anniversary) Clarín Martes 19 de Julio 2005, pp 1. 
 
24Feldstein and Acosta-Alzuru note that Clarín has the largest circulation in Argentina, “with 45% of the country’s 
readership” (2003:159).  It is also worth noting that Clarín is a “popular” paper that appeals to individuals 
throughout the class spectrum, unlike its more elite competitor, La Nación.  
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 argentinidad and legitimate citizenship of Jewish Argentines.  The image of the Israeli flag 
both produces and reproduces a discourse of marginality for Jewish Argentines; 
emphasizing a connection with Israel over Argentina is one way that Jews can be described 
as not “really” Argentine.25  It also symbolically removes them from Argentine history and 
space and into a kind of diasporic ether untethered to place (from which neither Argentina 
nor Israel claim them—as Israeli citizenship, and thus responsibility, is not simply active by 
virtue of their “Jewishness”).  
The presence of the Israeli flag in a context such as the AMIA bombing anniversary 
represents a point of anxiety and ambiguity about belonging and allegiance that is animated 
both within and outside of the Jewish Argentine community.  (And indeed, this anxiety is not 
only located in Argentina, as I’ve noted elsewhere.)  In different moments in Argentine 
history, such as during the controversial capture, extradition and trial of Adolf Eichmann by 
Israeli agents, Jewish-Argentines have been accused of harboring “dual loyalties” (Rein 
2003).  These charges are most forcefully made from right-wing nationalist groups, and 
have been accompanied by gross acts of anti-Semitism.26  Marcos’ anger about the Israeli 
flag, and the attendant issues about Jewish belonging in Argentina, are centrally related to 
one of the principal discourses circulating about the AMIA bombing: That it wasn’t an attack 
on Argentines, but on Jews, and that Jewish-Argentines are more properly represented by 
or aligned with Israel than Argentina.  These ambiguities can be expressed by questions like 
the one asked Sofía Guterman: Is your daughter a Jew or an Argentine?  It is also 
expressed by Jewish-Argentines who at certain moments stress an alliance with Jewish 
identity—sometimes articulated to Israel—over national belonging.  Within this view, the 
                                                     
25See Rein (2003) for a detailed account of the relationship between Argentina and Israel, particularly during the 
Peron years and the capture of Adolf Eichmann.  Chapter 7 of his book addresses the issue of “dual loyalty” 
accused of the Jews.  
 
26One particular incident involves the kidnapping and assault of a 19-year old student, Graciela Narcisa Sirota.  
She was badly beaten and burned with lit cigarettes, a swastika tattooed onto her chest (for an extended 
description of this event see Rein 2003:214-221).  
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 specific location of the bombing, and any national responsibility for the attack, are eclipsed 
by a narrative of (obstinate and unchanging) anti-Semitism and “foreign” mid-East politics.  
As I will show more specifically below, this perspective on the bombing emerged from both 
non-Jewish and Jewish quarters, and again point to an ambivalence that marks the 
perception and living of Jewish Argentine citizen-subjects. 
Significantly, about a third of those who were killed in the attack were not Jewish, yet 
they remain largely invisible in the narratives about the bombing—except sometimes singled 
out as “innocent” victims, as I explain below.  These include individuals working for the AMIA 
in various capacities, and also contracted workers who were doing some renovations or 
other work in the building.  It also includes passers-by in the street.  The elision of some of 
these individuals happens on two levels: some are immigrants from Bolivia or Paraguay (five 
are Bolivian, there is one Paraguayan national) who are politically and socially marginalized 
in Argentina, and furthermore, their stories have become overwhelmed by the “Jewishness” 
of the crime.  In the memorial book for the victims of the AMIA, Sus Nombres y Sus Rostros 
(Their Names and Their Faces), the majority of the victims who were non-Argentine citizens 
(six total) are represented not by writings from family members, but by the Bolivian 
embassy, or in the case of one Paraguayan, by a poem written by Israeli poet Amir Guilboa.  
A few of these individuals don’t have a photograph next to their name.  Jewish family 
members of the victims have been open to and have tried to include relatives and 
supporters of non-Jewish victims in their memorial services and political activities, but 
except for a few families, there has been little success.27  
                                                     
27The reasons for this are not entirely clear to me.  On the one hand, it was difficult to track down some of the 
families of the victims who were not Argentine.  Some individuals did not have family members in Argentina.  For 
others, I would suppose that there may have been a lack of identification with the Jewish victims and their 
families, and concurrently, a possible insensitivity from the part of the Jewish Argentine community to non-Jewish 
victims. Certainly the framing of the bombing as a “Jewish problem” rather than an attack on the nation 
contributes to the elision of non-Jewish victims.  But even if the AMIA bombing were fully seen as an attack on 
Argentina, some of the victims would still be marginalized as (often undesired) illegal or migrant workers. This is 
an area that deserves further investigation.  
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 There are also some Jewish family members of the victims who are not actively 
involved in organized demands for justice, or in the various memorial events for the 
bombing.  Sofía, whose story is related above, had given me the phone number of a woman 
who had lost two daughters in the attack.  She told me that the family of the girls who were 
killed hadn’t been very involved in any of the groups formed by family members of the 
victims after the bombing, but that she would probably want to speak with me.  Sofía was 
quite wrong in this respect.  Not everyone desires to speak about their loss, or engage in 
public protest or memorialization.  
Immediately after the bombing, the citizenry expressed shock and horror at the 
enormity of the destruction, and incomprehension of the repeat performance—the AMIA 
echoing the explosion of the Israeli embassy.  Four days after the bombing, an estimated 
150,000 people attended a street convocation in repudiation of the attacks.28  Due to rain 
and the undulating shields of umbrellas that marked the crowd, the day became known as 
the Día del paraguas, or Day of the Umbrellas, the soft winter rain and grey skies seemingly 
an appropriate accompaniment to the pain, confusion and anger that coursed through the 
crowd.  The national newspapers and magazines were filled with stories ranging from 
earnest political analysis, analysis of the act from international “terror experts,” outrage and 
expressions of solidarity with the family members of the victims by government officials, and 
promises to find those responsible.  Emotional eyewitness accounts of the destruction 
accompanied pictures of seemingly dozens of people sifting through an enormous pile of 
rubble, picking up a shoe here, moving a body there.  Banners were raised in some Buenos 
Aires’ streets proclaiming, “Today we are all Jews,” and articles appeared with titles such as, 
“This didn’t happen to the Jews, it happened to everyone.”29  Genuine expressions of 
                                                     
28This estimate is provided by the DAIA and can be found in the memorial pamphlet “18 de Julio de 1994.”   
 
29“No le pasó a los judíos, nos ocurrió a todos” por Atilio Cadorín, La Nación, Martes 19 de Julio de 1994, pp. 14. 
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 solidarity and sympathy poured out from various sectors of society.  Harsh approbation was 
expressed toward the authors of an act that was widely agreed to be an act of horrific 
terrorism.   
A closer look at how the victims were portrayed in the media and by politicians 
shows a parallel discourse that equivocates over exactly who was attacked and why.  Often 
the victims were portrayed as “Jews” and contrasted with “innocent” or “Argentine” victims, 
the bombing a “Jewish problem.”  In their analysis of national media discourses (taken from 
the two most popular dailies, La Nación and Clarín) about the bombing, Feldstein and 
Acosta-Alzuru (2003) illustrate how common it was to write about “Jewish victims” and 
“innocent victims” and that the bombing was presented as something that happened to the 
“Jews,” rather than the nation as a whole, “…discursive strategies that effectively distanced 
Argentinean Jews from non-Jews” (2003:160).30  The authors also note that the victims were 
made to appear “foreign” by certain visual cues, such as using images of orthodox men and 
boys in black dress and hat with side-locks as representatives of the “Jewish people,” even 
though this representation only fits a very small minority of Jewish-Argentines (Feldstein and 
Acosta-Alzuru 2003:161).  
In a radio address two days after the attack, then-President Carlos Menem 
expressed that “we have all been dealt a blow”31 and that in terms of pain, he “also was a 
victim.”32  He also apologized for this unfortunate episode and promised to “redouble the 
efforts to investigate this new attack.”33  He goes on, however, from solidarity to separation, 
                                                     
30Federico Pablo Feldstein and Carolina Acosta-Alzuru (2003) “Argentinean Jews as Scapegoat: A Textual 
Analysis of the AMIA Bombing, Journal of Communication Inquiry, Vol. 27, No. 2, pp.152-170. 
 
31Todos hemos sido golpeados. “Discurso Del Sr. Presidente de la República Argentina, Dr. Carlos Saúl Menem, 
con motivo del atentado terrorista del 18 de Julio de 1994.”  
 
32…yo también soy una víctima. (Menem 1994).  
 
33“…quiero pedir perdón por este lamentable episodio y comprometerme a redoblar los esfuerzos para 
esclarecer este neuvo ataque…;” “redoblar los esfuerzos para esclarecer este nuevo ataque ” (Menem 1994).   
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 placing the attack, not within local space and time, but within a timeless narrative of Jewish 
victim-hood: “A thousand times the Jewish community has been struck.  A thousand times it 
has risen from its suffering.”34  
Menem’s address is noteworthy for the ways in which it offered solidarity and even 
identification with the victims (through “pain”) and simultaneously established a distance 
between them and “todos los argentinos” (all Argentines).  Menem effectively, if not 
consciously, places himself and the nation as sympathetic watchers, as if the suffering and 
destruction took place elsewhere.  His use of a narrative that inscribes Jewishness within a 
history of persecution and dogged perseverance removes the attack from historically 
inscribed local and global circumstances and makes it appear inevitable.  This fixing of 
Jewishness to a history seemingly driven by suffering and persecution (which has been very 
productive since the Holocaust) also appears to legitimize the attacks as a necessary 
element of an imagined “Jewish condition.” These unexamined “truths” mark the ways in 
which the AMIA bombing is frequently framed by politicians, journalists, and the public—
Jewish and non-Jewish.  They also contribute to a situation in which the Argentine 
government is not perceived to be responsible for victims of the AMIA bombing, and doesn’t 
need to seriously investigate the case.  
Perhaps the most emblematic gesture of the distancing between Jewish victims and 
the nation proper is the phone call Menem made to then Israeli Prime Minister, Yitzhak 
Rabin.  Shortly after the attack, Menem called the Israeli Prime Minister to express his 
condolences for the Jews who died in the bombing.  In their textual analysis of the bombing, 
Feldstein and Acosta-Alzuru write that, “…both newspapers [La Nación and Clarín] portray 
Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin as the representative of the Argentinean-Jewish 
community” (2003:163).  As I’ve learned from my time in Buenos Aires, this act enraged 
                                                     
34“Mil veces ha sido golpeado el pueblo judío.  Mil veces se ha levantado de su sufrimiento” (Menem 1994)  
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 many Jewish-Argentines—a community that was already well-established decades before 
the creation of Israel—because it seemed to place responsibility for Jewish-Argentine 
citizens on the Israeli government.  It also assumes that Jewish Argentines “feel” more 
connected to a transnational community than to their immediate neighbors and co-citizens; 
that somehow they have remained separate from the processes and knowledges, rooted in 
the everyday and beyond, by which one becomes “Argentine.”  During a conversation with 
Sofía, she emphasized to me that Menem’s call of apology was “the worst thing Menem 
could have done when he found out about the bombing.”35  It strongly suggests Israel as the 
legitimate home for “the Jews,” and places Argentina in the position of a surrogate and 
temporary homeland.  The phone call symbolically revoked Argentine citizenship, and the 
rights and responsibilities inherent to it.  In this way, the bombing is often situated as an 
“international” problem that has little to do with Argentina.  I imagine that all of this is part of 
what Marcos saw in the Clarín picture that winter day.  
While there certainly are international or global aspects to the bombing, with 
connections to other countries and events in the Middle East, the bombing has been shown 
to have distinct connections to local individuals, national politics and Argentine foreign 
affairs, and state agencies.  And as I’ve already mentioned, for a certain sector of society, 
the bombing, rather than being an unique event that “happened” to occur in Argentina 
because of the Jewish population, is directly linked to a Argentine history of state failure and 
terror.  Even when the victims are bracketed as Jews and not Argentines, the ways in which 
understandings of the bombing are “worked out” are always in reference to local 
understandings of politics, human rights, and citizenship, as well as “Jewishness” and 
“argentinidad.”  
                                                     
35“lo peor que pudo hacer Menem es que cuando se enteró del atentado a la AMIA mandó un telegrama de 
pésame al embajador de Israel.”  Sofía remembers Menem sending a telegram to the Israeli embassador, which 
he may well have done.  Other reports are that he called Prime Minister Rabin.  
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 Even if many Jewish Argentines express a separate, supra-national communal 
belonging, they don’t necessarily see this as contradictory to their Argentine citizenship—
having layered loyalties expresses the uneven ways that citizen-subjects are sutured to 
dominate articulations of the nation.  As persons may “feel” Jewish, they also can “feel” 
Argentine; the two don’t necessarily need to overwhelm each other.   
This double articulation of belonging—that exists as a tension and not a break—is   
communicated by those for those whom Jewishness is an important aspect of their identity, 
and yet, does not negate their identity as Argentines.  Santiago Kovadloff, the Jewish 
Argentine writer mention in chapter two, describes his Jewish identity as para mi muy central 
(for me very central), and refuses to settle the bombing of the AMIA as a “Jewish issue.” 
Sitting on a sofa in his elegant apartment in Barrio Norte, he describes in a soft but firm 
voice what he felt after he found out the AMIA had been bombed:   
And well when I found out from the radio what had happened, I felt, I felt that the 
country had been attacked, not the Jewish community and my first pronouncements 
to the press, television, or radio were to rebel against those who said that the Jews 
had suffered a bombing, I felt that they had bombarded my city and war was 
declared on us and I didn’t accept that it was a problem of the Jewish community.  
Buenos Aires had been bombarded.36   
  
Buenos Aires had been bombed.  The crater in Pasteur Street and mounds of debris 
attest to this fact.  But the question still lingered: who were the victims?  Santiago rebels 
against the rhetorics that articulate a unified, essential notion of identity, and a placing of the 
AMIA outside of the figurative borders of the city.  The bracketing of the AMIA attack as a 
Jewish problem negates how, through historically constitutive processes, Jewishness and 
Argentineness have mingled and influenced each other, if sometimes uncomfortably.  It 
raises the specter of the Jewish question: what kind of citizens can Jews be made into?  For 
                                                     
36Y bueno en cuando supe lo que había sucedido por la radio me sentí, sentí que el país había sido atacado, no 
la comunidad judía y mis primeros pronunciamientos a través de la prensa o a través de la televisión o de la 
radio fueron revelarme contra quienes decían que los judíos habíamos sufrido un atentado, yo sentía que 
habían bombardeado mi ciudad y que nos habían declarado la guerra y no aceptaba que hubiese sido un 
problema de la comunidad judía, Buenos Aires había sido bombardeada. 
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 some, identification with Argentinidad is stronger than any claim Jewishness might have on 
them.  Ana María, a woman whose ancestors arrived in Argentina around the turn of the last 
century, lost her daughter in the bombing.  She and her husband have been very active in 
one of the groups of familiares (Los Familiares y Amigos de las Víctimas).  Although she 
comes from a Jewish family she describes herself as “totally Argentine:”  “In general I’ll tell 
you that for me I’m totally Argentine, I feel Argentine… if I had to choose between saying I’m 
Argentine or Jewish, 100% I am Argentine, I totally identify with the good and bad of 
Argentina.”37  I heard this assertion from many who are identified in one way or another to 
Jewishness, and yet feel as comfortable (or more) as Argentines—revealing complicated 
alliances that can’t be assumed a priori.  In some ways, those victims of the bombing for 
who Jewishness had previously not been a significant aspect of their identity (although they 
claimed some connection), became “caught” in the bombing of the AMIA and a certain fixed 
Jewish identity was ascribed to them.  They literally and figuratively became marked as 
Jews, no matter how weak their connection to Jewishness, no matter how Argentine they 
felt or understood themselves to be.  The examples of Santiago and Ana María, show that 
common sense understandings of “Jewish” belonging in Argentina are contested and far 
from certain.   
As non-Jews or “Argentines” were often portrayed as innocent victims of a crime that 
had nothing to do with them, Jewish Argentines were sometimes accused of “bringing” the 
bombing to Argentina.  This echoes the attachment of disaster and Jew that Menem linked 
into, and is also a way of blaming the victim.  Anita, a member of Memoria Activa, 
understood the public response to the bombing as complex and contradictory: 
[The response was] Very diverse, very diverse, in the beginning there was a lot of 
anguish and a lot of misunderstanding.  A man that had a television program, one of 
the most popular in the country, that same afternoon [as the bombing], I heard him 
                                                     
37En general yo te digo que para mi yo soy totalmente argentina, yo me siento argentina y si tengo que optar y 
tengo que elegir entre decir soy argentina o soy judía, cien por cien soy argentina, yo estoy totalmente 
identificada con lo bueno y con lo malo de la Argentina. 
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 say that it was an attack on the community [the Jewish community], on a community 
building, and that innocents were also killed, making it understood that the Jews 
were responsible.  I think that this also was part of everything, there were people in 
solidarity with the victims and people who didn’t care, and there were those who 
were happy.38  
 
Repeatedly emphasized to me was this feeling of ambivalence toward the bombing 
and its victims, expressed from various sectors of society.  José, a friend from Memoria 
Activa, reflects upon a similar politics of blame, at the same time as he recognizes that the 
society in which he lives has more complicated attitudes toward the bombing and the Jews 
than he previously thought.  The public response to the bombing 
…was ambivalent, it was ambivalent. It [the bombing] was on a Monday and the 
following Thursday there was, here, in Congreso, a march that they called el día del 
paraguas (the day of the umbrellas), it was raining and there was an acto and they 
had at this acto, I don’t remember, around 200,000 people.  Obviously they weren’t 
all Jews. I realized that in Argentine society there were a large number of 
people…who not only didn’t have anti-Semitic feelings, but have their heads in the 
right place….But I don’t know, but there were [also] reactions of this type [anti-
Semitic] and this reaction, Michelle, is characterized by the following: this problem, 
the bomb in the AMIA, is a Jewish problem, and I don’t have anything to do with 
them, they are an element of danger that can bring a bomb.39  
 
The secretary of human rights for the city of Buenos Aires when I was in Buenos 
Aires, Gabriela Alegre, emphasized the positive reactions of solidarity at the same time as 
she notes certain discriminatory responses: 
I think that public reaction in general was good…I think that it was divided, let’s see, 
if we are objective I think that there must be a part of the population that will think, 
                                                     
38Muy diversa, muy diversa, de mucha angustia al principio, de no entender nada, de que un señor que tenía un 
programa de televisión, uno de los más vistos del país, esa misma tarde dijo, yo lo escuché, fue un ataque a la 
comunidad, a un edificio de la comunidad, también murieron inocentes, con lo cual dio por entendido que los 
judíos eran los culpables. Yo creo que eso también fue parte de todo, hubo gente solidaria hay gente que no le 
importa, hay gente que se alegró. Interview conducted in Buenos Aires, October 11, 2004. 
 
39 Fue ambivalente, fue ambivalente. Eso fue un lunes, al jueves siguiente hubo acá en Congreso una 
concentración que se llamó el día de los paraguas, fue un día de lluvia y hubo un acto y hubo en ese acto, yo no 
recuerdo, creo que alrededor de 200.000 personas, obviamente que no eran todos judíos. En la sociedad 
argentina yo me doy cuenta que hubo una gran cantidad de gente en la Argentina que no solo no tiene 
sentimientos antisemitas sino está muy bien ubicada…Pero no lo sé, pero hubo reacciones de este tipo, esa 
reacción Michelle es característica de lo siguiente: este problema, la bomba en la AMIA, es un problema de los 
judíos, yo no tengo que ver con ellos, ellos son un elemento de peligro que puede atraer traer una bomba.  
Interview conducted in Buenos Aires, May 10, 2004. 
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 this is something against the Jews… Look, look what the Jews bring here, the 
problems that they bring us.  Because this happened also with the embassy.40 
 
The politics of blame are not unknown in Argentina.  Indeed, during the Proceso or 
“dirty war” a locally articulated politics of blame worked to justify and make invisible the 
disappearances of thousands of people. Thus, the separation of Argentines and Jews, or 
“innocent” and “guilty,” echoes a similar tactic during the years of state terror, where victims 
were often assumed to be guilty: por algo sera, “they must have done something.”  Often 
underlying this reasoning is a tacit acceptance and even approval of the disappearances 
and deaths.  The politics of blame employed by some sectors in relation to the attack on the 
AMIA also distinguishes “real” Argentines from marginal or fraudulent citizens—again not 
unlike the rhetoric of the military junta, which distinguished between “authentic” and 
“suspect” Argentines.  In this context, it was Jews and their problems, Jews and the whole 
imbroglio of Middle East politics that was responsible, and a Jewish site in Buenos Aires 
“happened” to be the target.  Within this scenario, Argentines are separated from the victims 
as “sympathetic witnesses” who are watching, as if from a distance, the pain of others.41  
Importantly, however, it wasn’t only non-Jewish leaders and publics that declared the 
bombing more of a “Jewish” rather than national issue.  This was done in part through 
understandings of the attack that placed it within particular constructions of Jewishness; for 
example, by evoking the Holocaust and anti-Semitism.  At the same time, the President of 
the DAIA at the time, Rubén Beraja, positioned the bombing squarely within the problems of 
Argentina’s still nascent democracy.  Now I will turn to the march and convocation 
mentioned earlier, the “Día del paraguas,” (Day of the Umbrellas) to show how particular 
                                                     
40 Yo creo que la reacción pública en general fue Buena…Creo que debe haber estado dividida, a ver, si somos 
objetivos creo que debe haber una parte de la población que habrá pensado, esto es un tema contra los 
judíos…mirá lo que nos traen los judíos acá, los problemas que nos traen. Porque también con la Embajada 
había pasado eso.  Interview conducted in Buenos Aires, November 4, 2004 
 
41Feldstein and Acosta-Alzuru also make this point, 2003:160-161.  
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 acts and words were used to claim the bombing of the AMIA (and Israeli embassy) within 
Jewish and/or Argentine histories. 
The Day of the Umbrellas 
The convocation was called by the DAIA for the Thursday after the bombing, the 21st 
of July, 2004.  Steadily marching from the site of destruction on Pasteur Street to the Plaza 
de Congreso (Congress Plaza), one of the symbolic and political hearts of Buenos Aires, 
porteños from many walks of life expressed their shock, sadness, and outrage.  By most 
accounts, the amount of people (around 150,000) and the feeling in the crowd was 
impressive and moving.  In looking back on this day, Baruj Z. describes the event as akin to 
a cacerolazo.  “Do you know what a cacerolazo is?” he says to me.  (I did.) He continues, 
“two years ago with the [economic] disaster the people went out into the streets hitting pans, 
a very strong spontaneous human reaction, very impressive.”42  Argentines have a rich 
history of taking to the streets in acts of protest.  The many plazas of Buenos Aires seem 
made for such events, and over the years Argentines have used them well to make their 
claims, express their outrage, and struggle for other visions of the nation.  The streets and 
plazas of Buenos Aires are opportunities for public solidarity in grief and happiness, 
challenging the state and civil society to see and be seen.  The convocation for the AMIA, 
then, is part of a larger repertoire of political culture that manifests in public reclamation and 
solidarity.  
On that rainy Thursday, Argentines came out to mourn the attack on the AMIA and 
demand a response from the government.  How could an attack of this magnitude have 
happened again?  The choice of the plaza, situated between important sites of Argentine 
governmental authority and democratic possibility, itself offers a view of the bombing that 
transcends the perimeters of the historically Jewish neighborhood Once, location of the 
                                                     
42“la gente saliendo a las calles golpeando las cacerolas hace 2 años atrás con todo el desastre, una reacción 
humana espontánea muy fuerte, muy impactante.”  
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 AMIA building.  The convocation was a mixture of public mourning, questioning, and 
recrimination.  It combined specific acts of Jewish ritual, such as the recitation of Kaddish 
(prayer for the dead), with the air punctured by the seeming anachronistic sound of the 
blowing of a ram’s horn (Shofar).  But these community-specific words and actions 
accompanied speeches that attempted to interpolate the state and nation in particular ways.  
The implication was that although a distinct group was the target today, all were vulnerable 
within a state that could not guarantee security or justice—a state where the institutions of 
liberal democracy were seen to be lacking.  The possibility of the bombing and the seeming 
inability to clear up the attack on the Israeli embassy two years previous, were viewed as 
direct evidence of this failure.   
It should be recalled that democracy, while not new to Argentina, had been 
effectively eroded and superceded by many decades of leadership that was rooted more in 
authoritarianism than participatory government.  Moreover, Argentine democracy in practice 
was historically an exercise for the elite, except for a relatively brief period in the beginning 
of the twentieth century and (arguably) again under Peron (1946-1955).43  In a concrete 
sense, a vision of participatory democracy was still being worked out in the streets and 
institutions of the country.  At the time of the AMIA bombing, Argentina was only about 10-
years distant from a nearly 7 year brutal military dictatorship, and the continuing process of 
democratization was much in people’s minds.  After the brutality of the government toward 
the citizenry during the dictatorship, “human rights” became one of the primary lenses 
through which democracy was discussed.  Any situation in which the state was perceived to 
have violated human rights could be seen as continuing the policies of the military junta—
with “democracy” functioning as a mask over politics as usual.  As I detail in the upcoming 
                                                     
43Peron’s presidency can be called democratic in the sense that he gave a larger swath of Argentine society a 
greater political and social purchase than ever before.  However, his presidency became increasingly 
authoritarian over the years, and the state as conceived under Peronism departed dramatically from what might 
be called “classical” liberal traditions.  
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 chapters, the AMIA bombing became a window through which a “mask of democracy” could 
be revealed.  Within this context, Rubén Beraja’s response to the bombing of the AMIA, and 
by extension, his institution, the DAIA (which was housed in the same building), places this 
act of violence within a larger discourse about the rights and responsibilities of the state and 
society within a certain vision of liberal democracy.  Framed thus, the violence and 
specificity of the bombing of the AMIA could become a moment of horror—and of 
possibility—for the nation itself.     
Speaking through the rain, the words of the president of the DAIA filtered into the 
crowd and echoed off the buildings.  The AMIA president, Dr. Alberto Crupnicoff, and Chief 
Rabbi of the nation at the time, Shlomo Ben Hamu, sat behind him (they would also speak).  
At their side were President Carlos Menem, and the First Cardinal of the nation, Antonio 
Quarracino, among other political leaders.  At this moment, Beraja was still respected within 
the Jewish-Argentine community—his eventual disgrace will be discussed in chapter four—
and his political acumen shone as he captured and re-presented the feelings and desires of 
an attacked citizenry suspicious of their democracy.  Articulating what would become the 
basis of social movements like Memoria Activa (even as they later worked to distance 
themselves from Beraja and the organized Jewish-Argentine community), he eloquently 
explains what is at stake for Argentina, for all its citizens, in the wake of the attacks on the 
Israeli embassy and AMIA.  
Beraja’s words make clear that the bombings deliver a message that exceeds an 
attack on Jews: Argentina is an easy target because of the inability of the state to protect its 
citizens and provide justice.  In highlighting justice, Beraja is specifically referring to the 
failure of the state to bring suspected perpetrators of the Israeli embassy to trial.  But his 
reference to justice may have another, perhaps unintended, resonance among the listening 
public.  Just a few years previous, former president Alfonsín instituted the so-called “laws of 
impunity” which effectively ceased the trials against former military leaders.  Menem, upon 
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 taking office, further instituted impunity by providing amnesty for those military leaders 
already convicted.  Beraja never mentions these specific laws, nor directly implicates 
specific government leaders, but his placing of the bombings within a discussion of the (lack 
of) vigor of Argentine institutions inserts these acts within the heart of larger national 
struggles.  Determining who was responsible for the bombings  
was necessary not only as an issue of punishment but essentially because it would 
have meant a validation of the way things should be, our legal system above the 
system of terrorist criminals.  It would have demonstrated the capacity…to show 
ourselves and the world that the life of our residents, that their property isn’t at the 
mercy of international terrorism, but under the protection of the Republic of Argentina 
and its institutions.44  
     
Because Argentina failed to provide a sufficient response to the Israeli embassy 
bombings, and show themselves and the world that Argentine citizens are “under the 
protection of the Argentine republic and its institutions,” Argentine citizens will continue to be 
vulnerable, and within this climate of state weakness, anyone is a potential victim.  The 
implication here is not only that Argentine citizens could be targets of an attack organized by 
non-Argentines, but as was seen most recently during the “dirty war” would continue to be at 
the victims of their own institutions.  Beraja ends his speech with the following emphasis: “To 
make what we believe a reality is not merely in the interest of the Jewish community of 
Argentina.  It’s not simply an interest of the Jews of Argentina.”45  In his use of “we” Beraja 
makes and hails a certain kind of Argentine citizen-subject, one that believes in and 
demands a liberal democratic republic, where citizenship erases the difference of religion or 
ethnicity.  Additionally, by the utilization of discourse (“the liberal state”) that had become 
                                                     
44“era necesario no por una mera cuestión sancionatoria, sino escencialmente porque implicaba revalidar el 
orden constituido, nuestro sistema legal por encima del sistema de los criminales terroristas.  Implicaba una 
demostración de nuestra capacidad de reacción para mostrarnos a nosotros mismos y al mundo, que la vida de 
nuestros habitants, que sus bienes, no estan a merced del terrorismo internacional, sino bajo a protección de la 
República Argentina y sus Institucions.” (Discurso Beraja 1994) 
 
45“Para hacer realidad lo que creemos no es un mero interés de la Communidad Judía Argentina.  No es un 
simple interés de los judíos de la Argentina” (Discurso Beraja 1994).   
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 nearly hegemonic, accommodating Menem’s neoliberal visions as well as other articulations 
of rights and citizenship, Beraja’s speech combines critique with inclusiveness, encouraging 
a wide base of solidarity. 
Juxtaposed to Beraja’s astute political framing, Crupnicoff’s (the president of the 
AMIA) speech is more elegiac and broad, less about fortifying state institutions and more 
about the tragedy of the attack, and finding the strength to persevere.  But lest anyone doubt 
the legitimacy of the Jews as Argentine citizens, he says, “My grandfather, like so many 
other grandfathers came to this land because of persecution, and this land and its people 
took him in.  But I, and all of you like myself, are here thanks to nobody, but by our own 
right.  This land is ours.  It’s ours, and we can’t leave it undefended.”46  The fact that 
Crupnicoff feels he needs to establish the rightful place of Jews within the nation reflects an 
undercurrent of insecurity, both physical and conceptual, that has shaped the subjectivity of 
many Jewish-Argentines.  But it also betrays, I think, a real sense of ownership, of being 
claimed and claiming this land, Argentina, albeit with a melancholy awareness of the 
precariousness with which this belonging is achieved.   
I read these speeches after I left Argentina.  I have to admit that they surprised me, 
particularly the speech made by Beraja.  Having been somewhat conditioned to expect 
substantial differences between the tactics of community leaders and those of Memoria 
Activa and other non-official voices, Beraja’s speech in particular does not in substance 
contradict what Memoria Activa has come to argue.  (It is important to keep in mind that at 
the time of fieldwork Beraja was totally disgraced and his statements largely discredited.)  
Both emphasize why the bombing is not “merely” a Jewish problem.  Both appeal to 
normative ideas about liberal democracy and citizenship, and seek redress through the 
strengthening of its institutions and practices.  However, Memoria Activa becomes much 
                                                     
46“Mi abuelo, como otros tantos abuelos vino a esta tierra perseguido, y esta tierra y sus hombre lo cobijó.  Pero 
yo y todos ustedes como yo estamos aquí no por gracias de nadie sino por derecho propio.  Esta tierra es 
nuestra.  Es neustra y no podemos dejarla indefensa” (Discurso Crupnicoff 1994).  
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 more insistent in their demands and critical of the reigning power structure, while Beraja and 
the DAIA came to be seen as implicated in it.  Additionally, even as Memoria Activa calls 
upon normative ideas about liberal democracy, they also enact a vision of the state and civil 
society that challenges normative assumptions about what liberal democracy and 
Jewishness can mean.  These distinctions will become clearer in the upcoming chapters.  
Before, during and after the speeches, other knowledges about the bombing 
circulated through the crowd.  One particularly powerful way of approaching the bombing 
was through the Holocaust.  The Holocaust has been extremely constitutive of Jewish 
subjectivity, and has become a powerful interpretative filter through which “Jewish 
experience” past and present has come to be read.  Among the multitudes that rainy 
Thursday, some positioned the bombing within a narrative of ever-present Jewish tragedy, 
not unlike in Menem’s speech discussed above.  Some members of the crowd looked for 
meaning and solidarity through the symbolism of Nazi Germany and the Holocaust, framing 
the AMIA event within a historical trajectory of lachrymose Jewish experience.  This 
reference to the Holocaust wound its way through the crowd as a yellow star on the sleeves 
and chests of certain individuals.  The yellow stars bound the attack within a particularly 
Jewish historical narrative of pain, suffering, and victim-hood: the victims of the AMIA 
bombing can be added to the numbers who perished in the concentration camps and mass 
killings of Nazi-occupied Europe.  More recently, one of the familiares of Memoria Activa, 
Adriana, who lost her sister in the bombing described the attack on the AMIA explicitly as a 
Holocaust:  
And I’m going to tell you that the Jewish community also is very tired of protesting 
about the bombings and also prefer to say “no, enough, finish making your demands” 
it’s what you hear sometimes, but how can they say this?  Because it’s the same if 
they said you don’t need to protest more, that one has to forget the Holocaust.  No, 
this is the same, this was the Argentine Holocaust, this is the truth, the mass death of 
85 people without a common cause is a Holocaust… 47 
                                                     
47“y te voy a decir que la comunidad judía también está muy cansado del reclamo por los atentados y también 
prefiere decir “no, basta, terminen de reclamar”, es un poco lo que vos escuchás a veces, ¿pero cómo pueden 
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 In connecting the Holocaust to the necessity of memory and protest and to the 
bombing, Adriana gives the attack a specific charge and weight.  For her, the bombing of the 
AMIA and the death of 85 people is an injustice, like the Holocaust, that demands to be 
remembered and fought against.  
Comparison of the Holocaust or Nazism to Argentine tragedies is not limited to the 
AMIA bombing.  While the last military dictatorship did not officially sponsor anti-Semitism, 
the disproportionately high number of Jews who were targeted by the military, and the 
evocations of Hitler and Nazi Germany some Jewish-Argentine experienced under their 
captors, couldn’t help but resurrect and intersect with memories of Nazism (Timerman 1981, 
CONADEP 1985; Partnoy 1986).  For some Jewish family members of those who were 
killed or disappeared, memories (either transmitted or first-hand) of the Holocaust informed 
their understandings of what was happening in Argentina, and influenced the actions of the 
leadership of the Jewish community during this difficult time.48 
 Others (who may or may not have been Jewish) linked the AMIA bombing, 
specifically to the “dirty war” and disappeared.  Someone in the crowd carried a placard with 
the words: “We have another 70 disappeared.” (Bruchstein quoted in Taylor 1998:81), 
adding the victims of the bombing to the ranks of the disappeared.  “Disappeared” is a term 
used for the tens of thousands Argentine citizens who were kidnapped during the 
dictatorship, and whose bodies remain largely unfound and their stories untold.  
The use of the term “disappeared” is interesting in this context: its usage points not 
only to the fact that the fate of many individuals are still unknown, it also places the victims 
of the attack squarely within powerful currents of Argentine history and feeling.  It refers to 
                                                                                                                                                                    
decir eso?, porque es lo mismo que si dijeran no hace falta reclamar más, hay que olvidarse del holocausto. No, 
esto es lo mismo, esto fue el holocausto argentino, esta es la verdad, la muerte en masa de 85 personas sin una 
causa común es un holocausto,” Interview conducted on July 6, 2004 in Buenos Aires. 
 
48I come by this understanding through interviews with Jewish mothers of the Plaza de Mayo (Linea Fundadora) 
and other human rights groups related to the last military dictatorship. 
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 someone subjected to a specific and local experience of state violence: characterized as 
much by brutality as confusion, suddenness, and often, impunity.  Additionally, to be 
“disappeared” powerfully implicates the state and larger society in the crime, as was the 
case during and after the “dirty war.”  Since disappearances were directly related to the 
military dictatorship and dependent on the collaboration and “blind eye” of Argentine 
citizenry, the term “disappeared” not only reflects the state of a person, but also makes a 
compelling accusation—one that the public and the government can’t easily ignore.  It 
follows then that the incorporation of the AMIA bombing and its victims into the national 
consciousness by naming them “disappeared” is a politically powerful way to position the 
event and its victims squarely within the confines of Argentine history and human rights 
discourse.  The connection of victims of the AMIA and Israeli Embassy bombings to the 
victims of the last military dictatorship is continued by human rights groups such as CELS, 
Las Madres de la Plaza de Mayo, and Memoria Activa. 
*** 
This chapter has given an overview of the AMIA and its destruction and has 
examined the ways in which the AMIA bombing came to be a site through which tensions of 
identity and belonging were explored.  However, differences in interpreting the destruction of 
the AMIA reveal less of a split between Jewish and non-Jewish Argentines, but rather fault 
lines within the society itself.  While the AMIA bombing resurrected latent ideas about the 
ambivalence of Jewish belonging and citizenship, it also became a site through which the 
precariousness of citizenship and belonging of all Argentines could be called into doubt, due 
to a characterization of the state as institutionally weak, and worse, making deliberate 
victims out of its citizens through corruption and a culture of impunity.  The struggles against 
impunity and for justice discussed in the next chapters will deepen the complexities 
expressed in these statements. 
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After the Día del paraguas, the completion of the search, rescue, and identification of 
victims, the taking account of all that was destroyed and all that could be saved, and the 
settling of the shock of the attack, the focus of many shifted to the investigation of the 
bombing and the seeking of justice.  The family members of the victims continued their 
painful process of accommodation to a changed world, and most sought some limited 
solace through the hope of justice.  The pursuit of which has proven to be longer, more 
vertiginous and elusive than perhaps anyone would have expected.
V. We Are All Memoria Activa?: Community Divisions After 
the Bombing 
There is no political power without control of the archive, if not of memory.  Effective 
democratization can always be measured by this essential criterion: the participation 
in and the access to the archive, its constitution, and its interpretation. –Jacques 
Derrida, Archive Fever 
 
“To forget is synonymous with impunity”—Rabbi Daniel Goldman, 20081 
“In the beginning we all were Memoria Activa”—member of the group, Family and 
Friends of the Victims2 
 
Introduction: Picking up the Pieces 
The days following the bombing were overwhelming for the city and citizenry of 
Buenos Aires.  City and state officials were busy searching for victims and possible 
survivors, as well as the collection of evidence and eventual clean-up of the site.  Family 
members of the victims were dealing with burial preparations, or if they were lucky, caring 
for the injured.  The hospitals were overwhelmed with injured victims, the morgue flooded 
with bodies, parts.  Those who lived and worked near the AMIA had their own trauma, as 
the shock and force of the bombing worked its way into their lives, into their living rooms, 
shattering windows and filling their rooms and workspaces with the acrid, horrifying smells 
emerging from the enormous sepulcher down the street.  Volunteers worked to recover 
important books, papers—bits of an archive that contained documents pertaining to over a 
hundred years of Jewish Argentine life.  The remaining officials and personnel of the 
                                                     
1“Olvido es sinónimo de impunidad.”  “Las nueve razones del atentado a la AMIA.” 2008. Página 12, 22 de Julio, 
El País Buenos Aires.   
 
2“En principio todos éramos Memoria Activa,” interview recorded on September 21, 2004 in a suburb of Buenos 
Aires.    
 
 organizations and offices housed in the AMIA building, in particular, the AMIA itself, and the 
political organization of the Jewish community, the DAIA, scrambled to set up temporary 
offices around the corner at 612 Ayacucho.  The march and convocation that became 
known as the “Día del paraguas” was called for a few days after the bombing, in which the 
presidents of the AMIA and DAIA, their lives spared as they were not yet in their offices 
when the explosives went off, spoke to a crowd of roughly 150,000 in a steady downpour of 
winter rain.  Ex-president Menem in a radio address promised to redouble the efforts to find 
the perpetrators of this and the Israeli embassy bombing.  The city was busy with rescue 
and reconstruction, the state vowed to punish those responsible for the crime, the family 
members of the victims slowly absorbed their loss.  
The Monday immediately following the bombing, a few individuals went to stand in 
front of the Judicial Palace or Tribunales in Plaza Lavalle around the time of the bombing 
(9:53) as a kind of silent vigil, waiting and wondering how the state will respond to this 
second bombing.  Honoring the victims and the search for justice was the basic motivation 
of this incipient mobilization, but in the beginning, it wasn’t entirely clear what was called for 
or what should happen in the plaza.  Organized by the Association for Jewish Professionals, 
this weekly gathering was initiated by non-family members of the victims—those that had 
lost someone were quite preoccupied with their own grief and burial preparations.  Later, 
family members of the victims actively joined these weekly gatherings and would greatly 
influence the direction of the movement.    
The few people who stood in front of the Tribunales building in those early weeks 
mostly observed a moment of silence.  The choice to meet in this particular spot, in front of 
the building symbolic for justice, shows that from the beginning this was not just a gathering 
to express remorse or solidarity, but the public formation of a series of questions and claims, 
posed to the state and citizenry.  Would the state fulfill its responsibility to its citizens and 
pursue justice for the victims?  Would the citizenry demand that this be done?   
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 A month after the first silent vigil, a large act was convened in front of Tribunales, 
drawing a wide range of people from the Jewish Argentine community, government officials 
and representatives of political parties, and other citizenry.  As the days and months passed, 
and the investigation into the bombing appeared to falter—as well as people’s memory of 
the event—the questions posed by those gathered at Plaza Lavalle would gather the force 
of a sustained protest.  The name Memoria Activa came about in a meeting in the early 
weeks of the manifestation, and stuck.  It was a name that resonated deeply with Jewish 
traditions of justice and continuity, as well as the mobilizations of memory by Argentine 
human rights organizations and others to counter the lack of responsibility and 
accountability of the powerful and the historical amnesia of the status quo.  Like the Mothers 
of the Plaza de Mayo, who continue to circle weekly the enormous plaza in front of the 
Presidential Palace to protest and remember the disappearance of their children during the 
last military dictatorship, Memoria Activa protested every week in a public plaza.1 
In the early years of its inception, Memoria Activa was a group widely supported in 
the Jewish-Argentine community, including its primary institutions, the AMIA and DAIA.  The 
divisions among the familiares and the Jewish-Argentine community wouldn’t appear until 
later.  In what follows, I expand upon some of the basic tenets of Memoria Activa’s position 
vis-à-vis justice, the state, and the citizenry.  I also talk about the differences between 
Memoria Activa and other familiares groups, Familiares y Amigos de las Víctimas, and 
APEMIA, organized in 2002.  The differences between the groups reflect in part their 
attitude and relationship to the leadership of the DAIA and AMIA, as well as to the Argentine 
state.  As I show, the splits within the familiares became most pronounced after the 1997 
anniversary of the AMIA.  
                                                     
1Memoria Activa formally stopped their weekly protest in Plaza Lavalle in December 2004, although a small 
number of members continued to meet after this decision was made.  This is discussed in the conclusion.  
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 Memoria Activa 
 
A portion of the prologue to the booklet of speeches given at Memoria Activa actos in 
1994 and 1995 reads as follows:  
“Justice, Justice, You Shall Pursue” (Deuteronomy XVI:20) 
It is not a march, it is not an institution, it is an expression of life from all men and 
women with good will, Jewish and non-Jewish Argentines, and all those that want to 
accompany us in this demand for justice.  
Each and every one of us works daily to construct a better country, and only in a 
country where justice exists can we develop a full life.  
This active memory is our modest testimony for a society that doesn’t forget and 
wants to live in peace. 
A peace that begins by having justice…2 
 
This booklet contains many of the testimonios (testimonies) given by various 
members of society every Monday in the plaza.  It also contains the speeches given by the 
familiares on Pasteur Street every month on the 18th.  These monthly speeches began a 
short time after the bombing, organized under the name of Familiares y Amigos de las 
Víctimas.  The combining of the discourses of both the weekly and monthly actos reflects a 
period of time when formal divisions between the family members of the victims and their 
supporters had not yet emerged.  The above passage taken from the prologue represents 
the position of Memoria Activa in the fight for justice, placing the demand for justice for the 
AMIA within a larger national framework in which a properly functioning judicial system is 
necessary for a peaceful and fully achieved citizenship.  By framing the bombing in this way, 
Memoria Activa universalizes the specificity of the victims, emphasizing on one hand their 
rights as citizens in Argentina, and also, articulating their position to broader discourses 
about the rights and responsibilities of citizenship, the state, and civil society.  In contrast to 
                                                     
2“Justicia, Justicia Perseguiras…” (Deuteronomio XVI:20) 
No es una marcha, no es una institución, es una expresión de vida de todos los hombres y mujeres de buena 
voluntad, argentinos judíos y no judíos, de todos aquellos que quieran acompañarnos en este reclamo de 
justicia.  Todos y cada uno de nosotros trabajamos diariamente, construyendo un país mejor, y solamente en un 
país donde la justicia exista, podemos desarrollar una vida plena.  Esta memoria activa es nuestro modesto 
testimonio por una sociedad que no olvida y quiere vivir en paz.  Una paz que comienza haciendo justicia…” 
Norma Lew, Diana Malamud, Enrique Burbinski, and Sergio Bergman (1995) “Prologo” in Memoria Activa, a dos 
años del atentado de la AMIA. Buenos Aires: Editorial La Página S.A., pp. 7.  
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 the other group of familiares that would form, Familiares y Amigos de las Víctimas, Memoria 
Activa positioned themselves publicly, within the framework of society, rather than simply 
speaking from and to the Jewish community.  Diana Malamud one of the familiares of the 
group, explains: 
Memoria Activa began with a group of people from the Jewish community, who after 
the the attack on the AMIA thought that the possibility of obtaining justice would be 
very small, especially after the experience of the bombing of the Israeli embassy.  
These people, who all were members of the Jewish community, got together and 
decided to have an acto in a public place, in contrast to all the actos of the Jewish 
community, that always were closed and private, no?  Very much turned toward the 
community. And well, this group decided that it had to be in the Plaza Lavalle, in front 
of the Tribunales palace, on the same day and time as the attack on the AMIA 
occurred.3 
 
Initially, the leaders of the Jewish community supported the group, as they were 
seen as one facet of the struggle for justice and remembrance (Gurevich 2005:15).  
However, as it would become clear, Memoria Activa would only remain supported as long as 
they didn’t go beyond their place as defined by the DAIA: “[the] DAIA should remain as the 
sole formal and legal negotiator in the name of the victims and the Jewish organizations vis-
à-vis the national authorities, and also as the sole Jewish political representation within 
mainstream society” (Gurevich 2005:15-16).  But Memoria Activa would go against the 
desires of the Jewish community leadership, and their independence from the community is 
a key aspect of their identity as a social movement.  An elaboration on the ways in which 
Memoria Activa refused the role given to them by the leaders of the Jewish community will 
be explored below.    
 Early on, Memoria Activa based its protests broadly within struggles against 
impunity and for human rights.  While the bombing of the AMIA was its main touchstone and 
                                                     
3Memoria Activa empezó con un grupo de personas de la comunidad judía, que después del atentado a la AMIA 
pensaron que la posibilidad de hacer justicia era muy poca, sobretodo después de la experiencia del atentado a 
la Embajada de Israel. Esta gente, que eran todos miembros de la comunidad judía, se reunió y decidieron 
hacer un acto en un lugar público. A diferencia de todos los actos que había hecho la comunidad judía, que 
siempre eran cerrados y privados, ¿no? Muy hacia adentro de la comunidad. Y bueno, este grupo de gente 
decidió que debía ser en la plaza Lavalle, frente al Palacio de Tribunales, y el mismo día y a la misma hora que 
había ocurrido el atentado.  Interview with Diana, conducted on Nov. 4, 2004 in Buenos Aires, Argentina.  
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 motivation, their struggle became a fight for the rights of all Argentine citizens, and for a 
particular vision of state and society.  The actos of Memoria Activa became a forum through 
which issues of justice, impunity, corruption, and memory could be discussed, and not only 
in relation to the AMIA bombing.  Speakers—artists of all kinds, intellectuals, journalists, 
politicians, among others—were invited every week to give their testimony.  By inviting 
speakers from a broad spectrum of society, and demanding justice for the victims of the two 
bombings and other victims of impunity, they placed their struggle beyond the imagined 
borders of the Jewish community, at the same time as they expand the discursive borders of 
who and what is properly Argentine.  As they opened up new spaces for the articulation of 
Jewishness and Argentineness, however, they also retained a certain Jewish specificity that 
was easily recognizable.  
Those who attended Memoria Activa actos were diverse.  The primary participants 
were Jewish, although a few non-Jewish Argentines attended the weekly actos and were 
present as speakers.  Jewishness took different forms in the group.  A few were religious, 
such as Rabbi Sergio Bergman (who left the group in 1996), but most identified as Jews 
primarily in a cultural sense.  For those with little or no religious background, Jewishness 
was expressed through Yiddish culture and sometimes through leftist political orientations 
that at one time flourished in Yiddish speaking communities.4  Others, while coming from 
“Jewish backgrounds” (variously defined) did not particularly identify as Jewish in any 
substantial way.  The group then, can’t be simplistically characterized as a “Jewish group,” 
although they do engage particular histories and traditions affiliated with “Jewishness.”  This 
is most notably visible in the blowing of the shofar, or ram’s horn, to signal mourning, 
presence, and a call to action.  In addition, the Old Testament injunction, “Justicia, Justicia, 
                                                     
4For an example of the importance of Yiddish culture to many Jewish Argentines see Natasha Zaretsky (2008) 
“Singing for Social Change: Nostalgic Memory and Struggle for Belonging in a Buenos Aires Yiddish Chorus” in 
Rethinking Jewish Latin-Americans, Jeffrey Lesser and Raanan Rein, eds. Albuquerque: University of New 
Mexico Press, pp. 231-265. 
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 Perseguiras”(Justice, Justice, You Shall Pursue) serves as a key rationale guiding their 
struggle.  This particular section of the Old Testament is often interpreted to mean the 
centrality of “justice” (broadly defined) to Jewish practice.  
As certain members of Memoria Activa began to emphasize broader struggles 
against impunity, some family members of the victims as well as members of the Jewish 
community began to feel uncomfortable, as it seemed that the memory of the particular 
victims of the AMIA bombing were being diluted by other causes and victims.  Additionally, 
as I will show, Memoria Activa’s increasingly confrontational style against the state and 
Jewish leadership began to make some familiares and supporters began to feel unsure 
about the positioning and motives of the group.  Moreover, Memoria Activa based their 
struggle in part on liberal ideals that tended to emphasize the individual over the community, 
something that sat uneasily with the communitarian spirit championed by leaders of the 
Jewish Argentine community.  
In reaction to these feelings, a monthly commemoration of the victims on Pasteur 
street became a site where the names of the individual victims of the bombing could be read 
(this wasn’t generally part of Memoria Activa actos), and family members of the victims and 
their supporters could come to together in a more private and less “politicized” atmosphere.  
As is noted in the publication of testimonials referenced above, this split was not initially 
antagonistic, and familiares and their supporters tended to move between the weekly and 
monthly actos.5  As previously mentioned, the monthly commemoration in front of the AMIA 
became the group Familiares y Amigos de las Víctimas (Family and Friends of the victims).  
As months and years after the bombing passed and it became increasingly clear that justice 
for the victims of the AMIA bombing would not be easily obtained (see next chapter), the 
                                                     
5For more on the different groups of family members of the victims, see Beatriz Gurevich (2005) “After the AMIA 
bombing: A Critical Analysis of Two Parallel Discourses” in The Jewish Diaspora in Latin America and the 
Caribbean: Fragments of Memory, ed. Kristin Ruggiero, Brighton and Portland, OR: Sussex Academic Press, 86-
111 and Annette Prekker (2000) “Memoria y Justicia: Separate Places for Separate Spaces” Modernity 2, 
www.eiu.edu/~modernity/prekker.html. 
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 differences between the groups of familiares and their supporters became more ossified.  It 
wasn’t until the third AMIA anniversary in 1997, however, that the differences among the 
familiares and within the community came to a head.  Before discussing that watershed 
event, I will further elaborate on the differences between the two groups that organized in 
relation to the AMIA bombing, Memoria Activa and Familiares y Amigos de las Víctimas.  
Later a third group would form in 2002, APEMIA, due to increasing political differences 
between the family members of the victims.  
Familiares y Amigos de las Víctimas 
 
The gatherings of the Familiares y Amigos was historically quite different from what 
occurred in front of Tribunales every Monday.  These monthly acts, convened near the site 
(and later in front of) the AMIA, elicited a tone of “private” or “community” remembrance, 
rather than the open public protests of Memoria Activa.  The focus of these actos was on the 
AMIA bombing and its victims, and did not embrace other struggles and victims of impunity.  
In contrast, Memoria Activa positioned themselves in the heart of the city in front of one of 
the symbols of the Argentine state, the Supreme Court, and sought alliances with other anti-
impunity and human rights movements.  Connecting the AMIA bombing to other acts that 
have remained unpunished, and to a certain understanding of citizenship has been central 
to Memoria Activa’s claim that the AMIA bombing cannot rest as a “Jewish” issue.    
Initially the two actos were conceived to fulfill different but overlapping purposes.  
Mondays in the plaza became a place where private pain became a public demand for 
justice and change, while the monthly actos were a place where the familiares could come 
together with a particular focus on the victims of the AMIA bombing.  Although both 
manifestations were described as engaged in the struggle for memory and justice, one 
articulated these goals outward toward the nation in general, while the other positioned 
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 themselves inward, toward the Jewish community and the victims.6  These differences are 
reflected through the demarcation of physical space in the Familiares y Amigos actos, as 
well as the style of rhetoric.   
The monthly actos on Pasteur street had a much different feel than what happened 
in the Plaza Lavalle every Monday.  This is due in part to the more secluded location of the 
acto, and the closing of the street to vehicle traffic.  Pasteur street is a relatively small street 
in the city, and the blocking off of the street increased the sense that what was about to 
happen was a private event.  In addition, the presence of a number of obvious security 
personnel, an example of the extra security and vigilance that have accompanied Jewish 
organizations in the city since the bombings, added to the feeling that there was an “inside” 
and “outside” to what was about to occur.  Bystanders or passersby are treated with more 
attention and sometimes suspicion than in Plaza Lavalle.  Indeed, when I first attended one 
of these actos in 2004, I was subjected to some questioning by security.  Although this 
questioning was rather benign, having to justify my attendance made me feel somewhat 
uneasy.  This would not have happened in the plazas on Monday.  
A large banner is attached to light poles and hung over the street with the words 
“Justicia y Memoria” (Justice and Memory), and the amount of time that has passed since 
the attack.  In front of the AMIA building, sits a little podium and from there the names of 
each of the victims are read, with the lighting of a candle and placing of a rose for each of 
the dead.  Behind the podium, on the cement security wall that frames the outside of the 
building (the building itself is set off from the street by a small courtyard and security area), 
hangs a black board with the names of the victims spray-painted on, in a few instances a 
picture of the deceased was placed near their name.  This billboard had been at the AMIA 
                                                     
6There are some instances in which an expression of solidarity with other victims is expressed in the Familiares y 
Amigos actos: in the case of terrorism.  As over the years other bombings thought to be linked in ideology and 
source—in the United States, London, and Madrid—occurred, these events and anniversaries would be marked 
in the monthly actos.  Often the ambassador of the attacked nation would be invited to speak or be honored.  
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 site since it was a pile of rubble, and stands as a reminder that justice still has not been had 
(Gurevich 2005:8).  More solemn than the public reclamations of Memoria Activa, the 
Familiares y Amigos actos are more a place to actively mourn and recognize the dead.  
Every month a different family member of the victim would read a speech (over the years, 
the pool of familiares who will speak has shrunk to under ten people) that focused 
particularly on the bombing, the victims, and the search for justice.  
Contrasting themselves to Memoria Activa, the familiares associated with the 
Familiares y Amigos group present their group as apolitical, in contrast to the claim that 
Memoria Activa is “too political.”  As Memoria Activa became more firmly rooted as a 
grassroots mobilization against impunity that shared concerns with other victims in society 
and distanced themselves from the leadership of the Jewish community, they were thought 
to be politicizing the dead by other family members of the victims, as well as by some 
community leaders.  More specifically, what was it that was “too political” about Memoria 
Activa?     
The critiques of Memoria Activa’s politicization appear to reference four primary 
characteristics: Its critical position toward the leadership of the AMIA and DAIA, and its 
distancing from these institutions, particularly after 1997; the presence of overt political 
actors in some of their actos, which appeared to some to be a using of a victims for political 
gain; the ways in which Memoria Activa connects the AMIA bombing to other instances of 
violence and impunity, and aligns with itself with human rights movements; a sense that 
some of the more vocal participants of the movement are furthering a political agenda that 
seeks to transform aspects of state and society, above and beyond achieving justice for the 
victims of the AMIA.  Embedded within these criticisms are normative ideas about the 
“Jewish community” and “individual,” as well as vision of politics that is narrowly focused on 
“official” channels and a sanctification of the dead that sought to remove them from social 
and political struggle.   
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 With the exception perhaps of the first critique, which will be expanded upon in the 
next section, these evaluations often accompany a feeling that Memoria Activa isn’t 
sufficiently focused on the victims or achieving justice for them.  Or worse, that the dead are 
being used for political or personal purposes.  As Sofía iterated to me:    
In reality at first we were all together, every Monday we went to the plaza to demand 
justice in front of Tribunales, and on the 18th of each month we had an act in honor of 
the victims in Pasteur street.  Then Memoria Activa formally organized [as a non-
profit] and it was as if the plaza was an open place for all to speak, but among those 
who came to speak were politicians who came during their campaigns…and used 
the dead for their personal interests, and personally for me, I didn’t like this.7  
 
Another familiar expressed the difference between Memoria Activa and Familiares y 
Amigos in the following manner: 
We began to notice that there were some sectors of Memoria Activa that were 
politically involved, and aligned with certain political sectors or had political 
tendencies, or mixed other cases together with the AMIA.  And we decided that this 
wasn’t what we were looking for. If I want to support and accompany other parents 
that have had misfortunes…I’m going to go as a citizen but not as a member of the 
group because we want to maintain our purpose totally at the margin, removed from 
all other instances and everything else.  Do you understand me?  We don’t have 
political aspirations (apetencias), we don’t have any political interests, and the other 
groups, they do…8 
 
Having a political stance or engaging in what is seen to be as politics is seen as 
compromising the dead.  And interestingly, the above familiar makes a distinct separation 
between group interests and individual interests.  This relates to how the Familiares y 
                                                     
7“…en realidad al principio éramos todos juntos, los lunes íbamos a la plaza Lavalle a reclamar justicia frente a 
los tribunales, y los 18 de cada mes hacíamos el  acto de homenaje a las víctimas en la calle Pasteur. Luego 
Memoria Activa se institucionalizó y es como que la plaza fue un lugar abierto para que hablen todos, pero entre 
los que venían a hablar también había políticos que venían cuando hacían sus campañas… usaban a los 
muertos para sus intereses, y en lo personal a mi esto no me gustó, yo no quiero que usen a mi hija para 
intereses personales.” Interview conducted on July 1, 2004 in Buenos Aires, Argentina.  
 
8“…empezamos a notar que en Memoria Activa había algunos sectores que estaban involucrándose 
políticamente, acercándose a determinados sectores políticos o tenían tendencias políticas, o mezclaban otros 
casos junto con la AMIA. Y nosotros decidimos que eso no era lo que nosotros buscábamos. Si yo quiero 
defender y acompañar a otros padres que han tenido desgracias…yo voy a ir como ciudadana pero no como 
integrante de grupo porque nosotros queremos mantener nuestro propósito totalmente al margen, ajeno a todas 
las demás instancias, a todas las demás cosas, ¿me entendés?, no tenemos apetencias políticas, no tenemos 
ningún interés político, y los otros grupos sí…” Interview conducted on September 21, 2004 in Buenos Aires, 
Argentina. 
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 Amigos position themselves as non-hierarchical, in contrast to what they view as Memoria 
Activa’s explicit demarcation of roles and offices.  Since their incorporation as a non-profit, 
Memoria Activa has had a small group of members who function essentially as a governing 
body, not all of whom are familiares.  Luis Czyzewski, one of the most visible and vocal 
members of Familiares y Amigos characterizes the group in the following way: “We have an 
organization that’s a little bit special.  I am one more among many, we don’t want to 
organize ourselves with a board of directors, with special posts because we consider this is 
not they kind of organization that needs to have this kind of functions, let’s say.”9  The use of 
“we” when speaking of the familiares in this group is quite typical; when one gives a speech 
it is always implied that he or she is speaking for the group.  However, as I witnessed, this 
expression of horizontal organization and decision-making through negotiation is not 
perceived as such by all the familiares in the group.  
Up until relatively recently, the members of Familiares y Amigos have not publicly 
contradicted the opinions and tactics of the AMIA and DAIA, even if some familiares in the 
group might disagree with the leadership.  In this way they can be understood as continuing 
to champion the group over individual or political interests—to some extent it is an 
expression of loyalty.  The radical departure of Memoria Activa from the leaders of the 
community and other familiares can be seen in their decision to hire their own lawyer and 
file a separate complaint in the AMIA trial.  The other plaintiff was composed of the AMIA 
and DAIA and the Familiares y Amigos group.  Against the statements of approval made by 
the AMIA and DAIA (and not contradicted by the Familiares y Amigos group), Memoria 
Activa had raised suspicions about the way the judge assigned to the case, Juan José 
Galeano, was handling the investigation, and later the trial.  It wasn’t until the problems with 
                                                     
9“Nosotros tenemos una organización un poco especial. Yo soy uno más tanto como todos, nosotros no 
quisimos organizarnos con comisiones directivas, con cargos porque consideramos que este no es un tipo de 
organización que tenga que tener ese tipo de funcionamientos, digamos.” Interview conducted on August 20, 
2004 in Buenos Aires, Argentina.  
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 the trial and investigation were becoming increasingly difficult to ignore that Familiares y 
Amigos spoke out against the judge, while the AMIA and DAIA continued to support him.  In 
contrast to Familiares y Amigos and Memoria Activa, the group APEMIA is the most distant 
from the organized Jewish community, and the most aligned with more marginal social 
actors and political currents. 
APEMIA 
 
APEMIA is an acronym that translates to Association for the Clarification of the 
Unpunished Massacre of the AMIA Bombing.  In 2002 the group was formally inaugurated, 
principally by Laura Ginsberg, a once prominent member of Memoria Activa.  Laura left 
Memoria Activa after she publicly and unilaterally called for the resignation of the lawyer that 
Memoria Activa had hired to represent them, Alberto Zuppi. The departure of Ginsberg from 
Memoria Activa further fractured the increasingly splintered groups that had formed around 
the AMIA bombing, and she took some members of Memoria Activa with her.  Laura, a 
fierce critic of the political system as it has historically developed in Argentina, felt Zuppi’s 
recent appointment as secretary of justice in the brief presidency of Adolfo Rodríguez Saá 
(this was after the economic collapse when the office of presidency functioned as a kind of 
revolving door), presented a conflict of interest.  If Memoria Activa was positioning itself in 
critical opposition to the state, how could their very own lawyer properly represent them 
against the state and yet be part of the state as well?   
Not everyone was pleased with Laura’s departure from the group, and some 
members of Memoria Activa began to participate in both groups.  The individuals who 
continued to support Laura, while active and loyal participants in Memoria Activa, were 
generally those who had little power in the group.  These individuals, whose viewpoints are 
discussed further in the conclusion, often disagree with the leadership of Memoria Activa, 
but have little social power through which to press their opinions.  Nevertheless, they 
continue to attend the meetings in the plaza.  
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 The politics of APEMIA are more aligned with various leftist movements (Trotskyist, 
anti-globalization, worker’s rights) than the other familiares groups.  While Memoria Activa 
could be considered progressive in comparison to the center, they are also rooted in more 
middle class ideas about state and society that are essentially liberal in content.  Thus while 
from the perspective of the Jewish Argentine community, Memoria Activa is in certain ways 
“too political,” from the position of APEMIA, they don’t go far enough.  APEMIA has done the 
most to reach out and make allegiances with other groups who seek a more radically re-
defined state and society.  While Memoria Activa has done significant work to link the AMIA 
cause with other issues of human rights in Argentina, APEMIA has been successful at 
linking with movements outside of the middle class, where “human rights” is more broadly 
construed.  Ginsberg’s group has fostered overt connections with piqueteros (unemployed 
worker’s movements with different leftist or progressive political affiliations), CORREPI 
(Coordinators Against Police and Institutional Repression) and FUA (Argentine University 
Federation, a student rights organization), among others.  
APEMIA protests more closely resemble those organized by worker’s groups and 
piqueteros than most gatherings of the mainstream human rights community.  At APEMIA’s 
yearly anniversary acto, one can hear popular music, pick up flyers and pamphlets about 
worker’s rights and socialist or communist groups, and see flags with a screened image of 
Che Guevara.  The actos of APEMIA are less ceremonious than the others, with the 
laughter and movement of children and an absence of a hushed sense of formality.  
Ginsberg’s rhetoric at these events unfailingly highlights the inconsistencies and hypocrisy 
of government leaders who claim to be advancing the AMIA investigation, while being part 
of the same machine that has worked to cover it up.  This in turn, is her most fierce critique 
against Memoria Activa, as the latter seeks the Argentine state (as flawed as it might be) as 
an interlocutor in the AMIA case and the pursuit of human rights.  Any claimed achievement 
in getting the government to respond or move forward in the investigation is denounced as 
 166
 illusory according to APEMIA.  For Ginsberg, as Gurevich points out, “the Argentine state is 
the local connection of the attack against the AMIA” (2005:25).  
Regarding the AMIA investigation, APEMIA seeks full access to the government’s 
secret service files, as well as an independent investigation of the attacks.  While President 
Néstor Kirchner opened up some secret files pertaining to the AMIA, there are still many that 
remain unavailable.  In Ginsberg’s view, the state only operates under a mask of 
democracy, and has not changed in significant details since the last military dictatorship.  
Although many organizations that are “contra impunidad” (against impunity), such as 
Memoria Activa argue along similar lines, Ginsberg feels that they are still participating to 
some extent in “politics as usual,” because they seek some level of negotiation or 
participation with the state as it stands. 
Ginsberg’s analysis of the AMIA investigation is that the Argentine state deliberately 
mishandled the case in response to pressure from the United States and Israel.  Although 
she would like to see the perpetrators of the attack brought to justice, she sees the 
emphasis put on Iran and the Middle East as part of a politics of imperialism supported by 
Israel and United States that works to justify attacks against the “axes of evil.”  As she 
iterated at the 12th anniversary of the AMIA bombing, “We are not in agreement with putting 
the AMIA case at the service of the politics of war and aggression.”10 Thus she is as critical 
of the imperialism of the Israeli and U.S. governments as she is of the Argentine state 
(Ginsberg and her group are anti-Zionist), and she sees these imperialist interests as part 
and parcel of the cover-up of the AMIA.  In this way, APEMIA connects to broader critiques 
of the U.S. and Israel that circulate within certain leftist circles in Latin America and beyond.  
Furthermore, as the state appears to be making advances in the AMIA case through a focus 
on Iran, impunity in Argentina can continue.  Recently, in response to a disturbing 
                                                     
10“Nosotros no estamos de acuerdo en poner la causa AMIA al servicio de esta política de guerra y agresión.” 
(APEMIA, “Discurso 18-07-06” http://apemia.blogspot.com, accessed on August 1, 2006). 
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 kidnapping and attack against one of the former lawyers who had worked on the 
investigation of the AMIA (those who carried out the attack claimed to be from the Argentine 
secret service), Ginsberg wrote 
The entirety of the official investigation is directed toward accusing a group of 
Iranians as the intellectual organizers of the crime [AMIA].  With this accusation, on 
the one hand, and with the search for “irregularities” [of the investigation] on the 
other, the State attempts to avoid being responsible for its criminal responsibility and 
cover-up of the AMIA massacre.  For this reason impunity continues.11  
 
To be clear, Ginsberg is not accusing the state of being directly behind the attack on 
the AMIA.  According to Ginsberg, the state is responsible, however, for failing to protect the 
rights of its citizens, for allegedly participating in the attack as an accessory (this allegation 
is made against police forces), and for contributing to a political culture in which crimes 
remain unpunished.  These aspects of the AMIA bombing connect to other cases where 
state officials are directly implicated in acts of violence, but whose actions effectively remain 
beyond the reach of the law.   
Like Memoria Activa, Ginsberg sees the leadership of the Jewish community as 
working in tandem with the state’s efforts to place the AMIA bombing squarely within the 
realm of Middle East politics and terrorism, in an effort to occlude Argentina’s responsibility 
in the attacks.   
In order to better understand the historical role of the leadership of the Jewish 
community, particularly the DAIA, in the next section I discuss the often-fraught relations 
between this organization and the community it seeks to represent.  Finally, I give an 
account of the famous J’accuse speech given by Laura Ginsberg at the third AMIA 
                                                     
11Toda la investigación oficial está encaminada a acusar a un grupo de iraníes de ser los cerebros organizadores 
del crimen. Con esta acusación, por una parte, y con la búsqueda de “irregularidades”, por la otra, el Estado 
pretende evitar ser inculpado por su responsabilidad criminal y encubridora en la masacre de la AMIA. Por eso 
sigue la impunidad.” (APEMIA, “Ante el sequestro de Claudio Lifschitz” http://apemiacomunicados.blogspot.com, 
accessed on March 10, 2009.) 
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 anniversary, which signified one of the turning points in the struggle for justice and ability of 
the DAIA to represent the community. 
“Defending Jewish Dignity”: The DAIA 
Mediating between the street and the state, the DAIA is a non-governmental 
organization that has become the main official advocacy group to represent the “Jewish 
community” to the government.  Instituted in the1930s in response to rising anti-Semitic 
currents in Argentine society, the DAIA ‘s motto is “Defending Jewish Dignity.”  An important 
aspect of their work involves the investigation and production of yearly studies related to 
issues of racism and discrimination in the country.   
Representing what they decide are Jewish interests, they function as a political lobby 
and primary unified voice of the Jewish community.  The DAIA seeks to be (and has been 
officially seen as such) the legitimate political arm of the Jewish Argentine community, and 
engages directly with government officials and state-run institutions.  In this way, they 
consider themselves to be a neutral party for the Jewish community, and see themselves as 
best positioned to speak for the collectivity.  However, the DAIA is not a democratic 
institution (its leaders are appointed rather than voted in by the community), and their vision 
of the Jewish community tends to be narrow and quite conservative.  Thus from its 
inception, its stated goals were controversial.  The executive director of the DAIA in 2004 
described DAIA function in this way: 
What is understood by political service? To petition, to ask, to demand to the 
authorities—the government, police, political parties—to have one voice that can go 
out to confront, discuss, and fight so that a president of a schule (school) or a 
president of an institution doesn’t have to. This is political service, to confront 
situations that have to do with defending dignity, security, the DAIA is primarily 
involved with combating anti-Semitism, the defense of human rights, and defending 
the community. These three things are done or are achieved with work programs and 
with political lobbying, the lobby has to have people that have a view of the whole 
community and are able to sit down with a president, with a governor or minister, 
with a police officer, to ask, discuss, and fight but this activity doesn’t affect other 
institutions because if I am a president of a school, I’m not capable of these things, 
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 therefore, when there is some problem that comes from outside the community, the 
DAIA must go out and speak in defense, this is representation.12 
 
While the DAIA claims to speak for and represent the “Jewish community,” 
historically this community was conceived rather narrowly, and the definition of “Jew” was a 
politically conservative one.  From early on, Communist and Anarchist Jews were excluded, 
creating an official boundary of acceptable Jewishness that still exists today to some 
extent.13  The exclusion of more politically “radical” Jews, however, may have been in part a 
reaction to the downplaying of Jewish identity by many involved in these political 
movements.  
As was seen during the last military dictatorship, the DAIA is a politically 
conservative organization that will not openly confront the government if this isn’t 
understood to be in the best interests of the Jewish community as a whole.  In this way, the 
DAIA is often perceived as submitting to governmental power rather than challenging it.  Its 
style tends to be one of negotiation and accommodation rather than substantial critique.14 
Before heading into the ways in which the DAIA came under attack in relation to the AMIA 
bombing, I will briefly discuss their role during the “dirty war,” and the ways in which they 
privileged the community at the expense of individuals.  
                                                     
12“¿Qué se entiende como prestación (provision/service…) política?, el peticionar (to petition), el pedir (to ask), 
exigir (to demand) frente a las autoridades, gobierno, policía, partidos políticos, tener una voz que pueda salir a 
confrontar, a discutir, a pelear y que no tenga que ser el presidente del schule o el presidente de una institución. 
Eso es la prestación política, frente a situaciones que tienen que ver con la defensa de la dignidad, la seguridad, 
la DAIA tiene como tema el combate del antisemitismo, la defensa de los derechos humanos, la defensa de la 
comunidad, estas tres cosas se hacen o se logran con programas de trabajo y con lobby político, ese lobby lo 
tiene que hacer gente que tenga una mirada de toda la comunidad y que pueda sentarse con un presidente, con 
un gobernador, con un ministro, con un policía, pedir, discutir, pelearse pero que esa actividad no afecte otras 
instituciones porque si yo soy presidente de una escuela yo no estoy capacitado para estas cosas, entonces 
esta es la representación política, entonces cuando hay algún problema que viene desde afuera de la 
comunidad quien debe salir a hablar en defensa es la DAIA, esa es la representación.” Interview conducted on 
December 14, 2004 at the DAIA, Buenos Aires.  
 
13Feitlowitz, Marguerite (1998) A Lexicon of Terror. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 97.  
 
14Perhaps the most severe critique I heard about the DAIA from individuals was that it functioned akin to the 
Judenrat, mediators between the Jews and Nazis within the ghettos of Nazi-occupied Europe.  The famous 
Jewish Argentine journalist, Jacobo Timerman also names the DAIA, Judenrat, for their actions during the “dirty 
war” (Feitlowitz 1998:108).  
 170
 During the last military dictatorship, the DAIA remained essentially neutral, even as 
dozens of Jewish Argentine families appealed to them for help.15  The actions of the military 
during the “dirty war” presented a paradox for the leaders of the Jewish Argentine 
community.  While the community on the whole wasn’t directly affected in a negative way by 
the dictatorship, many Argentines who were Jewish were.  As Rein and Lesser (2008:13) 
put it, “…Jews arrested by the military suffered more than non-Jews; yet, community 
institutions continued with their normal activities, no anti-Semitic laws were ever instituted, 
and relations with the State of Israel were excellent.”  The failure of the DAIA to speak out 
against the junta, even while human rights were put aside in order to achieve particular ends 
of the dictatorship, is one oft-cited instance when the institution failed to represent at least 
some of its constituents, and apparently, went against its mandate to protect human rights.  
The thinking was, why should the DAIA potentially risk retaliation on the whole community 
for a relatively small number of individuals? 
For the DAIA, as long as Jewish life could continue more or less unhindered, it was 
not worth challenging the power of the generals.  Granted, the Jewish-Argentine community 
was already nervous under a regime that proposed to rescue “Western and Christian” 
society for Argentina, and imagined Jewish influence through Freud, Marx, and Einstein 
were singled out as prime subversive forces.16  One way DAIA officials legitimated their 
actions during the junta is by how they chose to define “Jew,” and those who were deemed 
subversive were often characterized as undesirable members of the Jewish community, or 
not interested in being part of it.  Might “real Jews” come to signify a subversive, foreign, and 
dangerous element in society?  This image of Jews was already circulating in the nation, as 
it had in the past.  Accordingly, DAIA officials often assumed along with the ruling generals, 
                                                     
15On this topic, see again, Feitlowitz (1998:89-109).   
 
16Feitlowitz (1998)  
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 that the individuals targeted must have done something.  In response to this, Rabbi Marshall 
Meyer is quoted as saying, “As though anything could justify disappearance” (Feitlowitz 
1998:100). Exemplifying what Jon Stratton (2000) has termed “ghetto thinking,” the leaders 
of the Jewish Argentine community proceeded with caution during the last military 
dictatorship as they will with the AMIA bombing.17  The status of the DAIA as “representing” 
the community is disrupted and challenged by this history. 
With the memory of the last military dictatorship hovering in the minds of many 
Argentines, a large part of the distrust of the DAIA comes from its direct link with 
government officials, whom many already think to be corrupt.  Given the close connection 
with the government that the DAIA seeks to foster, an allegation of corruption against the 
government has tended to reflect negatively upon the Jewish institution.  At the time of the 
AMIA bombing, the specter of corruption within the DAIA was embodied by the figure of 
Rubén Beraja.  Beraja was president of the DAIA from 1991-1998.  In the early decades of 
the nineties—principally before the bombing of the AMIA— Jewish community leaders and 
Jewish Argentines in general were particularly “close” or in support of president Menem.18  
However, after the AMIA bombing, this closeness, rather than viewed as an asset, came to 
be seen by many in the community as a sign of suspicion.  Immediately after the bombing, 
Rubén Beraja, then president of the DAIA, demanded that Menem’s government investigate 
all possible hypotheses about the origin of the attack, and insisted that the bombing had a 
                                                     
17Stratton has defined “ghetto thinking” as a kind of structure of feeling (Williams 1977), in which fear, a focus 
within the community, and mutual self-help systems are main components.  Although his main subjects of 
analysis are Yiddish-speaking Jews and their descendents, he sees “ghetto thinking” as a possibility among 
other minority groups as well.  Regarding Jews and “ghetto thinking” he states, “…over many centuries the Jews 
of Europe evolved a way of being in the world which was premised on an assumption that the world in which they 
lived their everyday lives was fundamentally antagonistic to them.  Fear was an adaptive defence mechanism 
which kept the Jews on their guard, every watchful, ever protective of their own” (2000:84).  While I think this is 
overstating the case somewhat, I do find that this description resonates with some expressions of Jewishness in 
Buenos Aires, and the attitude of the main Jewish organizations.  
 
18Reasons for this closeness are explained in Diego Melamed’s (2000) Los Judíos y el Menemismo. Buenos 
Aires: Editorial Sudamericana. 
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 local connection .19  However, as time went on and the investigation appeared seriously 
compromised, Beraja and the DAIA were later seen as “soft” in their demands, and even 
accomplices to (the growing awareness of) an organized cover-up. 
Beraja’s position as a banker didn’t help matters.  He was the president of the now 
defunct (Jewish) community bank, Banco Mayo, and had substantial economic reasons to 
align himself with Menem and Corach (ex- minister of interior under Menem), and these 
close relations were seen as a significant conflict of interest.  At the same time as the AMIA 
investigation was underway, Beraja’s bank was floundering, and eventually collapsed.  The 
collapse of Banco Mayo resulted in the loss of millions of client’s dollars, and also further 
eroded the faith that many Jewish Argentines had in their own institutions.  Moreover, Beraja 
was accused of some culpability in the bank’s collapse and was subsequently detained in an 
Argentine jail for almost two years (he has since been freed), for his suspected involvement.    
As many Jewish-Argentines as well as many familiares began to increasingly accuse 
the state of deliberately mishandling the AMIA case, there was an expectation that the 
leaders of the community, the AMIA and DAIA, would speak out against the government.  
This would not be the case.  Instead, Beraja would be formally accused in 2008, along with 
former president Menem, former judge Galeano, and Hugo Anzorreguy the ex-president of 
the SIDE of obstruction to justice in regards to the AMIA case.20  The DAIA, at least under 
Beraja, is widely accused of compromising the Jewish Argentine community in its demand 
for a thorough and impartial investigation of the bombing.  The tarnished image of Ruben 
Beraja only confirmed the impression for Memoria Activa and many others that the DAIA is 
corrupt and untrustworthy. 
                                                     
19“…el presidente de la Delegación de Asociaciones Israelitas Argentinas (DAIA), Rubén Beraja, reclamó al 
Poder Ejecutivo que no descarte ninguna hipótesis sobre el origen del ataque contra el edificio de Pasteur 
633…” Página/12, (1994) “Tensiones Locales.” Pp.11, 19 de Julio, El País, Buenos Aires.  
 
20Irina Hauser (2008) “Un banquillo para los encubridores de atentado,” Página/12, 14 de Noviembre, El País, 
Buenos Aires.  
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 The tensions between the DAIA and Jewish Argentine community have been publicly 
reflected during the AMIA bombing anniversaries.  In recent years, representatives from the 
DAIA have not spoken at the yearly anniversary commemorations of the AMIA bombing held 
on Pasteur street, although they do remain an official presence.  Nineteen ninety-seven is 
the last year that a DAIA official spoke at an AMIA anniversary acto.  This is also the year 
when former member of Memoria Activa, Laura Ginsberg (now of APEMIA), gave her 
powerful and moving “J’accuse” speech that unequivocally denounced the Argentine 
government, and initiated the formal departure of Memoria Activa from the mainstream 
Jewish Argentine community.  I will now turn to this important day.  
A Community Divided and Furious: the Acto of July 18, 1997  
It had been three long years since the AMIA had been bombed, and five since the 
Israeli Embassy lay in a crumpled heap at the corner of Arroyo and Suipacha.  The family 
members of the victims were becoming impatient with the investigation into the attack on the 
AMIA, and pointed accusations against the government of ex-president Carlos Menem and 
the former governor of Buenos Aires (and later president of the nation), Eduardo Duhalde, 
were already circulating in the Jewish Argentine community.  Menem, Duhalde, and the 
Secretary of the Interior at the time, Carlos Corach, were no longer appealed to by some 
familiares in an effort to ensure against impunity and deliver justice—for many they were 
now seen as part of the problem.  Allegations of a cover-up were rising from the citizenry, 
the state itself accused of being an accomplice to the bombings.  Meanwhile, growing 
impatience felt towards the AMIA and DAIA as they continued to be mild in their 
condemnations of the government.  At the third anniversary acto, this suspicion and anger 
toward the Argentine state and increasingly the head of the DAIA, Ruben Beraja, pulsed in 
the crowd of 10,000 standing that cold morning on Pasteur Street.  People in the crowd 
were hoping to hear Beraja “name names” and pinpoint government officials involved in a 
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 cover-up.  The anger in the crowd may have drew in part from the still potent memories of 
the violations of human rights inflicted on the citizenry during the last military dictatorship.  
The liberal democracy desired by the majority of the middle class was still being built, and 
the politics surrounding the AMIA bombing were beginning to stink of the old “politics as 
usual,” where impunity for the powerful stubbornly remains.  
On the stage facing the crowd this winter morning were Rubén Beraja of the DAIA, 
Oscar Hansman, the president of the AMIA, and then Israeli ambassador, Yitzhak Avirán.  
Joining them were several government officials from the executive branch, but not president 
Menem.  The crowd was already agitated at the arrival of these individuals: would the same 
people suspected of being part of a cover-up stand on stage as if they were working for the 
public?  As these officials walked up to the stage cries of “asesino,” and “complice” 
(assassin and accomplice)—and worse—rose from the audience.  Some of the most virulent 
remarks against state officials were directed toward the Secretary of State, Carlos Corach, 
who as a Jew, was perhaps seen to have betrayed the Jewish Argentine community in both 
his official capacity and community affiliation.  During the speech made by Corach, shouts of 
“Jewish traitor” were hurled from the crowd (Gurevich 2005:19).  From the perspective of the 
leadership of the Jewish community and government officials, the acto to commemorate the 
AMIA bombing was off to a rocky start.  But it would only get worse.  
An article that appeared in La Nación the day after the event remarked that the acto, 
“Was an hour and half charged with hostility.  It was the harshest acto organized by the 
Jewish community in Argentina since the AMIA was blown up.”21  The crowd’s anger was 
channeled and amplified by the remarkable speech given by Laura Ginsberg of Memoria 
Activa.  At this time, Memoria Activa still participated in the large community event that took 
place on the anniversary of the bombing, and Laura was still an active member of social 
                                                     
21“Fue una hora y media cargada de hostilidad. Fue el acto más duro organizado por la comunidad judía en la 
Argentina desde que explotó la AMIA.”  Rey, Alejandra (1997) “Indignación con el gobierno” in La Nación,19 de 
Julio, Información General, Buenos Aires.   
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 movement.  In 1997, Laura was the designated spokesperson for all the familiares.  Her 
address, popularly referred to as the “J’accuse” speech, powerfully struck the public with its 
moving language and fierce accusations against Carlos Menem’s government.  Unlike the 
directors of the AMIA and DAIA, Ginsberg did not mince words or fail to name names.  This 
speech was a lament for and remembrance of the dead, but it did not dwell in a passive 
articulation of memory.  Instead, like the name Memoria Activa suggests, it made memory 
into an accusation, a persistent question, and a tool against impunity, not unlike the use of la 
memoria to challenge the official discourse of the military after the “dirty war.”  Ginsberg’s 
speech took the AMIA cause beyond talk of victims and perpetrators, the dead and the 
wounded, Jews and non-Jews, and opened it up to a discussion about citizenship and 
human rights.  And more than this—Ginsberg’s speech, like the politics of Memoria Activa, 
challenge the status quo of the Jewish Argentine community.  Ginsberg is no parvenu, and 
she elicits a politics and identity that will not acquiesce to the accepted norms of Jewishness 
elaborated by the leaders of the Jewish community and Argentine society.22  She and 
Memoria Activa will not quietly “work with” state power, no matter what the cost, in the name 
of security and tolerance.  
Like Zola’s famous J’accuse speech ninety-nine years earlier, Ginsberg directly and 
lyrically accuses those in power of contributing to a cover-up.  Speaking to the crowd of 
thousands, Ginsberg eloquently moves from personal images of life before the bombing to 
sharp accusations aimed at the highest state offices.  It is worth quoting this historic speech 
at length: 
“I close my eyes, and I imagine that it is July 1994 at seven o’clock in the morning.  
Like any Monday, we all get up to begin another week.  Parents have breakfast with 
                                                     
22It should be noted that Ginsberg’s relationship to Jewishness is a tenuous one.  In her interview she explained 
that her connection with Judaism was mostly through other people, her deceased husband and friends.  For her, 
Jewishness was not something she grappled with or thought much about; it wasn’t an identity she positively 
ascribed to herself.  However, in relation to the AMIA bombing, she became positioned to some extent as 
Jewish.   
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 their children, and we…say ‘I love you’ before we leave the house.  But many of us 
didn’t do this because we never thought that it would be for the last time... 
 
I open my eyes, and the image of the horror invades my being: smoke, firemen, 
police pushing, people crying, people screaming, people praying, people who are not 
able to do anything…At seven minutes to ten the building belonging to the Jewish 
Center has been blown up… 
 
…I open my eyes, it is three years later, and I am with other victims of the same type 
of unpunished crime: the twenty-nine dead in the attack on the Israeli embassy and 
the photographer, José Luis Cabezas, assassinated six months earlier…And all the 
while the assassins surely glory in the crime and trust in the national government that 
covers their backs… 
 
All the crimes and attacks, committed and yet to be committed, have a common 
denominator.  I accuse the government of Menem and Duhalde [then Governor of 
the province of Buenos Aires] of consenting to the impunity, of consenting to the 
indifference of those who know and yet keep silent, of consenting to a lack of 
security, of exhibiting a lack of skill and sense of ineptitude.  I accuse the 
government of Menem and Duhalde of covering up the local connection that killed 
members of our family.  
 
I close my eyes, and I imagine that it is twelve midnight on 18 July. We are all deep 
in dreams, our families are still whole and we make plans for the following day with 
the irreverent madness of living, the defiant thought of living, the illusory desire to 
live. 
 
But when I open them, I find myself three years later with the irreverent madness of 
longing for justice, with the defiant thought of demanding justice, and with the illusory 
desire of “never again.” 23 
 
In this speech, the last speech anyone from Memoria Activa would give in front of the 
AMIA building, Ginsberg forcefully emphasizes one of Memoria Activa’s most important 
political claims, that the bombing of the AMIA is a not a “Jewish” problem but a national 
tragedy, and that the failures of the state made evident by this case highlight the 
vulnerability of all Argentines—not just the Jews. She speaks about living and justice as if 
they are a dream, illusions that one defiantly holds onto, and thus, presents the attack on 
the AMIA as a breach of human rights.  By speaking of unpunished crimes she alludes to an 
entrenched political culture that isn’t about Jewish victims.  Rhetorically, she emphasizes 
                                                     
23The translation of this speech was taken from The Argentina Reader, Gabriela Nouzeilles and Graciela 
Montaldo, eds. Patricia Owen Steiner, trans. Durham: Duke University Press, pp. 544-548.  To see the full text in 
Spanish, go to http://www.memoriaactiva.com/aniversarios.htm 
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 this by talking not just about the attacks and crimes that have already happened (which I 
interpret as going beyond the two bombings), but about the ones that have not yet occurred, 
but are poised to do so, given the prevailing social and political climate—“the illusory desire 
of ‘never again.’”  She relinquishes Argentines from an imagined security and into the real 
possibility of horror.  Going against Menem’s official politics of forgetting and his 
championing of neoliberal pleasures and solutions, Laura says, “No.”  She reminds 
Argentines that they have not been safe in the past and will continue to not be so, if the 
victims of the AMIA bombing are swallowed by impunity.  
As I detail in chapter five, the accusations and claims presented in Ginsberg’s 
speech have formed the nucleus of Memoria Activa’s activism: the state is responsible for 
failing to provide security for its citizens; the state is responsible for deliberately obstructing 
justice; the state is responsible for participating in a political culture where impunity is 
unremarkable; the AMIA bombing, along with many other acts of terror and violence, is an 
Argentine human rights issue.24 
Ginsberg’s “J’accuse” speech tore asunder the already tenuous relations between 
the leadership of the Jewish Argentine community and much of the community itself.  In its 
tone and independence it was defiant; and Laura refused to be silent even though leaders of 
the Jewish community had warned the familiares against “inflammatory speech” (Gurevich 
2005:18).  Laura’s speech, while ostensibly meant to reflect the thoughts and opinions of the 
familiares as a whole, left some feeling uncomfortable.  This unease was rooted in a sense 
of going against “the community”—represented by its leaders—and showing the nation that 
the Jewish community was not unified.  This discomfort was present even among those who 
liked and agreed with the assertions made in Laura’s speech.  Given that Laura was most 
                                                     
24While Ginsberg may still agree with these accusations, she is not in agreement with the ways in which Memoria 
Activa has attempted to force the state to claim responsibility.  See next chapter.  
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 closely identified with Memoria Activa, her speech further placed the group beyond the 
bounds of the community.  She, and Memoria Activa, had become too political.  
Despite the misgivings some in the crowd may have had toward Ginsberg’s 
confrontational style, her speech was greeted by enthusiastic applause.  On the other hand, 
Beraja’s speech, which followed hers, was seen as laughable: along with hisses and other 
insults, the crowd turned its back on the speaker, denying the titular representative of the 
Jewish Argentine community his role.  
After Ginsberg’s explosive performance, the leaders of the Jewish community, 
Beraja and Hansman, apologized to President Menem for Ginsberg’s harsh speech, 
infuriating many of the family members of the victims.25  This act of apology was seen as an 
example of cowardice—or worse—and a contradiction of a primary purpose of the acto: to 
demand justice and transparency from the Argentine government.  But it also showed the 
leadership of the Jewish community scrambling for authority: the AMIA and DAIA could no 
longer unequivocally be seen as representing the Jewish community.  This act, among 
others, solidified the view stressed by some familiares, Memoria Activa, and later, APEMIA 
that the community leadership is complicit with government (son cómplices).  Since her days 
with Memoria Activa and continuing today, Laura has stressed that, “…from the beginning 
and throughout these ten years [now 14], the leadership of the Jewish community took a 
supportive role and went along with the politics of the Argentine state…”26  
The DAIA seeks to represent and act in the “best” interests of the Jewish Argentine 
community.  But how one defines “community” is continually a source of conflict, as was 
explicit during the last military dictatorship.  The power of Jewish agencies like the DAIA to 
“speak” for the “community” is an attempt to solidify and define the negotiated boundaries 
                                                     
25La Nación (1997).“Replanteo tras el acto de la AMIA” 20 de Julio, Información General, Buenos Aires. 
 
26“…la dirigencia judía desde el principio y durante todos estos diez años tuvo un papel de sostenimiento y de 
acompañamiento de todas las políticas que el estado argentino tuvo…” Interview, December 14, 2004.  
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and multiplicities of Jewish Argentine life.  In this way, the DAIA becomes a powerful force in 
producing and maintaining normative Jewish Argentine identities and practices.  From the 
perspective of the DAIA and its supporters, dissent and critique of the government, society, 
and Jewish Argentine community—when it is articulated from a position of Jewishness—
should ideally be expressed through the (private) networks of the Jewish Argentine 
agencies, rather than publicly on the streets.  This form of disciplining is justified through the 
proposed necessity of presenting a “united front” to the rest of society, as if Jews are a 
discrete group set apart, and embattled.  
 Contrary to these expectations, Memoria Activa has ignored their “place.”  Rather 
than go through authorized channels they have opened up a space as Jewish citizens to 
interpolate the state.  The members of Memoria Activa act “out of turn” within the two 
overlapping circles of the organized Jewish-Argentine community and Argentine state and 
society.  In taking to the street and constantly making demands on the state they are unruly 
citizens.  By refusing to work with legitimate and sanctioned channels of negotiation (which 
generally takes place behind closed doors) between the leaders of the Jewish community 
and the state, they are seen as disloyal to their community and as “loud Jews.”  And 
importantly, until the AMIA bombing and challenge to the leadership of the DAIA by Memoria 
Activa, the organization was viewed by the state to be imbued with the sole authority to 
represent the Jewish community.  This is no longer the case, as Memoria Activa has not 
only helped to undermine the credibility of the leadership of the Jewish community, but has 
successfully interpolated and negotiated with the state, as will be seen in the next chapter. 
VI. The Search for Justice and the Politics of Impunity  
 
Introduction: The Boiling Frog 
Buenos Aires, September 10, 2004.  I am traveling to the office of Baruj Z. again, this 
time to speak with his secretary about the American Rabbi Marshall Meyer, since she had 
known him personally for many years.  Rabbi Meyer transformed Jewish practice in 
Argentina and beyond, and was one of the most important voices of opposition from within 
Argentina during the last military dictatorship.  He is well known and highly regarded within 
human rights movements such as Las Madres de Plaza de Mayo, and was a member of the 
Argentine National Commission on the Disappeared or CONADEP.  However, in addition to 
my meeting regarding Rabbi Meyer, Baruj and I sit down at a long wooden table in a 
conference room adjacent to his office.  I want to discuss with him the recent unsettling 
news regarding the verdict of the AMIA trial.  All the defendants had been acquitted based 
on insufficient and invalid evidence.  Reactions to the results of this historic trial had been 
occupying the attention of many porteños for a week now, and it hovered in my thoughts as 
well.  
Baruj, sitting across from me at the table, his demeanor respectful and kind, begins 
to talk about justice.  Baruj couldn’t say whether he thought those who were absolved were 
actually guilty of something.  However, for him, the essential failure of the trial reflected a 
problem with the judicial system, and signaled a lack of justice in general in the country.  He 
looks directly at me as he says, “There isn’t justice in Argentina,” and then, echoing 
 
 comments I heard in other places, he remarks, “Argentina seems like a country but isn’t.”  
He goes on to say that the laws of Argentina functioned like “dead letters,” even though 
“everybody promises justice, truth, saying that these are the most important things.”  Like 
many other middle-class porteños, Baruj expresses his critiques within a liberal framework, 
in which individual rights of citizens are to be guaranteed by the state.  The breaking of this 
bond between state and citizen, according to this principle, can be devastating.  In 
accordance with this dire scenario, Baruj’s reflections about his country became ever more 
bleak and hopeless.  
“To not have confidence in the institutions of a country is very serious. We have 
confidence in football.  This is what is in the news.  This isn’t a country or a society.”  Finally 
I asked him, “But how does one live in a country that isn’t a country?”  To this question, 
Baruj responds with a parable.  He asks me if I had heard about the story about the frog.  I 
tell him I wasn’t sure that I had, so he continues: “If you put a frog into boiling water it will 
immediately jump out. But if you put a frog in room temperature water, water that is pleasing 
to the frog—water it can live in—and then put the heat on low, slowly heating up the water, 
the frog hardly notices that his climate is becoming toxic, deadly.  He stays in the water as it 
slowly boils, and eventually the frog gets boiled alive.”  You get used to the dangers, slowly 
over time. “It’s like this” he says simply and looks at me with a gentle but firm expression.  
I leave his office with the sad image of the slowly boiled frog representing the citizens 
of Argentina.  
Degrees of Responsibility 
In July of 2005, shortly before the eleventh year anniversary of the AMIA attack, 
Kirchner’s government published a page-long “Decreto” (Decree) in Argentina’s leading 
newspapers.  The purpose of Decreto 812/05 was an acknowledgement and acceptance of 
the failure of the Argentine government to fulfill certain obligations to its citizenry, and is 
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 signed by “the president of the nation”—at the time, Néstor Kirchner.  The subject was the 
1994 AMIA bombing.  After eleven years, the Argentine government formally accepted 
responsibility for denying the following rights to its citizens: The right to life (derechos a la 
vida); Physical Integrity (la integridad física); Judicial Process (las garantías judiciales y la 
tutela judicial efectiva).  The Decreto goes on to state the following: 
The Argentine state…recognizes the responsibility incumbent upon it for the 
denounced violations, as prevention of the attack was not achieved because suitable 
and effective measures weren’t adopted—taking in account that two years previous 
there was a terrorist attack against the Israeli Embassy—and because there was a 
cover-up of the facts and a serious and deliberate failure to fulfill an adequate 
investigation of the crime… which produced a clear denigration of justice …1 
 
In addition to an admission of culpability on various accounts, the Decreto also 
details some concrete actions that the government promises to take.  These include the 
publication and diffusion of the Decreto itself, different measures to support the investigation 
of the AMIA and the sanctioning of those found responsible in hindering it, the creation of a 
special “catastrophe unit,” with particular contingencies for attacks like the AMIA and Israeli 
Embassy, to improve medical emergency efforts and the collection and protection of 
evidence, and measure taken to improve the transparency of the SIDE’s use of funds as 
well as helping to make intelligence information available to judges who are investigating 
acts of terrorism.  The publication of the Decreto, although eleven years too late for many, 
was received by Memoria Activa and several familiares, as an important step toward greater 
governmental transparency and accountability.  As will be shown, the attack on the AMIA 
has become a case of Byzantine proportions—a kind of disorienting fun-house labyrinth, 
with no end in sight.  Many of the government officials involved in the investigation of the 
                                                     
1“Que el Estado argentino…reconoció la responsabilidad que le incumbe por las violaciones denunciadas, en 
cuanto existió incumplimiento de la función de prevención por no haber adaptado medidas idóneas y eficaces 
para prevenir el atentado—teniendo en cuenta que dos años antes se había producido un hecho terrorista 
contra la Embajada de Israel—y porque existió encubrimiento de los hechos y medió incumplimiento grave y 
deliberado de la función de investigación adecuada del ilícto, lo cual produjo una clara denegatoria de justicia…”  
A full text of this document can be accessed at http://www.memoriaactiva.com/Decreto812_2005.htm  
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 bombing or with the power to influence it, are now themselves being investigated for 
allegedly engaging in a deliberate miscarriage of justice.  The Decreto, then, is an official 
acknowledgement of many counts of failure on the part of the state, and an effort to achieve 
a position of authority and trust amongst citizens who graffiti the walls of governmental 
buildings with words like impunidad (impunity) and asesinos (assassins).  
This Decreto is a direct result of Memoria Activa’s presentations, along with CELS 
(Centro de Estudios Legales y Sociales) and CEJIL (Center for Justice and International 
Law), before the Organization of American States’ (OAS) Commission of Human Rights.  In 
1999, Memoria Activa embarked on an important new route for their activism, and presented 
their case internationally, to the Commission of Human Rights in the OAS.  In this, they 
supplemented their weekly demands in front of the Tribunales building by appealing to the 
power of the OAS to monitor the Argentine state and force compliance to internationally 
recognized standards of democracy and human rights.  Traveling by plane from Buenos 
Aires to Washington D.C. two of the familiares from Memoria Activa, along with lawyers and 
representatives from CELS and CEJIL, presented their case to the Commission on various 
occasions, the most recent being in 2007.  The basis of their accusation rests on the failure 
of the Argentine state to take proper precautions in preventing the attack and protecting the 
life of its citizens and the failure of the state to provide justice for the victims—essentially 
what the Decreto recognizes .2  Memoria Activa’s actions in the OAS resulted in the 
assignment of an official observer of the trial relating to the bombing that had begun in 2001.  
This overseer, Claudio Grossman, published a report of his findings after the outcome of the 
trial was determined in 2004.3  (This was the failed trial that Baruj and I discussed above.)  
                                                     
2In the words of the presentation, “El Estado Argentino ha fracasado en brindar prevención y no se ha hecho 
cargo de su fracaso. El Estado Argentino ha fracasado en su obligación de impartir justicia y no se ha hecho 
cargo de su fracaso.” Presentación de Memoria Activa ante la Comisión Internacional de Derechos Humanos de 
la OEA, 4 de Marzo de 2005, can be accessed at http://www.memoriaactiva.com. 
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 His findings, which validated much of the public knowledge about the “irregularities” of the 
investigation circulated by the media and Memoria Activa, helped to precipitate the 
Argentine government’s acceptance of responsibility.  
For some of the main actors in the Argentine human rights community, the Decreto is 
a document not just for the victims of the AMIA, although this was the cause of its 
publication.  It is a document for the nation proclaiming that the Argentine state takes its 
responsibility toward its citizens seriously.  Víctor Abramovich, the director of the well-
respected human rights organization CELS, praised the Decreto for its “historical value” and 
added that the AMIA case made evident the “weakness of Argentina’s democratic 
institutions.”4  
Although the Decreto and Kirchner’s words and actions have been criticized as mere 
gestures, the publishing of the Decreto illustrates a significant shift in attitude and approach 
of the Argentine government.  When Memoria Activa first presented their case to the 
Commission in 1999, they were treated with harsh, combative words from Menem’s 
government.  This is in contrast to the “solución amistoso,” or friendly negotiation promised 
by Kirchner’s government in the Decreto.  Kirchner’s government ran on a platform of 
human rights with the slogan “Argentina-un país en serio” (Argentina—a serious country), 
and as I witnessed on numerous occasions, Kirchner was greatly admired by many in the 
human rights community.  When I arrived in Argentina, the slogan of Kirchner’s government 
could be seen all over the place, on signs announcing public works, old campaign posters, 
even in pre-movie advertisements.  It was as if repetition would make it a reality.   
What is implied by stating that under Kirchner’s leadership, Argentina would become 
“a serious country?”  Kirchner’s campaign was articulating with historically constructed 
                                                                                                                                                                    
3Informe Observación del Decano Claudio Grossman Observador International de la CIDH en el Juicio de La 
Asociación Mutual Israelita Argentina (AMIA), 22 de Febrero, 2005.  
 
4Página 12, (2005)“El estado admitió su culpa,” 13 de Julio, El País, Buenos Aires.  
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 popular feelings of failure—most recently animated by the disastrous economic collapse that 
reached its peak in 2001.  Capturing the middle class’s strong attachment to liberalism, “a 
serious country” refers to a nation with solid democratic foundations based in part on the 
protection and solidification of human rights.  However, the slogan is also broad enough, 
with its connotation of responsibility and reliability, to appeal to other sectors of society that 
don’t necessarily adhere to a liberal understanding of human rights.5  “A serious country” is 
a response to those Argentines who say that “Argentina doesn’t exist” or “This isn’t a 
country.”  It is also referencing stability, and assuring the populace that they can begin to 
have confidence in their government after the chaotic succession of five presidents in 
roughly four years that followed the 2001 economic collapse. 
By many accounts, the installation of human rights and democracy, officially begun 
by Raul Alfonsín and human rights activists in1983, suffered serious setbacks under Menem 
(Bonner 2007).6  The manner in which the investigations of the Israeli embassy and AMIA 
were handled, and the pardons granted to military officers convicted of human rights 
violations are two examples of his controversial legacy.  Menem’s robust embrace of 
economic neoliberalism is also blamed by many sectors as precipitating the country’s 
economic collapse.  The privatization of state-owned companies under Menem contributed 
to a growing number of unemployed workers—many of whom have organized as 
piqueteros.  In contrast to Menem and the instability that followed his presidency, Kirchner 
presented himself as another kind of president.7   
The national congress under his presidency repealed two of the laws that effectively 
granted amnesty to the armed forces for their actions during the military dictatorship, the Ley 
                                                     
5Thanks to my colleague Karen Faulk for pointing this out.  
 
6 However, the erosion of human rights had already begun at the end of Raul Alfonsín’s presidency, as I note in 
the introduction.  Under Menem these trends deepened.  
 
7Interestingly, Kirchner, a relatively unknown politician from Patagonia, won the presidential election with only 
23% of the popular vote, after Carlos Menem dropped out of the race.  
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 de Punto Final (Full Stop Law) and Ley de Obediencia Debida (Law of Due Obedience), 
thus making way for the re-opening of human rights cases.  In relation to the AMIA bombing, 
in addition to Kirchner’s government willingness to amicably treat with Memoria Activa and 
the publication of the Decreto, he sat down many times with some of the familiares from the 
group most closely aligned with the AMIA and DAIA, Los Familiares y Amigos de las 
Víctimas—something Menem never did—and made a portion of the secret service files 
available for the investigation.  For the Familiares y Amigos group at least, this willingness to 
talk was viewed positively.8  (The question of why the secret service files concerning the 
bombing were closed (and still are in part) in the first place is one of the strongest pieces of 
evidence of a cover-up, and the basis of much of the accusations about the government’s 
unwillingness to investigate the attack.  The “secret files” of the AMIA bombing are at the 
heart of the protests Laura’s group APEMIA have issued against the government, and as 
I’ve previously noted, she sees little difference between Kirchner’s leadership and Menem’s: 
both engage and perpetuate a system of impunity.) 
Despite the shift in attitude and acts of goodwill, little has effectively changed on the 
ground for the surviving victims of the bombing.  The case still remains unsolved, and many 
of the tangible actions promised in the Decreto have yet to be realized.  For these reasons, 
most familiares think that Kirchner has done little in concrete terms to further the cause, and 
protest against what they see as mere gestures.  Laura’s group APEMIA has issued the 
harshest critiques of the Decreto, claiming: “In the hands of these people, the proposed 
actions contribute to a deepening of the cover-up of the attack and not a clear explanation.”9  
                                                     
8To the best of my knowledge, Kirchner only met with members of the Familiares y Amigos group.  I believe this 
is because, in part, these meetings were facilitated by the AMIA and DAIA, which Memoria Activa and APEMIA 
were estranged from, and also reflect an unwillingness of members of these groups to appear to treat in a 
relatively cozy manner with the state.  Memoria Activa negotiated with the state through the international NGO 
the Organization of American States, while APEMIA’s Laura Ginsberg would not treat in any way with 
representatives of the state who she saw as criminals.  
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 For APEMIA, the Decreto represents one more manipulation in which the public is deceived 
into thinking that the state accepts responsibility for their part in the bombing, while in 
actuality only a few sacrificial victims will be punished.  
Nor was the Decreto received with satisfaction by the presidents of the AMIA and 
DAIA at the time, Jorge Kirszenbaum of the DAIA and Luis Grynwald of the AMIA.  Both 
dismissed the importance of the Decreto.  As I mentioned in the previous chapter, the 
leadership of the Jewish community has been loath to pursue the culpability of the state in 
the bombing.  In contrast to the claims of Memoria Activa, APEMIA and some other 
familiares, they view the concentration on the Argentine government’s role in the bombing 
as diverting the focus from the real perpetrators of the attack—most directly, Iranian citizens.  
The placing of the bombing outside of the frame of the nation explicitly contradicts how 
Memoria Activa and APEMIA see the attack as intimately caught up in the political 
machinations of the state, and reinforces APEMIA’s assertion that privileging an 
international cause for the AMIA bombing is part of a wider U.S. and Israel led effort to 
isolate and demonize particular states.   
At the acto for the eleventh anniversary of the AMIA bombing hosted by Memoria 
Activa—which took place roughly a week after the publication of the Decreto—
spokesperson Diana Malamud had harsh words for the leadership of the Jewish Argentine 
community.  (This was the same acto that Senator Cristina Fernández de Kirchner 
attended.)  Gripping a microphone, Diana shouts a response to Kirszenbaum (who isn’t 
present) and his claim that focusing on the Argentine government was simply a diversion: 
“He says that we aren’t putting our focus where we should.  Let it remain clear: Our focus is 
                                                                                                                                                                    
9“En manos de esta gente, las acciones propuestas contribuyen a profundizar el encubrimiento del atentado y no 
su esclarecimiento.” APEMIA, “Acto a 11 Años de la Masacre de la AMIA,” www.apemia.blogspot.com, accessed 
on August 10, 2005.  
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 on the carcel of assassins, accomplices and others engaged in a cover-up.”10  She goes on 
to respond to Grynwald’s proposal to “stop blaming previous governments” and says, “ The 
responsibility is on the governments, their officials and their leadership, that for personal 
interests are to blame for the reasons why we don’t know the truth.”   
The Decreto then, was interpreted in differing ways.  And while its significance has 
decreased as time has passed, at the time of its publication it was perceived as a significant 
act in many circles beyond the Jewish-Argentine community and the familiares.  This was 
most notable with some of the central actors in the human rights movement, as the quote by 
the director of CELS, above, demonstrates.  From the perspective of those invested in 
furthering the installation of human rights based on liberal traditions in the nation, the 
admission of culpability by the state has at least initiated an end to the construction of an 
“official story.”11  The recognition by the state that there was indeed a cover-up and an 
organized obstruction of justice is seen as an important step toward changing or challenging 
the “culture of impunity” that many Argentines see as socially and politically endemic.  In 
order to get a perspective on the Decreto from one of the key players in the Argentine 
human rights community, I met with one of the lawyers from CELS working with Memoria 
Activa in bringing their case to the OAS.   
Buenos Aires, July 30, 2005. To get to my meeting at the Centro de Estudios 
Legales y Sociales, or CELS, I travel by subway and bus from the Buenos Aires’ 
neighborhoods of Palermo to San Telmo.  When I emerge from the subway steps in 
downtown Buenos Aires, I find myself in the middle of a protest, with people shouting and 
wearing photos of dead teenagers around their necks.  One hundred ninety-four were killed, 
                                                     
10“Dice que no estamos poniendo el eje donde lo debemos poner.  Que quede claro, nuestro eje es cárcel a los 
asesinos, cómplices y encrubridores…. dejar de culpar a los gobiernos anteriores… La culpa es de los 
gobiernos, de sus funcionarios y de los dirigentes que por intereses personales son culpables de que no se sepa 
la verdad.” See the full speech at http://www.memoriaactiva.com/aniversarios.htm. 
 
11 Although Laura Ginsberg would say that the presentation of the Decreto only appears to arrest an “official 
story” and is really hoodwinking the public.  
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 mainly adolescents, in a recent fire (December 30, 2004) in a popular nightclub in Once.  At 
a New Year’s Eve concert in the club, a lit flare proceeded to ignite in flame the highly 
flammable materials that surrounded the concert-goers.  Against city regulations, all but two 
of the doors were locked from the inside with chains, including fire doors, and most of the 
victims died from inhalation of a mixture of poisonous gases and smoke.  This atrocity 
renewed accusations of impunity and criticisms of the apparent dysfunctions of city and 
national government.  The protest I find myself witnessing is primarily a demonstration 
against the then mayor of the city, Aníbal Ibarra, for a failure to enforce public safety laws 
and the general disorganization of the inspection system.  (Ibarra was subsequently 
impeached, amidst much controversy.)  As I wind my way through the crowd, the protesters 
wave their flyers against “impunidad” and “cover-ups,” grainy images of pubescent kids 
flapping on their chests.  The rhetoric is the same used during many of the AMIA actos, and 
I carry these images with me as I continue to San Telmo.  In so many ways, the deaths of 
those in the nightclub and the deaths of the AMIA were linked through a narrative of state 
corruption and failure—two horrendous examples of what can result in a “culture of 
impunity.”   
As the bus steers its way through the congested downtown streets of Buenos Aires, 
south toward picturesque San Telmo, the view from the window begins to change.  Instead 
of the many business and buildings of downtown and its crush of people navigating the 
narrow sidewalks, San Telmo is a neighborhood of cobblestone streets with people casually 
strolling by quaint looking cafés and stores filled with antiques or the products of local 
artists.  I had spent weekends walking the markets of San Telmo, eating tasty parilla at 
sidewalk tables and watching the occasional street-side tango show.  A combination of 
working class and Buenos Aires’ bohemian with some touristy kitsch thrown in, I notice 
some particularly elaborate and beautiful graffiti praising Evita—something that is rare in the 
middle and upper middle class areas of the city.  
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 I am heading to CELS to meet with Andrea P. who works with Memoria Activa and 
their case with the OAS.  I enter the beautifully restored building and given the reputation 
that precedes this organization, I feel as if I have come to a very special and authoritative 
place.  CELS is one of the most important centers of the Argentine human rights movement, 
and the joint work between Memoria Activa and CELS is one illustration of how fully the 
AMIA case has been adopted by the human rights community.  Because human rights are 
central to most mainstream discussions of democracy in Argentina, the positioning of the 
bombing within this locally active discourse is a very effective means by which to hold the 
state responsible for the AMIA bombing and install it as a national and international concern.  
Importantly, in 2006 the judge now handling the investigation of the AMIA case, Rodolfo 
Canicoba Corral, in the same statement in which he called for the capture of nine Iranian 
citizens—including ex-president Rafsanjani—clearly stated that the AMIA bombing was a 
“crime against humanity.”  Understanding the bombing in this way situates the bombing 
within the heart of human rights tradition and activism as it has developed internationally 
and in Argentina, and strongly inserts the bombing within the local culture and politics of 
impunidad.    
 The porteños I know often speak of an ingrained “culture of impunity” that 
permeates both civil society and government.  This culture of impunity is seen to greatly 
contribute to the violation of human rights, social indifference, and weak democratic 
practice.  Both the discourses of human rights and impunity are strongly aligned with the 
practices of la memoria (memory)—a rich site of potential dissent, mourning, and 
oppositional politics in Argentina, something that has informed the political praxis of 
Memoria Activa.  
Sitting across from Andrea in a non-descript meeting room in CELS, she begins to 
explain her work and the importance of the Decreto.  I ask her what she thinks will be the 
long-term effects of this document.  First she emphasizes to me the significance of the AMIA 
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 case in terms of the dys/functions of the state: “Because for us the AMIA case is above all a 
paradigmatic case of how the state neglected its function, how the state didn’t fulfill its role, 
how state institutions put in place to prevent or obstruct impunity didn’t work.”12  Then she 
goes on discuss to the importance of the Decreto and its possible ramifications:   
I believe that it has important cultural effects.  I think that it’s no small thing that the 
State recognizes this, because this begins to re-write the “official truth.” The “official 
truth” was marked by the discourse of Galeano, and of Menem and Beraja for so 
much time, and it [the decreto] begins to change the story, converting it into truth, it 
seems to me…this has a very important cultural effect. I think that it will result in the 
re-writing of history.  Official truth…this seems to me very interesting…and the 
promised measures here [in the decreto] will hopefully be achieved because this 
would have a lot of effect in the long-term.  This is what we hope for, to have a long-
term effect. That the weight of the tragedy of the AMIA case allows for a before and 
after.  That democracy will be improved and things won’t be the same as before…13 
 
Laughter interrupts her last sentence.  If from nervousness or from some form of 
doubt, I’m not sure.  
Andrea’s mention of “official truth” has its basis in the struggles of the Argentine 
human rights community to uncover what happened to Argentine citizens during the “dirty 
war” and cut through the “official” stories designed to make a society deaf, dumb, and blind.  
Re-writing the official story is essentially a struggle about knowledge and who controls the 
archive.  Since the end of the military dictatorship in 1983, the human rights community has 
attempted to wrest the archive from state control and write history from another perspective, 
turning subversives into victims.  A similar process of occlusion has happened with the AMIA 
bombing, and the Decreto is a sign of, at the very least, an effort at transparency.  
                                                     
12 Porque para nosotros el caso AMIA es sobretodo un caso paradigmático de cómo el Estado resignó su 
función, como el Estado no cumplió con su función, de cómo las instituciones que el Estado tenía para evitar 
que el caso AMIA sucediera o para impedir la impunidad, no funcionaron. 
 
13 Yo creo que tiene efectos culturales importantes, yo creo que no es poca cosa que el Estado reconozca esto, 
porque esto es empezar a escribir la verdad oficial de nuevo. La verdad oficial que durante mucho tiempo estuvo 
marcada por el discurso de Galeano, y de Menem, de Beraja, y esto empieza a cambiar la historia, esto, esto se 
convierte en verdad, me parece. Y…y eso tiene un efecto cultural muy importante. Yo creo que tiene el efecto 
de volver a escribir la historia de nuevo….Verdad oficial, y…y eso me parece muy interesante y ojalá tenga esto, 
las medidas que se prometen acá sean cumplidas porque eso sí tendría mucho efecto a largo plazo. Eso es lo 
que buscamos, tener efecto a largo plazo. Que el caso AMIA permita a pesar de la tragedia, permita un antes y 
un después, no? Que no sea igual que antes y que se mejore la democracia… (Risa). 
 192
 Notably, Andrea speaks of “cultural effects.”  This reflects a position that views the 
construction of an “official story” and impunidad as one of complicity between state and civil 
society.  In other words, it takes a network of politicians, bureaucrats, neighbors, security 
forces, etc. to make impunidad work and to construct an “official story.”  It is a community 
affair, and involves participants at all levels of society.  This perspective is historically 
based—most recently—in the cultural politics of the “dirty war,” where one saw but did not 
see, heard but did hear, becoming tacit accomplices to terror (and these accomplices were 
themselves terrorized).  The point being that as in the “dirty war” and with the AMIA case, 
the citizenry allows, and sometimes fosters, a culture of impunity.  However, the discourse 
about impunity in Argentina has much deeper roots than events in the last 30 years.  It is a 
discourse that can be rooted in the “civilization and barbarism” debate from the nineteenth 
century, and the critique or championing of caudillismo. The discourse of impunidad is 
flexible enough that it can be utilized for various ends and from different ideological 
positions.  The charge of impunidad, like the discourse on human rights, is claimed and 
reshaped by actors across the political and class spectrum.  
Memoria Activa continues their work with the Commission on Human Rights in the 
OAS.  While those directly responsible for the bombing still elude the courts, the Argentine 
government has, at least for now, admitted its culpability in relation to the AMIA case, and at 
present trials are underway to determine degrees of culpability of various former state 
officials (see below).  For the leaders of Memoria Activa, and those seeking greater 
accountability and responsibility from the government, these actions constitute perhaps a 
weak promise that the violation of their rights with impunity will abate in the not so distant 
future.   
How did we get here?  How did the AMIA bombing become primarily a case against 
the Argentine state for actors such as Memoria Activa, APEMIA, and other human rights and 
counter-impunity organizations?  In part, this answer must come from a careful historicizing 
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 of the discourses of impunity and human rights, and an analysis of how the relationship 
between state and civil society developed into a site of intense agonism.  While I will not be 
able to provide such detail here, what I will show are the concrete actions and situations that 
have turned the AMIA bombing into an emblematic case of impunity and the weaknesses of 
democracy in Argentina.  
Anatomy of a Fracaso Part I: The International Investigation14  
Three months after the attack on the AMIA, President Menem asserts with 
confidence that the Justice department will clear up the terrorist attack against the AMIA.15  
Ten years later, Memoria Activa is still standing in front of the judicial palace in downtown 
Buenos Aires—“El Palacio de Injusticia,” I was quickly instructed.  They speak the words 
from Deuteronomy, “Justicia, Justicia, Perseguirás…” (Justice, Justice, You Shall Seek…) 
and through their words and actions fight against the perception that the AMIA bombing is a 
“Jewish problem,” and that justice is only a matter of finding the direct authors of the attack.  
No, from the perspective of Memoria Activa, justice will be achieved when the culture of 
impunity comes to a halt, when there is a change in a governmental ethos that fosters 
criminal activity and shelters criminals, when society stops looking the other way, and when 
all the accomplices and authors of the attack are brought under the gaze of a functioning 
and authoritative judicial system.  
I don’t know if anybody thought they would be standing in the Plaza Lavalle for ten 
years, demanding justice.  I don’t know if anyone felt they would have to.  At the time of my 
fieldwork it had been ten years since the AMIA building was blown up, in broad daylight on a 
street were people live and work.  It had been ten years since 85 people were violently 
killed, and not one of the suspected architects of the crime had been brought to trial.  
                                                     
14Fracaso means failure.  It also has connotations of disaster and ruin. 
 
15This is reported in the “Crónica de los Noventa Días Siguientes al Atentado,” published by the DAIA, Centro de 
Estudios Sociales, 1994.   
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 Meanwhile, more and more evidence was surfacing that implicated high-ranking government 
officials in a cover-up.  Moreover, much about the bombing was still unknown: evidence 
seemed to appear and disappear, bribes were offered and taken, international and national 
realpolitik seemed to be in the way.  
Before any specific accusations of wrong doing by particular individuals could be 
made, the investigation of the AMIA was seen as seriously compromised.  The forensic 
teams assigned to investigate the case were accused of being unorganized and ill-prepared 
for an attack of this kind (despite the similar attack two years previous) and even the exact 
number of dead bodies was unclear for a few years.  (There still are doubts about the exact 
number of dead in both the Israeli embassy and AMIA bombings.)  The scene of the 
bombing was described as chaotic, with hundreds of people climbing over a mountain of 
rubble to retrieve victims and others waiting in the sidelines to offer assistance.  Search and 
rescue was performed with the help from many different quarters, including Argentine 
security forces, a team of search and rescue experts from Israel, and average citizens—all 
leading I imagine to coordination difficulties.  The collection and storage of potentially 
important evidence was seen as disorganized and inefficient, and in some cases it appears 
that evidence was deliberately lost or destroyed—as Decreto 812 admits. 
The investigation, under the guidance of federal judge Juan José Galeano, moved 
along at a seemingly glacial place.16  Shortly after the attack, Galeano detained and 
questioned various individuals, mostly Argentine nationals.  All but one, Carlos Alberto 
Telledín, accused of selling the van (a Renault Traffic) to the perpetrators, were released 
after a brief detention.  (Telledín was later prosecuted in the “local connection” AMIA trial, 
described below.)  Galeano also investigated the activities of Irani diplomats and ordered 
the international capture of four of these diplomats who were no longer in Buenos Aires, 
                                                     
16Today the speed of the AMIA investigation is frequently compared to 9/11, and the bombings in London and 
Spain, where in a matter of days key suspects were apprehended. 
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 (nothing came of this and Argentina is still seeking their extradition).17  The investigation 
thus followed two routes: one centered on international connections to the bombing, the 
other focused on the so-called local connection.  It soon became apparent that the 
investigation of the conexión local was going to proceed more quickly—but ultimately not 
more successfully—than the international investigation, and there are many possible 
reasons for this.  
On the one hand, there was the recurring opinion that that Argentine agencies and 
institutions weren’t sophisticated or coordinated enough to handle attacks of this magnitude 
and complexity.  In 2005, the U.S. State Department’s Coordinator for Counterterrorism, 
Philip C. Wilcox, corroborated this opinion in a hearing before the U.S. House of 
Representatives.18  On the other hand, there seemed to be a conspicuous lack of will.  Raul 
Kollman, a Página 12 journalist who has closely followed the AMIA case for many years, 
has written:  
The real problem is that the Argentine government was never interested in solving 
the case.  At times, only fifteen to twenty people were assigned to it, while after the 
Oklahoma City bombing 5,000 law enforcement officials were deployed immediately.  
The United States sent over 1,500 agents to Africa after the bombing of the 
embassies in Tanzania and Kenya. These agents interrogated 10,000 witnesses in 
four days.  In Argentina, witnesses are still waiting to be called. And it took over three 
years to put together a 100-person team of investigators that never functioned 
properly. [Escudé and Gurevich 2003]  
   
As has already been demonstrated, it is widely felt by familiares that on Argentina’s 
part there has been little political motivation to solve the case.  Almost immediately, the 
bombing was hailed as an act of international terrorism, calling forth the various agencies, 
experts, and nations interested in fighting terrorist acts that appear to stem from groups 
                                                     
17In 2001 a former Iranian diplomat stationed in Buenos Aires, Hade Soleimanpour, was arrested in London in 
connection to the AMIA bombing.  However, British officials would not extradite him to Argentina because they 
rejected the evidence provided by Judge Galeano as insufficient.  Soleimanpour was later released.  
 
18See U.S. government document “Terrorism in Latin America/AMIA bombing in Argentina.” Can be found at 
www.state.gov.  At the hearing, a representative of the DAIA and one familiar, Luis Czyzewski, presented their 
case, along with various representatives from U.S. Jewish agencies, to the Committee on International Relations 
of the U.S. House of Representatives.  
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 such as Hezbollah or so-called rogue nations such as Iran.  Thus the secret service 
agencies of the U.S., Spain, and Israel were mobilized to contribute to the investigation, and 
after the fall of the Twin Towers and the attacks at Atocha the focus on the Middle East was 
intensified.  With the power and cooperation of all these nations, why did the investigation 
falter?   
Weaving its way through all this is the specter of corruption. “Corruption” while not 
used in the same manner as institutions such as the IMF might use it, is a common critique 
of the state expressed by Argentine citizens.  The charge of corruption often goes hand-in-
hand with accusations of impunidad.  By embracing and rearticulating this all too easily 
made assumption about political culture in Latin America, Argentines from across the 
political spectrum are able to harness the power of this label to demand change.  This 
change is often rooted in strengthening responsibility and accountability between and 
among state and society, and is not necessarily aligned with the interests of international 
lenders or the United States government.  At first this lack of will—most directly associated 
with the government of Carlos Menem—was thought to be due to political and economic 
agreements made between Menem and other governments, and the belief that a thorough 
investigation would reveal networks of corruption in which particular government officials 
could be caught.  Moreover, it was speculated that a careful inquiry into how and why an 
attack of this magnitude happened a second time in Buenos Aires could implicate too many 
individuals and agencies, and expose not only possible corruption, but widespread 
incompetence.19 
The minute twists and turns of the international investigation have been documented 
elsewhere, and here I will only relate some of the main trends and complications .20  Initially, 
                                                     
19This was often related to me as popular knowledge, but Escudé and Gurevich (2003) note this as well.  
 
20For detail on this up until 2003 see, for example, Escudé and Gurevich (2003).  Joe Goldman and Jorge 
Lanata’s book, Cortinas de Humo, also gives some details about the initial enquiries about the bombing. More 
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 the international investigation was mainly focused on Hezbollah and Iran, with possible 
Syrian support.  The  “Syrian connection” was later downplayed, somewhat suspiciously.  In 
part, this has been attributed to Menem’s connections with and promises made to Syria.  
Menem had received financial support for his presidential campaign from Syria, and had 
later made promises to Assad of nuclear technology and a partnership in a ballistic missile 
project.  As world geopolitics shifted after the U.S. invasion on Iraq, however, Menem broke 
his promises and positioned himself more firmly with the U.S. and Israel.  A further 
investigation of the “Syrian connection” was seen to be a potential source of embarrassment 
for Menem, given his previous dealing with Assad.21  Israel has also been suspected of 
dragging its feet with the finding and prosecution of suspected perpetrators, particularly the 
“Syrian connection.”22  This was thought to be due to tentative steps taken to include Syria in 
the peace processes under way at the time.23 
There was also the mysterious case of Alberto Jacinto Kanoore Edul, an Argentine of 
Syrian descent who was initially wanted for investigation for the attack, but essentially fell 
from the radar after his father was seen visiting the Casa Rosada (presidential palace) a few 
days after the bombing .24  A raid on his house was subsequently cut off and the 
investigation of him essentially diverted toward other suspects.  Since his visit to the 
                                                                                                                                                                    
recently, the Informe published by Claudio Grossman about Federal Oral Trial #3 (colloquially known as the 
AMIA trial, or local connection trial) in 2005 has some details about the international investigation, as does a 
2006, 800-page report written by prosecuting lawyer for the AMIA case, Alberto Nisman.   
 
21It is well known that Menem is of Syrian descent, and this often appears as subtext to his connections with 
Syria.   
 
22With both the AMIA and Israeli embassy bombings there is a popular and official sense that the perpetrators 
are known and that if the Argentine government, along with Israel and the United States wanted them to found 
and brought to trial it would have happened. This may be a piece of wild speculation, but it seems to me that if 
this is true all three governments have decided either tacitly or more overtly to “punish” those thought responsible 
(Iran and Hezbollah, perhaps Syria) by other means.  
 
23Escudé and Gurevich (2003).  
 
24The Argentine press often refers to Kanoore Edul as “la pista Syria”, meaning the Syrian clue or track.  It is not 
clear if this is merely a reference to his country of origin, or if it is thought that he had connections to the Syrian 
government that might implicate them it the bombing.  If it is the former, it appears to be an example of how 
certain groups continue to be defined by their country of origin, rather than as “Argentines.”  
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 presidential palace his whereabouts have remained unknown.  The apparent disappearance 
of Kanoore Edul from Argentina and from the investigation would come back to haunt 
Menem and other government officials.  
 For all intents and purposes, in the initial years of the investigation Syria appeared 
to be dropped in connection to either the Israeli embassy or AMIA bombings.  As Escudé 
and Gurevich iterate, “The generalized perception of senior Argentine Foreign Ministry 
sources was that Syria had been an important co-sponser of both the 1992 and 1994 
bombings, but that it was in no one’s interest to bring this out, excepting the victims’ 
families…” (2003: 5-6).  Except for recently in relation to Kanoore Edul, the “Syrian 
connection” has effectively faded from the investigation.  Whether this is because 
intelligence information has cleared Syria from any direct involvement, or due to other 
reasons, remains unclear.   
What was increasingly becoming apparent to certain actors, however, was that the 
Argentine government appeared to be deliberately directing the investigation in particular 
ways.  Important evidence was deemed “lost.”  Information about how the federal judge in 
charge of the investigation, Juan José Galeano, was handling the case cast deep suspicion 
on his impartiality.  Popular knowledge held that there was too much at stake, politically and 
economically, to allow the AMIA bombing to be fully investigated. As Alejandro Rúa, former 
director of the Ministry of Justice’s Special Investigative Unit for the AMIA bombing stated 
upon his leave of office in February 2006: “There was a false hypothesis driven by the 
intelligence (SIDE), the police and the ministry of justice, with the backing of a large part of 
the leadership of the Jewish community, that at that time was almost impossible to put in 
doubt…”25  
                                                     
25“Había una hipótesis falsa impulsada por Inteligencia, las policias, la Justicia—con el respaldo de gran parte de 
la dirigencia comunitaria judía—que en aquel entonces era casi imposible de poner en duda…” La Nación 
(2006) “Entrevista con Alejandro Rúa: ‘Cayó el impulso en la causa AMIA,’” 26 de Febrero, Enfoques, electronic 
edition, accessed on February 26, 2006.  
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 Over the years, suggestive, but not conclusive, details have emerged about the 
AMIA case.  In the late 1990s, national and international media reported that more than a 
week before the bombing, a Brazilian man calling himself Wilson Dos Santos tipped the 
Argentine consulate in Milan that another Jewish target in Buenos Aires was to be 
bombed.26  A curious figure with supposed connection to an Iranian “terrorist cell” that 
claimed to be responsible for the Israeli Embassy bombing, Dos Santos also provided 
information to the Buenos Aires’ police and Argentine officials in Rome after the bombing.  
The information was never forwarded to Jewish institutions in Argentina and only passed on 
to higher national authorities after the attack.27  Strangely, Dos Santos denied his knowledge 
of the bombing during later investigations in Argentina and was charged with perjury and 
jailed, but was conditionally released after a week.28 
In 2001, it became public that an Iranian intelligence official known as witness “C” 
had confirmed that Hezbollah and Iran were involved in the Argentine bombings.29  In his 
testimony he implicated the cultural attaché to the Iranian Embassy at the time, Moshen 
Rabbani, as well as another senior Iranian intelligence official.  Witness “C” also stated that 
former president Menem had accepted a large sum of money from Iran, with the suspicion 
that this was hush money.  However, a couple of years later, witness “C” recanted and said 
that Iran had never given money to Menem’s government.30  The alleged payment to 
Menem has not been confirmed, and this suspicion is not part of the charges currently held 
                                                     
26Rotella, Sebastian (1999) “Deadly Blasts and an Itinerant's Tale. ” Los Angeles Times, April 17, electronic 
edition, accessed on August 4, 2004.   
 
27Gurevich, Beatrice (2005: 3). 
 
28Rotella (1999); see also Escudé and Gurevich (2003).  
 
29Apparently, Witness “C” and his claims were known by investigators but not the public.  See Clarín (2001) 
“Quieren que vuelva a declarar un iraní que habló del menemismo,” 17 de Junio, Buenos Aires; Clarín (2002)“El 
Testigo ‘C”: Un Viejo conocido para los investigadores del caso,” 23 de Julio, Buenos Aires; Rohter, Larry (2002) 
“Iran blew up Jewish Center in Argentina, defector says” New York Times, June 22, electronic edition, accessed 
on October 15, 2008. 
 
30Gerardo Young (2003)"El testigo C ahora dice que Irán nunca le pagó al menemismo", Clarín, 12 de Enero. 
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 against him.  It does, however, add to the intrigues of the investigation and the distrust many 
have of Menem’s political dealings.  
In September of 2002 the suicide bomber who is believed to have carried out the 
AMIA attack was identified by Argentine intelligence and the FBI as Ibrahim Hussein Berro, 
a member of Hezbollah.  Family members of Berro deny his involvement in the attack, as 
does Hezbollah.31 
As I have demonstrated above, the investigation of the international connection to 
the AMIA bombing has not been a straight-forward process of finding and bringing to trial 
suspected perpetrators.  Witnesses come forward and then later recant their testimony.  Iran 
refuses to cooperate with the investigation.  APEMIA’s claims that the investigation is being 
directed toward particular international targets with U.S. and Israeli backing, casts further 
suspicion on an already severely compromised investigation.  While a case of this 
complexity can never be entirely straight forward or easy, the AMIA case is marked by 
serious questions about the investigators themselves.  For every step forward, something 
happens or is revealed that effectively takes the case two steps back.  Carlos S., who lost 
his daughter in the bombing of the Israeli embassy, has described the two bombings as part 
of a wide-ranging and complicated (una envergadura muy grande) network or politics and 
politicians that “imply a large sphere of suspicious negotiations that have, let’s say, 
international protection, other countries mixed up with Argentine politics and politicians…”32  
The troubled international aspect of the bombing is further complicated by the failure 
of the only AMIA trial to date, Federal Oral Trial #3 or the popularly called “local connection” 
trial.  This is trial in which Baruj Z. talked about the lack of justice in Argentina.  In the 
                                                     
31La Nación (2002) “Identifican al conductor del coche bomba” 28 de Septiembre, Información General, Buenos 
Aires. 
 
32“…implica un gran globo de negociaciones raras que tiene digamos una proyección internacional, mezcla 
países con la politica argentina, con los políticos argentinos…” Interview with Carlos S. on October 22, 2004.  
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 collapse of this historic trial, evidence of a deliberate obstruction of justice becomes even 
more lucid. 
Anatomy of a Fracaso, Part II: Federal Oral Trial #3 
It is September 2nd of 2004, and I am visiting the Northwest of Argentina with other 
North American researchers living in and around Buenos Aires.  Through the generosity of 
our granting institution we are spending a week in the Northwest of Argentina—an area of 
the country significantly different in culture and landscape than the city of Buenos Aires and 
the Pampas.33  I’m in Salta, the medium-sized capital of Salta province.  This city feels more 
like a typical Spanish colonial city than Buenos Aires, whose French-style architecture and 
expansiveness overwhelms the vestiges of the colonial Spanish vernacular.  Sitting around 
a long table eating dinner at a simple but comfortable small downtown hotel, we are just 
getting into our salads when a local anthropologist serving as our guide and companion to 
the area rushes into the room and relates the outcome of the nearly 3-year AMIA trial of the 
“local connection”: all those on trial were to be acquitted, based on insufficient evidence and 
what were referred to as “irregularities” (irregularidades) that had invalidated much of the 
proceedings.  After three years, the defendants of the trial are deemed neither innocent nor 
guilty.  Moreover, the judges’ verdict includes an accusation of wrongdoing on the part of the 
investigators of the case.  Immediately I feel sick and anxious, and I want to leave the table, 
go lie down, write.  I also feel impatient to get back to Buenos Aires.  But I don’t move, and 
sit there in numbed silence, absent-mindedly chewing my lettuce.  The other Argentines 
present are equally awe-struck by the news, calling it a “disgrace” and evidence of 
impunidad.  I’ve been following the trial, mostly through the analysis and reactions to it from 
members of Memoria Activa and different familiares.  At this moment, I wish to be in Buenos 
                                                     
33The trip was organized and paid for by Fulbright (U.S. Dept. of Education), and included both Hays and IIE 
grantees.  
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 Aires, I wish to be in the courtroom awaiting the judge’s verdict and not thousands of miles 
away, my attention diverted for a while, my time spent in educational leisure.   
When I return to Buenos Aires a few days later, I find out that some familiares and 
members of Memoria Activa did not attend the reading of the verdict.  The outcome had 
been predicted, particularly by members of Memoria Activa, and it was thought to be too 
painful to watch in person.  In a phone conversation, Sofía expressed how the acquittal of 
the five accused was like “starting over again,” how difficult it was to feel as if she and the 
other familiares were, after ten years, at “point zero.”  (The acquittal of the accused in the 
AMIA case was not a clear verdict of innocence.  It was more an acknowledgement that the 
defendants could not be fairly judged.)  
Buenos Aires, September 6, 2004.  When I arrive at the Memoria Activa acto in the 
Plaza Lavalle the Monday after the verdict, the gathering crowd is more excited than usual.  
The weather is pleasant, easing into spring after the dreary and cold winter.  Everyone is 
standing around in small groups discussing the fallo (verdict).  The leadership of Memoria 
Activa, while unhappy that the trial is essentially a failure, is in agreement with the verdict.  
In significant ways, the verdict confirmed what Memoria Activa has been saying for many 
years; that Galeano, the lawyers appointed to help with the investigation, and various 
governmental officials all the way to the highest levels have been engaged in an elaborate 
cover-up.  Memoria Activa considers the whole trial “armado,”(basically falsely constructed) 
and therefore any “truth” that could be found in a conviction is fundamentally troubled.  Their 
position toward the verdict is contra to both APEMIA and Familiares y Amigos de la Víctimas 
and the AMIA and DAIA.34  While APEMIA and Familiares y Amigos are in agreement with 
the Supreme Court judges confirmation that the actions of Galeano and other government 
                                                     
34For a detailed breakdown of the different responses and how they agree and disagree, see Kollmann, Raul 
(2004)“Un fallo judicial que divide las aguas” in Pagína/12, 9 de Septiembre, El País, Buenos Aires. Also see 
Kollmann, Raul (2004) “Menos Memoria Activa, todos convocan a la marcha” in Pagína/12, 8 de Septiembre, El 
País, Buenos Aires.  
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 officials demand investigation, all but Memoria Activa believe that there was enough 
evidence to at least convict Telleldín.  The leadership of the AMIA and DAIA at the time not 
only wanted a conviction, but remained supportive of Galeano.  For the majority of the trial, 
Familiares y Amigos did not overtly critique Galeano, but towards the end, they too began to 
negatively view the Judge.   
Immediately after the verdict was announced, APEMIA held a rally at the busy 
intersection of Pasteur and Corrientes in which they announced that the verdict of the trial 
was a further example of impunidad.  Although here impunidad is primarily referring to the 
release of the defendants without charges.  At this moment, individuals normally at odds 
became joined by the rejection of the outcome of the AMIA trial, and some familiares from 
Familiares y Amigos attended APEMIA’s rally, and APEMIA attended the convocation called 
by Familiares y Amigos along with the AMIA and DAIA a few days later.  As in 1994 after the 
AMIA was bombed, they decided to have a march in Plaza de dos Congresos under the 
banner “85 muertos no son nada para la justicia argentina” (85 deaths are nothing to 
Argentine justice).  The AMIA and DAIA wanted it held on Pasteur street in front of the AMIA 
building, but the spokesperson for the Family and Friends group, Luis Czyzewski, argued 
that it had to be in front of the buildings of congress, “to treat the convocation as something 
not just for the Jewish community, but for the whole society, like it was in ’94.”35  But in the 
plaza in front of the judicial palace, Diana Melamud of Memoria Activa announces that they 
won’t attend.  They refuse to attend an event that is held with the support of the DAIA: 
Those who claim to be the political representation of the Jewish community, led by 
the ex-lawyer of Banco Mayo, Jorge Kirzenbaum, have the gall to call for a march 
that has nothing to do with the search for truth and justice, but instead will be used to 
cover up and escape unscathed from the responsibilities that they have… 
                                                     
35“…se trata de una convocatoria no sólo a la comunidad judía sino a toda la sociedad como fue aquella del ’94.” 
Kollmann, Raul (2004) “Menos Memoria Activa, todos convocan a la marcha.” 
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 To be against the acquittals is to support all the illegal actions of Galeano. In fact, 
two weeks ago the DAIA through their lawyer Nercellas…declared in favor of 
Galeano before the Consejo de la Magistratura.36  
The decision taken by the leadership of Memoria Activa to avoid the central march in 
the Plaza de dos Congresos was not only a source of controversy within the Jewish 
Argentine community, but within Memoria Activa itself.  After the Monday morning acto, I’m 
having a lagríma with some members of Memoria Activa in a popular pizza restaurant on 
Corrientes.  There is indignation that the decision to boycott the community-wide 
convocation was made without input from all the members of Memoria Activa.  This is a 
common feeling among the members of Memoria Activa who regularly meet at this 
restaurant.  While many members of Memoria Activa envision the group as a horizontally-
run grassroots social movement, in practice significant decisions are made by a small group 
of individuals.  Others aren’t angry with how the decision was made by Memoria Activa, but 
aren’t in agreement with the decision and plan to attend anyway.  
It was not just family members of the victims and their supporters for whom the 
verdict was painful.  A press release from CELS shortly after the verdict argues this case by 
stating that, “The verdict of the trial reveals the machinations of impunity” and “At ten years 
the challenge continues to be for truth and justice and the need for deep restructuring of 
democratic institutions.”37  I return to the various reactions toward the verdict below.  Now I 
turn to some details about Federal Oral Trial #3 (or TOF for short), and illustrate how it fits 
into the AMIA case as a whole. 
                                                     
36“Los que se atribuyen la representación política de la comunidad judía, encabezada por el ex abogado del 
Banco Mayo, Jorge Kirzerbaum, tienen la vergonzosa actitud de convocar a una marcha, que nada tiene que ver 
con la búsqueda de la verdad y la justicia, sino que será utilizada para tapar y buscar salir indemnes de las 
responsabilidades  que les caben…. Estar en contra de la nulidad de toda la  causa brigadas es avalar todo el 
accionar ilegal de Galeano. De hecho hace dos semanas la DAIA a través de su abogada Nercellas concurrió a 
declarar a favor de Galeano ante el Consejo de la Magistratura.”  
37“El fallo del tribunal reveló la trama de impunidad” and “A diez años, el desafío sigue siendo la verdad y la 
justicia y las reformas profundas de las instituciones democráticas.” Comunicado, Centro de Estudios Legales y 
Sociales/CELS, Atentado de la AMIA, 7 de Septiembre de 2004. 
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 In length, topic, and unfortunately, in its failure, this trial is one of the most historic 
trials in Argentine history.  As I mentioned previously, the AMIA case has split into two 
distinct investigations, the international and the local.  Federal Oral Trial #3 concerns the 
“local connection” and focuses on the alleged roles Argentine citizens had in the bombing, 
primarily as accessories to the crime.  The trial began in 2001 and came to its end, but not 
conclusion, in 2004.  It remains the only trial concerning either the Israeli Embassy bombing 
or the AMIA bombing. 
It is significant to note that the prosecution was undertaken by two separate 
prosecuting parties.  One group consisted of the AMIA, DAIA and the group Los Familiares 
y Amigos de las Víctmas (Family and Friends of the Victims, who represented the majority of 
the victims), and the other was Memoria Activa.38  This is one of the clearest examples of 
the independence of Memoria Activa from the leadership of the Jewish community and other 
familiares.  Because they had a different vision of how the case should proceed, and 
political differences with the representatives of the AMIA and DAIA, Memoria Activa chose to 
have their own lawyer and give independent testimony.  A key point of difference between 
Memoria Activa and the other plaintiffs has been their severe critique of judge Galeano.  
Members of Memoria Activa were also suspicious of the lawyers representing the AMIA, 
DAIA and the Los Familiares y Amigos, considering them a part of the same forces that 
would seek to derail the AMIA investigation.  
The whole trial was primarily centered upon this one piece of evidence: the charred 
engine of a Renault Traffic (a van).  Twenty-two Argentine citizens were accused of being 
involved in the preparation and transfer of the van to those who would carry out the attack, 
but due to insufficient evidence and the statute of limitations, only five of them came to trial.  
These five included one previously prosecuted reconditioner of stolen cars (which he would 
                                                     
38According to one of the members of Memoria Activa, originally it was hoped to have four prosecuting parties: 
AMIA, DAIA, Familiares y Amigos, and Memoria Activa.  But it turned out they were limited by law to two, so the 
first three organizations united, and Memoria Activa remained independent.  
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 then resell) named Carlos Telleldín, and Juan José Ribelli, a high-ranking police officer of 
Buenos Aires province.39  Telleldín had been detained as a suspect ten days after the 
attack.  He was identified as the last known person to have had the Renault Traffic that 
supposedly contained the deadly explosives.  In the story of how these five individuals—four 
former police officers and Telleldín—came to be under trial as accomplices to the AMIA 
bombing, we begin to see how the investigation and trial was marked by “irregularities”— 
ultimately leading to the acquittal of all five men charged.  
In his initial statements Telleldín reported that he sold the van to a man named 
Ramón Martínez.  However, two years later, in 1996, Telleldín changed his story.  In this 
new version of events, Telleldín implicated the police of the province of Buenos Aires, 
known as los bonaerense.  Telleldín was engaged in illegal car trafficking, and claimed to be 
subject to extortion by the provincial police.  In exchange for payment of cars or money, 
Telleldín could continue his “business,” and the police would look the other way.  Telleldín 
asserted that the Renault van was one such payment, and implicated the police officers that 
were subsequently were accused, and a few were brought to trial.  This statement, while not 
exonerating Telleldín, cast deep suspicion on members of the provincial police: How were 
the police implicated in the delivery of the van to those planning a terrorist attack?  Did they 
know about the plan to bomb the AMIA?  
It is important to note that in Buenos Aires and Buenos Aires province, police 
involvement in something like the AMIA bombing can be made plausible without much 
difficulty.  Some members of Memoria Activa as well as other porteños I spoke with 
emphasized that there are certain elements of the security forces (including the local and 
provincial police of Buenos Aires) that are corrupt and dangerous.  This distrust of the police 
is not just a rumor or suspicion, but is based in part on a long history in which the police and 
                                                     
39 The three other accused were former police officers.  The provincial police force is known as Policía 
Bonaerense, and they do not serve in the city of Buenos Aires (which is served by the Federal police), but the 
province of Buenos Aires.  
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 military have acted independently to pursue their own ends (or the ends they have deemed 
“good” for society), and have often gone unpunished for their actions.  The security forces, 
both police and military, have long operated with great autonomy from other state actors, 
and the military with the cooperation of certain sectors of the police, has at various times in 
Argentine history opposed and taken over the government, effectively becoming part of the 
central leadership of the state—the junta in 1976 being the most recent example of this.  
The police have been suspected of involvement not only in the AMIA bombing, but also in 
kidnappings and assassinations.40  In 2004, the disappearance and death of Axel Blumberg, 
a 23 year-old student, captured the headlines for many weeks.  Blumberg’s death was part 
of a wave of extortion-based kidnappings in which the provincial police force had been 
strongly implicated.  More recently, with the 2006 re-opening of human rights trials dealing 
with the 1976-1983 dictatorship, threats were made against court officials, and a man who 
was tortured during the dictatorship who provided testimony that helped to convict a police 
commissioner, disappeared. 41  However, while some porteños view the actions of some 
sectors of the police as a source of terror sanctioned by impunity, others view them as 
protectors of certain political or ideological views.  
Thus, seeing members of the provincial police on trial for the AMIA bombing was not 
a great surprise.  Indeed, there were many rumors circulating about how the provincial and 
city police at least knew that the AMIA was going to be bombed.  One of the most common 
instances of this concerns the apparently conspicuous absence of police officers in the area 
of the AMIA building on the morning of July 18, 1994.  (In Buenos Aires it is common police 
practice for there to be a stationed police officer at street corners scattered throughout the 
                                                     
40Based on information that Telledín was paid to implicate the police, there are many members of Memoria Activa 
who now think the police had little if any connection to the bombing.  This is another reason why they didn’t have 
as many issues with the verdict of the trial as the other familiares groups. 
 
41See Goñi, Uki (2006)“Terror Tactics Return to Argentina”, in The Guardian, October 5, electronic edition, 
accessed on October 5, 2006 and Clarín (2006) “A viente días de la desaparición, ninguna pista conduce a 
Lopéz,” 8 de Octubre, electronic edition, accessed on October 8, 2006. 
 208
 city.)  However, evidence began to surface that placed doubt on Telleldín’s testimony and 
the impartiality of the Judge Galeano.  Most damning was a videotape presented in 1997 by 
one of the accused, Juan José Ribelli, in which Galeano appears having an informal 
discussion with Telleldín about the case.  In this video, parts of which were aired on national 
television, Telleldín was offered a significant amount of money (later confirmed to be 
400,000 dollars) in a manner that strongly suggested that he was being asked to direct the 
investigation in a specific way.  It later emerged that the money was obtained, at the request 
of Galeano, through negotiations with the ex-head of the Argentine secret service agency 
(SIDE), Hugo Anzorreguy, and ex-secretary of the interior, Carlos Corach.  This transaction 
between Galeano and Telleldín, with the apparent participation of other government officials, 
effectively called into question the investigation of the police, and undermined the 
foundations of the whole case.  As is telling from the appearance of the videotape, and his 
admission in 2001 that he had destroyed videotapes that contained evidence potentially 
useful to the investigation, Galeano’s conduct in the investigation was “irregular” from the 
beginning.42  After this revelation, the lawyers of Memoria Activa pressed charges against 
Galeano and the judge went under investigation, but still remained on the case as it went to 
trial.43  The trial continued despite the growing clamor of its illegitimacy (from Memoria 
Activa and others), allegations which Galeano and his supporters denied. 
In late 2003, the case was finally taken from Galeano’s hands and reviewed by three 
Supreme Court judges who would decide on a verdict.44  It was these judges who 
                                                     
42See Kollman, Raúl (2001) “Galeano admitió que destruyó los videos que había mandado filmar” in Página/12, 
20 de Septiembre, electronic edition, accessed on January 25, 2004.  See also Claudio A. Lifschitz (2002) AMIA, 
porque se hizo fallar la investigación. Buenos Aires: Departamento Editorial, 2000, pp. 10-11.  
 
43Under Argentine judicial procedure, the judge is essentially in charge of the investigation with the lawyers 
presenting their evidence to him or her.  It is the judge who also determines the verdict.  Thus Galeano was well 
positioned to manipulate the case.  
 
44 The 3 judges are Guillermo Andrés Gordo, Gerardo Felipe Larrambebere, and Miguel Ángel Pons.  Argentine 
Judicial procedure has a two-tier system of judges.  Judges in the first tier, such as Judge Galeano, investigate 
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 determined the final ruling of acquittal.  What is baffling to myself, and many others following 
the case, is given the evidence mounting against him, how was Galeano able to remain the 
principal investigator of the AMIA bombing as long as he did?  When I’ve inquired about this, 
the usual answer consisted of a rueful shrug and the mention of la impunidad.  
    On September 3, 2004, federal Judges Gordo, Larrambebere and Pons issued their 
infamous verdict on Federal Oral Trial #3.  While the five under trial were not technically 
found innocent of the crimes charged to them, they were absolved.  And as I’ve already 
shown, responses to the acquittal of Telleldín, Ribelli, and the three other provincial police 
officers were varied.  Included in the verdict was a request for a criminal investigation of the 
former judge in charge of the case, Juan José Galeano, the lawyers working with him, and 
other officials, including the ex-president of the SIDE and the former secretary of the interior.  
Ex-president of the DAIA, Rubén Beraja was also named.  In response to reasoning 
expressed by the judges for the acquittal and the request of an investigation of Galeano, et. 
al, the president of the DAIA remarked without approbation, “The trial that should have been 
against the accused ended up being against the judge, the lawyers, as far as the leaders of 
the Jewish community.”45 
The Downfall of Federal Judge Juan José Galeano 
A communiqué presented by Memoria Activa at one of their Monday morning actos 
sums up, in their opinion, one of the most important achievements of the verdict.  Following 
the summary provided by the verdict of the judges, the communiqué states: “It [the verdict] 
established the roots of numerous proven irregularities, that the Sr. Judge Instructor 
[Galeano] guided his behavior toward constructing an incriminating hypothesis, pretending 
                                                                                                                                                                    
cases along with the help of district attorneys.  When they have amassed enough evidence, the case is sent to 
trial to be reviewed and tried by three second-tier judges.  
 
45“El juicio que debía ser contra los imputados terminó siendo contra el juez, los fiscales y hasta los dirigentes de 
la comunidad judia.” see Kollmann, Raul  (2004)“Un fallo judicial que divide las aguas.”  
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 to look after …the logical demands of society, at the same time satisfying obscure interests 
of unscrupulous leaders (Memoria Activa a la Opinión Publica).”46 
Once in charge of one of the most historic and complicated investigations and trials 
in the nation’s history, Galeano’s once promising career ended in infamy and disgrace.  As 
the results of the verdict (the full reasoning of which was published in October of 2004) 
clearly called into question the impartiality of judge Galeano, procedures were finally being 
taken by the state that could lead to the destitution of Galeano, and perhaps later, his 
prosecution in a criminal court.  In the Argentine summer of 2004, the Accusation Committee 
of the Consejo de Magistratura (Magisterial Council, an entity that oversees the selection of 
judges and supervises their performance) began a round of hearings in which Galeano’s 
fate as a judge would be decided.  In essence, this committee would have the power to 
recommend—or not—to the general Consejo that Galeano be subject to a political trial.  
Despite the real steps being taken to evaluate Galeano’s conduct, there were many doubts 
that Galeano would actually suffer any serious repercussions from the AMIA affair.  And 
indeed, it was a tense few months for all interested parties.  It wasn’t clear that all members 
of the Accusatory Committee would vote in favor of a political trial—there was at least one 
member on the committee who clearly supported him.  Moreover, the hearings seemed to 
unfold erratically, in fits and starts: one week there wouldn’t be a quorum, the next week 
Galeano would be scheduled to present his defense but would never show up, asking for 
more time to read the fundamentals of the AMIA verdict, finally a member of the committee 
requested that the vote be put off until after the summer recess, putting in jeopardy the 
whole process, as there was a specific date by which a decision had to be made.  Laura and 
another member of APEMIA expressed their doubt that anything would happen to Galeano.  
                                                     
46“Se pudo establecer, a raíz de las numerosas irregularidades comprobadas, que el Sr. Juez Instructor orientó 
su actuación a “construir” una hipótesis incriminatoria, pretendiendo atender… las lógicas demandas de la 
sociedad, a la vez que satisfacer oscuros intereses de gobernantes inescrupulosos.” Memoria Activa, Lunes 6 
de Septiembre de 2004.  
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 According to them, if Telleldín wasn’t found guilty, Galeano wouldn’t be either.47  (Laura and 
this other individual asserted that rather than risk a political trial Galeano would give up his 
post voluntarily and the government would accept this; the implication being that the 
government wouldn’t gain anything by a further inquiry into Galeano’s wrongdoings.  
Galeano did try to give up his post, but ultimately was blocked by President Kirchner.)  
Members of Memoria Activa had high hopes that Galeano would be disrobed, but had little 
faith in the Argentine judicial system.  The DAIA continued in their actions and statements to 
stand by Galeano.  We would all have to wait and see how it would unfold.  
Buenos Aires, December 7, 2004. Tribunales Palace, meeting of the Accusation 
Committee of the Consejo de Magistratura.  It is a hot summer morning as I make my way 
from my apartment in Palermo to the Tribunales building.  I wasn’t sure what to expect.  
Having spent many months standing in front of the building with Memoria Activa, I had never 
actually been inside of it.  It is an imposing structure, made of large blocks and fronted by an 
impressive series of stairs.  Barricades are positioned around the front, bottlenecking access 
to the building—too many protests, I suppose (these barricades are common in front of 
government buildings in Buenos Aires).  Challenging the authority of the architecture and 
the proceedings within it, however, are small acts of defiance; words like impunidad and the 
word justicia with a slash through it act like cracks in the facade.  I walk up the steps and a 
feeling of menace comes over me; I have, after so many months of talking with people who 
feel betrayed by Argentine justice, come to embody a feeling of suspicion. 
   Inside, the building is chaotic and disorienting.  It is bizarrely maze-like.  I get to the 
room where the meeting is to be held and am immediately hit with the smell of cigarette 
smoke; numerous people in the room have lit cigarettes, even though I notice a no-smoking 
sign on the wall.  The room is fairly dark, hazy with drifting smoke.  Around a huge, dark 
wood table sit members of the committee.  Hanging on a wall is a large crucifix.  Over by the 
                                                     
47“¿Pero alguien cree que Galeano va a ir preso?, no fue preso Telleldín va a ir preso Galeano?”  
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 wall, near the door is a long bench, and I walk over to where the members of Memoria 
Activa are sitting, along with a few familiares from the Los Familiares y Amigos group.  
Absent are representatives from the leadership of the Jewish Argentine community and 
APEMIA. 
The proceedings seem to me an unexpected mix of formality and informality.  
Galeano, after postponing three times, finally presented his defense in November.  All that is 
needed now is a vote.  As the members of the committee discuss the matter, people are 
walking in and out the room, smoking cigarettes at the table and talking on their cell phones.  
It soon becomes clear that not everyone on the committee has shown up today, which 
effectively works to delay the process—no vote today.  I can barely hear what is being said, 
but it seems that a long time is spent arguing when the next meeting will be, and 
accusations of deliberately causing delays shoot across the table.  As the proceedings 
continue, a man dressed in black pants and a white shirt rushes around bringing water and 
coffee to the members.  Some committee members admit they have not read, or have only 
skimmed, the report prepared for the session.  This is not looked favorably upon, and 
tensions are high around the large table.  As we watch this admittedly painful process 
unfold, a member from Memoria Activa whispers in my ear, “Do you see why justice is so 
slow here?”  Another individual, rage barely suppressed, turns to me and says, “Do you see 
the culture of impunity that is here? This is it.”  His comment refers to the apparent 
unpreparedness of members of the Consejo, and what he sees as obvious moves to delay 
the vote. 
This committee met for a series of meetings from November 2004 to February 2005.  
Members of Memoria Activa, other familiares, journalists and researchers like myself came 
and sat along the hard benches, straining our ears to hear what the committee members 
were discussing.  Often what was said elicited groans and dismissive gestures from the 
people sitting around me. Finally on February 2, 2005, the Accusatory Commission came to 
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 a vote.  Despite all the delays, and the presence on the committee of individuals 
sympathetic to Galeano, the commission voted to recommend that Galeano be subjected to 
a political trial for his conduct in the investigation of the attack on the AMIA.48  The general 
Consejo, having approved this recommendation a week later, began to prepare for the 
political trial of Juan José Galeano.  In the meantime, Galeano was still a practicing judge.  
The political trial began in June 2005 and ended on August 3 of that same year.  The 
tribunal was presided over by Supreme Court Judge Augusto Belluscio, and consisted of 
nine jury members.49 
Buenos Aires, August 3, 2005.  From where I am sitting, I can see the courtroom 
clearly.  Galeano appears to be absent, on this, his day of judgment.50  The room is filled 
nearly to capacity, and I am sandwiched between my friend, another North American 
anthropologist, and a friend from Memoria Activa.  Laura from APEMIA sits behind me, and 
scattered throughout the room are various familiares, members from the AMIA’s ministry of 
justice and past president of the AMIA Abraham Kaul, a well-known Rabbi involved in 
human rights, and various other individuals from the Jewish Argentine community who are 
following the case.  Present, also, are ex-police members who were previously accused in 
the AMIA trial, including Juan José Ribelli.  Conspicuously absent are any representatives of 
the DAIA, and of course, the accused himself.  It is a rather unlikely congregation of people, 
and the tension in the room is as much a result of the impending verdict, as rivals—and one 
could even say enemies—sitting shoulder to shoulder in a packed room.  It is an impressive 
                                                     
48See Fernández Moores, Lucio (2005) “Galeano quedó más cerca del juicio político por la causa AMIA” in 
Clarín, 2 de Febrero, electronic edition, accessed on February 3, 2005.  
 
49For more detail about the trial and the verdict, see Hauser, Irina (2005) “El juez actuó fuera de todo cauce 
legítimo” in Pagina/12, 4 de Agosto, El País, electronic edition, accessed on August 4, 2005. 
 
50At the July 14th session (the penultimate session before the verdict) I witnessed Galeano’s lawyer present his 
case in front of the jury.  Sitting next to him, Galeano engaged in the seemingly incongruous gesture of 
comforting his lawyer, who was gesticulating and speaking so forcefully on behalf of his client that his papers 
flew about and sweat ran down his face.  Galeano patted his back and said something to the effect of, “it’s 
alright.”  To this, a member of Memoria Activa remarked, “this is theater.” 
 214
 turnout, and the place is abuzz with representatives from various media outlets.  Unlike the 
hearings conducted by the Accusatory Committee, the room and the proceedings have a 
decidedly more formal and impressive feeling.  Security is tight, and I have waited in a long 
line to show a picture I.D. in exchange for entry.  The courtroom, with its dim lighting and 
walls paneled with dark wood, one wall is graced with an incredible piece of stained glass 
(two hands clasped with a sun over them), looks somewhat familiar.  Later I find out that the 
courtroom is the same one used in the historic trial of top military officials from the last 
dictatorship.  Sitting here, surrounded by so many people who have invested so much in the 
process, I can feel the momentousness of the occasion.  And indeed, after the jury finally 
delivers its verdict announcing that judge Galeano was to be destituido and cease to be a 
judge, the room seems to become quiet and loud all at once, and it is clear that for so many 
this act is representative of something much bigger than the AMIA case and a rogue judge.51  
For many, it spoke perhaps to a tiny crack in the structures of impunity and corruption that 
many of the porteños I know view as part of daily life.  For others, it was perhaps an 
example of justice ill-placed, or not just at all.  As one person remarks to me as we walk out 
of the courtroom into the flashing lights of the media, “this is a historic day for Argentina.”  
And I think this is true no matter how one views the situation.  
Galeano no longer serves as a federal judge of Argentina.  But for members of 
Memoria Activa, along with many familiares, this is but one achievement in a much larger 
struggle.  As Laura Ginsberg would respond, the punishment of Galeano must not serve as 
a sacrificial lamb onto which all other sins can be absolved.52  The actions of former judge 
Galeano are a part of a network of encubrimiento, that many believe leads right to the top of 
                                                     
51The decision to remove Galeano as a federal judge was based on three of the most serious accusations he 
faced.  These three are 1) the payment to Telleldín to implicate the provincial police; 2) having informal and 
secretive conversations with the accused, and surreptitious filming these conversations; 3) Galeano had 
approved the recording in secret of a conversation between the lawyers of the plaintiffs AMIA-DAIA and Los 
Familiares y Amigos and one of the accused. (The lawyers wore microphones under their robes.) 
52See, for example her speech given on the eleventh anniversary of the bombing, which can be accessed at 
http://www.apemia.blogspot.com  
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 the Argentine government.  Thus Diana Malamud of Memoria Activa feels that the verdict 
against Galeano is bittersweet:   
I was satisfied because after working so long to unmask what is shameful and 
offensive has been fruitful.  At the same time I felt indignation and hate.  Galeano 
made an illegal payment in order to create an official story that would end the 
investigation. He didn’t do it alone, but with the participation of government leaders 
and the Jewish community.53 
 
The struggle to re-write the official story continues.  
“We’re At Where We Began:” The Investigation Today 
The political intrigues surrounding the AMIA case have not only seriously damaged 
the investigation, but have overwhelmed the case itself.  As a historical event it is as much 
about the death of 85 individuals as a window onto the machinations of Argentine politics 
and the functioning of its institutions.  Perversely, the bomb that ripped open the AMIA also 
in many ways created a hole in which the Argentine public could effectively see how the 
government “works”—in multiple senses of the word.  For many, this view confirmed what 
had been suspected all long: the rot of corruption, the flagrancy of impunity.   
Over the years a few seemingly confirmed details about the bombing have emerged.  
To the contrary, these past 14 years have yielded more intrigue and confusion than 
information.  Accordingly, Memoria Activa presented the fourteenth anniversary of the AMIA 
bombing within the theme of a labyrinth, proclaiming that, “after 14 years we are almost 
experts in traveling through labyrinths, nevertheless we still can’t find the exit.”54  
                                                     
53“Tenía satisfacción porque tanto trabajo para desenmascarar lo bochornoso rinde sus frutos. Y a la vez sentía 
indignación y odio. Galeano hizo un pago ilegal para crear una historia oficial que cerrara la causa. Pero no lo 
hizo solo sino con los dirigentes de turno y de la propia comunidad judía.” Quoted in Hauser, Irina (2005)“El juez 
actuó fuera de todo cauce legitímo” in Pagína/12, 4 de Agosto, El País, electronic edition, accessed on August 4, 
2005. 
 
54“Después de 14 años somos casi expertos en recorrer laberintos y sin embargo todavía no encontramos la 
salida.” Memoria Activa, Discurso Pronunciado en Plaza Lavalle. 
http://www.memoriaactiva.com/aniversarios.htm 
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 To date, Iran and Hezbollah continue to be the main focus of the investigation of the 
AMIA bombing, and current President Cristina Fernández de Kirchner has ramped up her 
government’s pressure on Iran to cooperate with the investigation.55  In the last year of 
Néstor Kirchner’s presidential term in 2006, Argentine federal judge Rodolfo Canicoba 
Corral issued international arrest warrants for former Iranian President Ali Akbar Hashemi 
Rafsanjani and eight others.56  This was in response to an 800-page report put together by 
the head of a special AMIA investigative unit organized by President Kirchner, lawyer 
Alberto Nisman, along with his colleague Marcelo Martínez Burgos.  This report charges 
high-level Iranian officials and one leader from Hezbollah with the attacks, which basically 
repeats the allegations made in the early years of the investigation.  Nisman offered as a 
possible motive for the bombing a suspension in 1991 of assistance of nuclear technology, 
an agreement made under Alfonsín’s government (1983-1989).57  However, Iran continues 
to refuse to aid in the deliverance of former high-ranking Iranian officials that have been 
solicited by Judge Corral, claiming that Iranian citizens didn’t have any involvement in the 
bombing and there is insufficient evidence for extradition.58  Increased pressure on Iran is a 
recent phenomenon. 
Added to the investigations of the international and local connections to the bombing 
is a third, the investigation of “irregularities” related to the investigations.  The destitution of 
former judge Juan José Galeano is part of this third investigation.  The charge of 
“encubridor” (someone involved in a cover-up) has been leveled all the way to former 
president Menem who is currently under investigation, along with former Judge Galeano, 
                                                     
55“Cristina pidió a Irán que facilite la presentación ante la justicia de los acusados por el atentado a la AMIA” 
Página/12, Martes, 23 de Septiembre de 2008.  
 
56“Argentina Seeks Arrest for Iran’s Ex-Leader,” Reuters, NYTimes, November 10, 2006  
 
57Fernández Moores, Lucio (2006)“AMIA: el nuevo fiscal acusó a Iran como responsible del atentado” in Clarín, 
26 de Octobre, electronic edition, accessed on October 27,2006. 
 
58“Una respuesta política de la Justicia” Página/12, Viernes, 24 de Octubre de 2008   
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 Menem’s brother Munir (the ex-ambassador to Syria), ex-head of the secret service, Hugo 
Anzorreguy, and ex-police chief Jorge Palacios.  Ex-president of the DAIA, Rubén Beraja is 
also being investigated and will soon go to trial in relation to the illegal payment of 400,000 
dollars to Telleldín.59  Confirming the arguments of Memoria Activa and others, the state 
prosecutor Alberto Nisman presented in May of 2008 a formal denunciation against the 
aforementioned officials.  Based on Nisman’s presentation, the judge in charge of 
investigating the irregularities of the investigation, Judge Ariel Lijo, called all of the named to 
appear in court and testify.  Nisman presents evidence of a “a phenomenal conspiracy of 
concealment” and to this end, he cites the “destruction of evidence, a failure to fulfill the 
duties of a public official, omission or delay of duties of office, use of ideologically motivated 
lies as a political instrument, and failure to fulfill the obligation to promote the persecution 
and repression of offenders.”60  At the center of these accusations is the alleged protection 
of an Argentine man named Alberto Jacinto Kanoore Edul—the so-called Syria 
connection—mentioned above.  In other words, it is now thought the false accusation of the 
provincial police provided by Telleldín was an effort coordinated at many different levels to 
maneuver the investigation away from Kanoore Edul.  Although the links to Menem’s family 
are established, the precise reasons for this extreme act of subterfuge to protect one man 
remain unclear. 
The AMIA case, then, remains arrested in a tangle of international negotiations and 
national political maneuverings, and the painfully slow process of creating a common truth 
                                                     
59At the request of Judge Lijo, at present a number of individuals will be subjected to a criminal trial for the illegal 
payment.  The prosecuted include Beraja, former judge Juan José Galeano, Carlos Telleldín, lawyers who 
worked with Galeano, ex-president of the SIDE, Hugo Anzoregguy, among others.  In a move that infuriates 
many, on February of 2009 the AMIA and DAIA announced that they would not testify against Rubén Beraja or 
the ex-prosecutors in the case.  
 
60“…una fenomenal maniobra de incubrimiento” and  “…destrucción de pruebas, incumplimiento de los deberes 
de funcionario público, omission o retardo de los deberes del oficio, falsedad ideological de instrumento público 
e incumplimiento de la obligación de promover la persecución y repression de delincuentes.” See Fernández 
Moores, Lucio (2008) “Acusación del fiscal Nisman por la pista Siria” in Clarín, 30 de Mayo, electronic edition, 
accessed on May 30, 2008.  
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around which justice might be had.  The dead don’t hold their breath, but the living might be 
suffocating.    
VII. Memoria Activa, the Plaza, and the Reshaping of 
Citizen-Subjects 
We do here what nobody would have done for us.  We shout here what nobody 
would have shouted for us.  We denounce what nobody would have denounced for 
us.  We say, with first and last name, all that impunity and the powerful wanted to 
hide.—2004, Diana Malamud of Memoria Activa. 
 
…in a country without memory or justice… This plaza was witness to our struggle—
2004, Adriana Reisfeld of Memoria Activa 
 
Is it possible that the antonym of “forgetting” is not “remembering,” but justice?—
Yosef Hayim Yerushalmi, Zakhor, 1996  
 
Many Endings 
December 27, 2004, Buenos Aires.  Well, I’ve come to the end.  I think this as I get 
off the bus at Talcahuano and cross the street to get to the Plaza Lavalle.  I pass the 
confiterías, the newspaper vendors, lawyers heading to work.  It is a hot, humid summer 
day, and the sun at 9:30 AM is already gathering its strength.  The light linen shirt I’m 
wearing by now feels damp and heavy on my body.  I come to the spot, in front of a mature 
palm tree, where Memoria Activa officially gathers for the last time.  The final decision to 
leave the plaza—but not the fight—was made a week ago in a meeting at the Hebraica 
sports and social club.1  It is the last time Memoria Activa in full will regularly meet in front of 
the Judicial Palace on Monday mornings to make their demands, and appeal to the state 
and society to challenge impunidad, and take responsibility for each other.  It is also nearly 
                                                     
1The decision to leave the plaza was intensely argued over two meetings.  There was not consensus on the 
issue, and many felt that the decision to leave the plaza was made unilaterally by the leaders of Memoria Activa, 
and there was much anger and frustration.  See below. 
 
  the end of my 13-month stay in Buenos Aires.  And given these “endings,” I feel 
melancholic, and also exhilarated with heightened senses—I want to absorb everything, and 
I want to be able to meet the situation with the consideration and gravity it deserves. 
I enter the loosely formed circle, and begin to greet the friends and acquaintances I 
have made over the year.  Benjamin has draped the Memoria Activa banner that says 
“Todos Somos Memoria Activa” (We are all Memoria Activa) around the commemorative 
sculpture made by Mirta Kumpferminc, recognizing the victims of the bombing and the 
achievements of Memoria Activa.  He sees me and asks me to take a picture.  It seems we 
are all here with an incredible urge to document, to witness, and take account the ways in 
which this small area of concrete and trees has been transformed into a place of heightened 
purpose by the words and presence of Memoria Activa.  There are several active cameras 
and other recording devices here today.  
The crowd is more numerous than it has been most of the past year, but despite the 
energy a large turnout provides, it is a solemn and subdued gathering.  Enrique, who always 
begins the Memoria Activa actos, begins to speak, and a halo of microphones and recorders 
form a technological collar around his face.  He begins as he has for many years, with a 
counting of days: “At 4665 days since the attack on the Israeli embassy; at 3779 days since 
the AMIA massacre; At 544 weeks from July 18, 1994, Memoria Activa returns to say, 
PRESENTE!”  He continues his speech in the form of a testimony, beginning each 
statement of acknowledgement, appreciation and remembrance with the words, “Quiero 
testimoniar” (which one can translate as “I want to bear witness to”).  Many in the crowd, 
mostly those who have attended every Monday for years and years, are standing arm and 
arm, tears marking a trace on their faces.  Enrique continues with his testimony, questioning 
a society—his society—that doesn’t seem to value “justice” as a system that meets out 
punishment and reward in a transparent and accountable manner: 
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 I want to testify to society that these massacres [of the AMIA and Israeli embassy] 
are lamentably, a continuation of other massacres and disappearances that are the 
expression of a people that still don’t prioritize justice as elemental to a just society. 
 
I want to again testify that these and so many massacres that bring us together are 
not merely a Jewish issue, they happened in our country, in our Buenos Aires, and 
here they try to sell to us again, like so many other times, the garbage of an official 
lie, that still continues.1  
 
Many people go to the microphone to read something about Memoria Activa and the 
struggle against impunity.  As with other Memoria Activa actos, the speeches tend to 
negotiate between remembering the specific dead of the two bombings and connecting 
these acts of violence to other tragic acts in Argentina.  People struggle to sum up with brief 
words, 10 years of struggle in the plaza, 10 years of trying to reconstitute shreds of truth that 
have become submerged under “official stories.”  Adriana Reisfeld, one of the familiares of 
Memoria Activa, emphasizes that leaving the plaza does not signal an end to the fight: “The 
plaza was witness to the history [of the struggle], we are not abandoning our struggle, but on 
the contrary we are going to intensify it, make our presence felt by every official… judge or 
legislator that has something to do with the AMIA case.”2  After the last speech is read, 
people embrace and begin to break up.  It is hard to leave the plaza today, knowing that to 
step away concretely marks the departure, the shift in the struggle, away from weekly public 
reclamations to more private, and ultimately more exclusive venues.  “The end of an era” 
someone mentions.  Leaving the plaza is seen as a loss in so many ways, ranging from the 
power that comes from placing one’s body on the line in a public protest, to the loss of a 
                                                     
1Quiero testimoniar a la sociedad que estas Masacres, lamentable continuidad de otras Masacres y 
desapariciones son expresión de un pueblo que aun no a priorizado a la Justicia como eslabón primordial de 
una sociedad justa. Quiero volver a testimoniar que estas y tantas Masacres que nos convocan no son un tema 
de los judíos, ocurrió en nuestro país, en nuestra Buenos Aires, y aquí intentaron vendernos nuevamente, como 
tantas otras veces, la basura de la mentira oficial, que aun no termina.  Discurso de Lunes de Diciembre de 
2004, www.memoriaactiva.com, accessed on January 30, 2005. 
 
2 La plaza fue testigo de la historia, no abandonamos nuestra lucha, muy por lo contrario la intensificamos, 
marcaremos de cerca a cada funcionario…juez o legislador que tenga que ver con la causa AMIA.  Discurso de 
Lunes de Diciembre de 2004, www.memoriaactiva.com, accessed on January 30, 2005. 
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 special space for social interaction and involvement that many members of Memoria Activa 
cherish. 
After saying goodbye to those I won’t likely see before I journey back to the United 
States, I slowly leave and head to coffee with José, Abraham, and Julio.  Over cortados that 
emit curls of steam, Julio regrets the loss of the public reclamation.  He sees both aspects—
the public protests and the work done in the OAS and the legal pursuit of the encubridores –
as essential to the fight for justice.  This opinion is expressed among another group I have 
coffee with, those who congregate at the pizza restaurant Banchero, and there is mention of 
the importance of having a “Jewish presence in the street” while another agrees with this 
comment but adjoins, “but Memoria Activa is not a Jewish group.”  The ambivalence that 
marks the characterization of Memoria Activa is a result of the difficult and controversial 
stance that the group tries to maintain—appealing to the universal in arguing for rights of 
citizenship while holding on to a certain specificity—and also the different ways that 
members identify as Jews and Argentines.   
In general, those who express an attachment to the public fight in the plaza are 
generally dismissed as “sentimental,” or not keeping their focus on the overall cause.  This 
became clear during two meetings held over the previous weeks.  These meetings were 
called to discuss the future of Memoria Activa, and a large number of the long-standing 
participants of the group were invited.  Ostensibly the meetings were about whether or not to 
leave the plaza, and the political course of Memoria Activa.  These meetings were tense and 
emotional, and while anger and exasperation were clearly palpable, edgy moments were 
more often than not diffused—at least for the moment—by humor.   
In practice, the work and cause of Memoria Activa was manifold for the participants.  
It was a place of Jewish solidarity and also a gathering of concerned citizens.  Memoria 
Activa members often dubbed themselves “citizens of the plaza,” and indeed, going to the 
plaza was understood to be a fundamental act and expression of citizenship.  But it was also 
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 a social opportunity and a place to enact a struggle against impunity; it was a means of 
bearing witness and a demand to be seen by the state and society; it was an important 
venue through which to connect with other sectors of society.  Perhaps all of these things 
are aspects of what members of Memoria Activa took citizenship to mean in late 20th 
century, early 21st century Buenos Aires.  Significantly, the work of Memoria Activa to 
engage the nation as citizens and Jews opened up a general social and political sphere in 
which difference was not entirely subordinated to the status quo, and the act of being a 
citizen was not merely ascribed from above. 
However, for the familiares of Memoria Activa who were most involved in the legal 
battles and the work with the OAS, the mission in the plaza had largely run its course.  
During one of the meetings, one familiar described the plaza as an “instrument.”  The 
question was, did their presence in the plaza every Monday make practical political sense 
anymore?  The familiares and those who comprised the mesa directiva (leadership) felt 
drained by the legal paths Memoria Activa had taken, and felt that the work in the plaza had 
reached its zenith, and its political power was in decline.  It was getting more difficult to pull 
in speakers, and the weekly attendance seemed to be shrinking.  Nevertheless, for a large 
percentage of Memoria Activa’s loyal participants, the plaza was the primary means of 
participation in the struggle for justice, and to leave the plaza meant giving up the struggle. 
Those who hadn’t lost anyone in the bombing did not participate in the trial (although they 
could attend portions of it), nor were most of them a part of the small circle that made most 
of the decisions.  Many of these individuals, while appearing in the plaza week after week, 
did not attend the hearings or trial relating to former judge Juan José Galeano.  For these 
individuals, the act of standing in the plaza had exceeded any measure of political utility; the 
plaza was transformed into a symbolically powerful site of resistance and solidarity, and 
going to the plaza a kind of responsibility, as citizens, and as Jews.  Importantly, it was a 
place where they felt they could act, politically and collectively, perhaps more comfortably 
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 than as individuals through more formal political channels.  For them, the work in the plaza 
is Memoria Activa.   
One individual stated that the “ soul of Memoria Activa is the plaza” and referenced 
the Madres de Plaza de Mayo: “Look at the Madres de Plaza de Mayo, every Thursday they 
are out there, they go even if they are only 8 or 10 people.  Memoria Activa is going through 
a crisis because we are unsure about how to continue.  But we need to keep the soul of 
Memoria Activa.” 
Despite staunch resistance the leadership of Memoria Activa held firm—even if 
privately they may have held similar feelings toward the plaza—they wanted to put their 
energies into something that might yield greater results.  They were weary and didn’t feel 
the need to rouse up the motivation to organize the Monday morning actos, especially when 
there seemed to be so little interest.  Those arguing to leave the plaza opposed the idea of 
the plaza being the “soul” of the struggle.  Summing up the purpose, difficulties, and 
successes of Memoria Activa, one individual forcefully retorted: 
I am in agreement that the soul of Memoria Activa isn’t the plaza. For me, what does 
the plaza represent? We had a piece of shit government (un gobierno de mierda) 
and we took the plaza at that moment. The Jewish institutions…their justice doesn’t 
represent us. The plaza was a space of liberty and what we have done there is very 
impressive. But when I call people to come speak in the plaza they say, “What can I 
say? I already said everything.” 10 years. 10 years. Now there are huge difficulties in 
getting people to speak in the plaza after 10 years…The plaza has resignified things. 
We had an enemy in the government, Menem, and we had Beraja. And now the 
picture has changed. What is happening with the Organization of American States is 
the primary juridical tool we have right now. Regarding the plaza, we don’t have the 
attendance we had. This isn’t our fault, but we need to find new methods. The plaza 
was the soul of Memoria Activa. Las Abuelas [de Plaza de Mayo] aren’t in any plaza 
but they have made a huge impact on the society. This is a good example for us.  
 
The final answer to all this debate was to leave the plaza.  As the above member 
emphasized, the plaza had done its work, and “the picture has changed.”  Another powerful 
actor in Memoria Activa adjoined:  “…we aren’t going to continue in the plaza.  We need to 
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 prioritize other things, even if it causes personal pain, we know this is the right step…we 
have some differences, but we will continue…we thank you.” 
The ultimate decision to leave the plaza clearly angered many.  Even though the 
leadership of Memoria Activa had called these meetings to discuss the future of the group, 
some members saw obvious signs that the leadership had already made its decision and 
the meetings offered an explanation as to why and a forum for people to express their 
opinions—with little actual dialogue.  In a small way, the meetings also provided a measure 
of gratitude for those who have participated in the actos for so many years.  These meetings 
showcased some of the clear cleavages within the group, and also highlighted the relatively 
powerless position of many long-time members.  As I was walking toward home with Karen, 
a fellow anthropologist, after the first meeting, a couple of the Memoria Activa members I 
spoke with regularly stopped us in the street.  Visibly upset, they wanted our opinion of the 
meeting and conduct of the leadership.  They clearly felt sideswiped, but perhaps even more 
upsetting for them, they felt that the leadership of Memoria Activa had decided to give up the 
struggle.  As I previously mentioned, for many in the group, the plaza is Memoria Activa and 
its fight.   
The disempowerment experienced by many and the divisions within the group were 
plainly articulated one Monday in December (one of the last before Memoria Activa would 
officially leave the plaza).  One member, who for many years was responsible for bringing 
and displaying the “We are all Memoria Activa” banner, abruptly stopped bringing the 
banner the Monday after the first meeting was held.  It was a conspicuous absence, and 
afterwards over coffee I asked him where the banner was.  He responded aggressively by 
pounding the table and saying that “it was clear that we are NOT all Memoria Activa.”  His 
eyes were hazy with tears.   
The differences within Memoria Activa are to some extent a reflection of class 
distinctions, as well as whether one was a family member of a victim.  The leadership and 
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 principal political authors of the group are mainly middle-upper middle class, cosmopolitan, 
and well-educated.  Others came from other sectors of Argentine and Jewish life, one that 
was of considerably humbler economic and social origins.  The voice of these individuals 
was often superceded by more “savvy” and mainstream discourse about politics, rights, and 
citizenship.  While recognizing the importance of the work Memoria Activa was doing in the 
OAS and other formal political actions, for individuals who are not a family member of a 
victim, and perhaps lack the knowledges thought to be needed to navigate international and 
formal political spaces, these arenas were effectively closed for participation.  
Given the purpose many saw in continuing in the plaza, this space was not given up 
entirely by all members of Memoria Activa.  If some in Memoria Activa still wanted to go to 
the plaza on Mondays, they should.  And they did.  Immediately after Memoria Activa 
formally vacated the plaza there was a lot of activity around “re-taking” the plaza.  There was 
talk of getting Laura Ginsberg from APEMIA to come back, or maybe the prominent leftist 
journalist Herman S.—a long-time gadfly to the leadership of the Jewish community—would 
seize the reigns (he came once but never returned).  But nothing formal happened.  
Nevertheless, for years afterward, ten to fifteen individuals would gather around the 
monument to Memoria Activa, using the metal structure as an anchor for their cause (this is 
a slightly different spot than previously).  They called themselves the “base” of Memoria 
Activa.  The few gatherings that I attended when I returned to Buenos Aires in the summer 
of 2005 were subdued, and continued with some of the traditions from before, including the 
measure of time passed, the blowing of the shofar, the mentioning of the victims and the 
struggle against impunity.  Afterwards, separate groups proceed to their confitería of choice.  
As of May 2009, a small group of individuals still continue to gather at the Plaza on Monday 
mornings.  
*** 
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  Even if the public presence of what was Memoria Activa dwindles to memory, for 
years to come residents of Buenos Aires, particularly those that followed the AMIA case with 
interest, or who walked over the stones of Plaza Lavalle nearly every Monday morning in the 
years Memoria Activa stood in front of the Tribunales, the place near the tall palm tree will 
still suggest activity.  Memoria Activa, in their struggle against impunity and for a vision of 
the nation that upholds the rights of citizens ranging from the courts of justice to the city 
plazas, have contributed to the making of a public sphere in which impunidad and 
indifference is not tolerated.  While their political goals may not be radical compared to other 
political actors, it is significant that they have mobilized in the street from a position of 
Jewishness—however widely or loosely defined—something that in Argentina, at least, has 
not happened very often.  I see in their activism a rejection of the terms of identity as it is 
often framed: to be either Jewish or Argentine, or be Argentine in public or Jewish in private.  
In the plaza Memoria Activa performed both Jewishness and Argentineness, public 
reclamation and the private pain of loss.  
But they did more than rearticulate public possibilities for Jewishness.  In struggling 
against the impunidad they see encircling many cases of violence in Argentina, they have 
also helped to instigate a process of change in civil society and the state.  Like many 
movements that target or call out impunity, they have mobilized an alternate vision of politics 
and society, one in which the oft-used expression Nunca Más (Never Again) ceases to be 
empty words.  They and the other actors that have worked to ensure the bombing of the 
AMIA does not became bracketed as a concern only for “others,” have reinvigorated an 
ethic of collective responsibility and accountability already discursively present in Argentina.  
But perhaps, with the scream of the shofar coursing through the streets, they have done so 
in a way that enlarges this call for social responsibility to include citizens who don’t easily fit 
into the “us.” 
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 At a broad level, this work contributes to the understanding of how non- 
governmental actors and the state negotiate the practices of citizenship, human rights, and 
justice, and adds to knowledge about difference and identity in Argentina. However, there is 
much in these many pages that I have reserved for future further inquiry.  For example, 
greater attention to how practices and knowledges concerning difference have historically 
developed in Argentina would help to expand the question of Jewishness in Argentina to 
consider other marginalized groups, ethnicities, sexualities as they negotiate the nation.  
More consideration of how Jewishness is constructed through the processes and 
negotiations of everyday life could lend greater richness and understanding to the ways in 
which Argentineness and Jewishness are mutually constitutive, particularly in a dense, 
cosmopolitan city like Buenos Aires.  Looking more closely at how the figure of “the Jew” 
has functioned socially and politically in Argentina in comparison to other nation-states 
would deepen an understanding of what is specific to Argentina with respect to Jewishness.  
Situating the AMIA bombing more securely in some of the larger social and political matters 
occupying the nation’s attention in the period that this work engages—the economic 
collapse, a concern with “security,” the faltering middle class, will contribute to a deeper 
analysis of the public sphere in which the bombing occurred, and the one it helped to create.  
Finally, asking what the functions of witness and witnessing are in relation to the AMIA 
bombing, remembering, and identity could open up new possibilities for the ethical 
dimensions of political practice and citizenship, and understandings of responsibility. 
It has been fifteen years since the black marble façade of the AMIA building, with all 
its activity inside, was blown up.  For many of those most directly affected by the violence, it 
has been another year of active remembrance and demanding to see the perpetrators 
brought to justice.  For others, in addition to remembrance this fifteenth year marks another 
cycle of questioning posed to the government and society.  Will this act remain unpunished?  
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Who will take responsibility for these deaths?  What other deaths and injustices remain in a 
similar state, and which acts not yet committed will bear the mark of impunity?   
Here at the end I find myself circling, erratically, the idea of witnessing.  Reflecting on 
one understanding of the practice of witnessing—not just to see, but to somehow be 
transformed by, to be claimed by something and thus somehow beholden to it—I ask myself 
what kind of witness I have been, and the relation of this work to this responsibility.  The 
answer comes in and out of focus, hazy with the dust and the debris of the years and events 
that have come since my body directly engaged with the people and occurrences described 
in these pages.  And yet, I do not forget, I have not ceased to be transformed and troubled 
by what I have learned, despite the distances of time, geography, and the alchemy of 
turning memories, relationships, and yes, information, into a dissertation.  
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